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SUMMARY 
An extraordinary and extremely sophisticated capability of human beings is 
that of performing motor actions in a goal-directed manner. Consider, for example, 
skilled golfers proficiently performing golf putts under various constraints such as 
putts from various distances, putts on different greens, or putts comprising diverse 
breaks. How did they arrive at performing in such a sophisticated, adaptive and yet 
stable, manner? 
The two most common means to learn a motor action are through physical and 
mental practice. Both types of practice have shown to lead to performance 
improvements, and in this sense, to promote motor learning. However, motor learning 
as induced by mental and physical practice has rarely been approached with a specific 
focus on the perceptual-cognitive, representational level of action organization. To 
date, research has yet to systematically investigate the influence that mental and 
physical practice have on the motor action system in terms of the development of 
mental representation of complex action. The present work seeks to bridge this 
particular research gap. Specifically, motor learning and the influence of two types of 
practice, mental practice (i.e., covert practice) and physical practice (i.e., overt 
practice), are approached from a perceptual-cognitive, architecture based point of view. 
As such, the present work provides insights into the perceptual-cognitive adaptations 
that occur within the motor action system during early skill acquisition. 
In short, the theoretical contributions of the present work entail elaborations on 
the distinct influence of mental and physical practice on the motor action system, and 
the level of mental representation in particular, drawing back on the cognitive action 
architecture approach. From an empirical standpoint, three learning studies are 
described that shed further light on motor learning and mental practice from a 
perceptual-cognitive, representation-based point of view. 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives and empirical 
evidence relating to motor learning and mental practice, with a particular focus on 
perceptual-cognitive approaches and the functional role of mental representation. 
Accordingly, the cognitive action architecture approach is described and the potential 
influence of mental and physical practice within the levels of action organization is 
sketched, followed by an outline of the purpose of the present work. 
Chapter 2 explores the development of one’s mental representation of a 
complex action during motor learning. In the study presented, the question was 
examined whether the mental representation structure of a complex action changes 
over the course of practice, and whether this change reflects a development toward a 
more elaborate and functional structure, such as that of an expert. Together with 
improvements in putting performance, mental representations of the putt were found to 
change with practice, developing toward more functional ones. Specifically, mental 
representation structures of the practice group became more similar to a golf expert 
structure over the course of practice, reflecting distinct phases of the putting movement 
(i.e., preparation, forward swing, and impact). Instead, mental representation structures 
of the (no practice) control group did not change and remained dissimilar in 
comparison to an expert structure. Thus, this study shows that, along with 
improvements in (overt) performance, the (covert) mental representation of a complex 
action develops as a result of practice. 
Chapter 3 provides further insights into the development of one’s mental 
representation of a complex action according to type of practice, with a particular 
emphasis on mental practice. Accordingly, the question was investigated whether 
mental representation structure of a complex action changes as a result of both mental 
and physical practice as well as a combination of both, and whether the changes reflect 
a development toward a more elaborate and functional structure. In line with findings 
from study one, mental representations of the putt developed over the course of 
practice. Interestingly, mental practice, either solely or in combination with physical 
practice, led to even more elaborate representations compared to physical practice 
alone. Specifically, mental representation structures of the groups practicing mentally 
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became more similar to a functional structure, thereby reflecting well the functional 
phases of the putting movement, whereas those of the physical practice group revealed 
less development toward a functional structure. Furthermore, putting performance 
improved over the course of practice, reflecting the well-known pattern of magnitude 
of improvement according to type of practice. Specifically, combined mental and 
physical practice was most effective, followed by physical practice, mental practice 
and no practice (i.e., combined practice > physical practice > mental practice > no 
practice). Statistically, the combined practice group proved more effective than mental 
practice only and no practice with respect to performance. Hence, findings from the 
first study were replicated such that, along with improvements in performance, mental 
representation of a complex action develops as a result of practice. More importantly, 
however, according to the results of the second study, mental practice added to the 
development leading to even more elaborate representations. Notably, these (covert) 
changes do not seem to transfer one-to-one to the (overt) motor output. 
Chapter 4 further explores the perceptual-cognitive background of 
performance changes that occur within the motor action system as a result of mental 
and physical practice, thereby providing insights into both mental representations and 
gaze behavior during complex action. Accordingly, the question was investigated 
whether mental representation structure of the putt and gaze behavior during putting 
changes with both physical and combined mental and physical practice, and whether 
the changes reflect a functional development. Similar to findings of study two, 
combined mental and physical practice led to more developed representation structures 
of the putt compared to physical practice alone. As an extension, combined practice as 
well led to more elaborate gaze behavior prior to execution of the putt. Specifically, 
final fixations prior to the onset of the putting movement were longer after practice for 
the group practicing mentally in addition to physical practice in comparison to the 
control group. This was not the case for the group practicing physically only. Instead, 
putting performance improved similarly in both practice groups over the course of 
practice. Thus, the results of study three once more indicate that it is the mental 
component of the practice that leads to more developed representation structures and 
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more functional gaze behavior. However, similar to study two, these (covert) changes 
do not become evident on (overt) motor output. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings of the three learning studies and 
discusses them with recourse to the cognitive action architecture approach to motor 
learning and mental practice. In particular, based on the findings of the present work, 
the differential influence of mental and physical practice on action organization within 
the motor action system is discussed, followed by an outline of both limitations and 
prospects for future research. Altogether, this body of work clearly demonstrates that 
motor learning by mental and physical practice is associated with perceptual-cognitive 
adaptations within the motor action system and with functional changes in mental 
representation structures of complex action in particular, and it furthermore indicates 
that mental and physical practice differ in their influence on the different levels of 
action organization. 
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1.1 Motor learning 
1.1.1 Intelligent systems and motor learning 
To be able to perform goal-directed actions is an extraordinary and extremely 
sophisticated capability of human beings. Imagine, for instance, expert golfers 
skillfully performing golf putts under various constraints: putts from long as well as 
short distances, putts on slower and on faster greens, or putts comprising larger and 
smaller breaks. How did they learn to perform in such a sophisticated, adaptive and yet 
stable manner? What kinds of overt and covert changes occurred that allowed for this 
extraordinary capability to perform such complex tasks? More general, how does the 
human motor action system learn to adequately solve a motor task in any given 
situation? The human body is comprised of the brain, bones, joints, ligaments, tendons, 
muscles, and other components. These components, when working together in an 
appropriate fashion, allow for movement (e.g., a putt in golf), and thus, for the 
attainment of an intended goal (e.g., sinking the ball into the hole). But, how do these 
components – the brain, bones, joints, muscles – become an entity that allows for goal-
directed, well-coordinated movement? 
Intelligent systems in general and intelligent action in particular are 
fundamental issues in cognitive science (e.g., Abrahamsen & Bechtel, 2012; Pfeifer & 
Bongard, 2007). To understand how intelligent systems learn to adequately act in a 
given environment with respect to a particular task, thereby permanently adapting, is of 
particular relevance to cognitive science disciplines such as psychology, biology, and 
computer science, to name just a few (e.g., Engel, Maye, Kurthen, & König, 2013; 
Pacherie, 2012; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, & Flanagan, 2011). In general, the potential to 
perform a motor action reflects the capability of an individual to attain an intended 
effect by way of a given behavior in a given situation (i.e., person-environment-task 
constellation; e.g., Nitsch, 2004, 2009; Seiler, 2000). This capability changes and 
develops with practice and experience, transitioning from an unskilled into a skilled 
motor action (e.g., Magill, 2011; Meinel & Schnabel, 2007; Schmidt & Lee, 2011; 
Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2008). That is, when being performed repeatedly, the planning 
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and the execution of motor actions are being refined within a particular person-
environment-task constellation, which in turn results in a refined interplay of the 
agent’s perception, cognition, and action in a given situation. Accordingly, the 
objective of motor learning is the development and the adaptation of the human motor 
action system. 
To this extent, learning is vital for any action system to become intelligent, as 
it allows action systems to both refine and widen their action repertoire and thus to 
interact with the environment in a more and more ingenious and adaptive fashion. 
Interestingly, despite growing research interest, advancing our understanding of 
intelligent systems’ actions remains a significant endeavor to this day, especially in 
view of prospective applications in various settings such as robotics, psychology, 
sports, and rehabilitation. For instance, the implementation of artificial intelligence and 
the development of intelligent interactive technical platforms such as robots, which are 
to assist humans while navigating smoothly within a given environment, require a 
thorough understanding of natural, intelligent forms of action and their acquisition, 
respectively (e.g., De Klein, Kachergis, & Hommel, 2014; Di Nuovo, Marocco, Di 
Nuovo, & Cangelosi, 2013; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007; Schack & Ritter, 2009, 2013). 
1.1.2 Theoretical perspectives on motor learning 
To learn how to solve a motor problem, that is how to perform well-
coordinated motor action such that it serves to attain intended effects within a given 
environment, is a major issue of human life. According to Bernstein (1947, 1967), 
motor control and learning are centered around finding suitable solutions to a particular 
motor problem. In this sense, the process of learning a motor action reflects more and 
more elaborate problem solving. In general, researchers agree upon the changing 
nature of the learning process from unskilled to skilled action (e.g., Anderson, 1982, 
1995; Fitts, 1964; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Gentile, 1972; Meinel & Schnabel, 1987): 
during early motor learning, the agent must solve an entirely unfamiliar motor task, 
attempting to find an appropriate solution for a specific motor problem (e.g., cognitive 
stage: Fitts & Posner, 1967; Entwicklung der Grobkoordination: Meinel & Schnabel, 
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1987), whereas, during later learning, the motor action that serves to solve the motor 
problem at hand is being refined based on prior experience (e.g., associative stage and 
autonomous stage: Fitts & Posner, 1967; Entwicklung und Stabilisierung der 
Feinkoordination: Meinel & Schnabel, 1987). 
The issue of motor learning has a long-standing tradition (e.g., Adams, 1987; 
Summers, 2004), during which researchers in the field have been trying to find suitable 
answers to the basic question regarding the underlying mechanisms of motor control 
and learning. Although a number of theories on motor learning exist to date, the 
specific mechanisms of learning a motor action are still a matter of debate (for an 
overview, see e.g., Hodges & Williams, 2012; Magill, 2011; Schmidt & Lee, 2011). In 
general, two main approaches to the basic mechanisms of motor learning can be 
distinguished: central (i.e., cognitive) and peripheral (i.e., ecological) approaches, also 
known as the motor approach and the action approach to motor control and learning 
(e.g., Meijer & Roth, 1991). In addition to these two camps reflecting two distinct 
positions, perceptual-cognitive approaches as an integrative perspective on motor 
learning are introduced in the following. 
1.1.2.1 Central perspective on motor learning 
A fundamental assumption of central or cognitive approaches to motor 
learning is the idea that movements are internally represented (e.g., motor program: 
Keele, 1968; schema: Schmidt, 1975; for an overview, see e.g., Ivry, 1994; Wiemeyer, 
1994a, 1994b)1
                                                     
1 The concept of memory is not introduced explicitly in the following, as it does not 
directly add to the purpose of the work at hand; for more details on declarative/ procedural 
memory, see chapter 2.1 as well as e.g., Anderson, 1982; Johnson, 2012; for more details on 
memory in general, see e.g., Tulving & Craik, 2000) 
. Specifically, information is being processed and stored in some 
representational format as a result of movement execution, and in turn influences 
subsequent movement execution. While skilled motor action is thought to rely on well-
developed representations (or motor programs or schemas, respectively), motor 
learning, according to central approaches, is a consequence of the permanent 
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refinement of representations, resulting in more appropriate representations and 
guiding movement execution in an increasingly reliable manner. 
To illustrate, a seminal prescriptive account of motor learning, emerging from 
the traditional information processing perspective, is the schema theory of discrete 
motor learning (Schmidt, 1975). Originating from the general idea of schemas 
(Bartlett, 1932; Head, 1926), schemas of motor action can be understood as abstract 
rules or generalizations that are stored in memory and guide motor actions (Schmidt, 
1975). Continuing the idea of two independent memory states (i.e., perceptual and 
memory trace; Adams, 1971), Schmidt (1975) suggested a recall schema and a 
recognition schema that guide motor actions. While the recall schema is concerned 
with movement production, and especially with the selection of parameter values for a 
particular action, the recognition schema is concerned with movement evaluation, and 
especially with the estimation of sensory consequences that arise from the action that 
has been executed. In other words, the recognition schema holds relational information 
about the motor output and corresponding sensory consequences, whereas the recall 
schema holds relational information about selected parameters and the corresponding 
motor output (e.g., McCracken & Stelmach, 1977; Newell & Shapiro, 1976). 
Furthermore, the concept of generalized motor programs (GMP) is essential to 
Schmidt’s theory. According to Schmidt (1975), a given GMP holds information of a 
particular class of motor actions and as such allows for the common representation of a 
class of variations of a motor action (i.e., one-to-many relation as opposed to one-to-
one relation; e.g., Adams, 1971). This class of motor actions has in common invariant 
features (e.g., relative force and relative timing), while set parameters (e.g., absolute 
force and absolute time) serve as means to scale a specific motor action (for a review, 
see e.g., Schmidt, 1985). Motor learning is thus associated with the evolution of 
abstract rules and thus schema formation, meaning that practice leads to better 
developed schemas which, in turn, allow for more stable performance of a motor 
action. Specifically, motor learning in the light of schema theory is associated with 
refinement of both the recall and the recognition schema, and thus with more elaborate 
movement production and evaluation. One major critique of this motor learning theory 
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is that the mere process of schema formation is not well developed and it remains 
unclear how schemas evolve (e.g., Newell, 1991). Although some major limitations of 
the schema theory such as schema formation have become apparent over time (e.g., 
Newell, 2003; Schmidt, 2003; Shea & Wulf, 2005; Sherwood & Lee, 2003), this theory 
still prevails among cognitive accounts of motor control and learning. 
In sum, central approaches to motor learning provide cognitive, memory-based 
explanations, assuming some form of representation that changes over the course of 
learning (e.g., Adams, 1971; Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Schmidt, 1975). 
Instead of focusing on the peripheral relation between the person and the environment 
in explaining motor learning (for details on peripheral approaches, see next chapter), 
cognitive approaches focus on the representation that is stored centrally and which 
changes over the course of learning. 
1.1.2.2 Peripheral perspective on motor learning 
Peripheral or ecological approaches represent a more recent view on motor 
learning, thereby challenging the traditional cognitive view. From a peripheral point of 
view, motor control and learning are approached by focusing on the reciprocal relation 
between the person and the environment. Originating from the theory of direct 
perception (Gibson, 1977, 1979), ecological approaches assume a direct relationship 
between perception and action (i.e., perception-action coupling), thereby dissociating 
from representational accounts (e.g., Michaels & Beek, 1995). Motor action, in this 
sense, resides in the direct relation of the person and the environment (e.g., Turvey, 
1991; Turvey & Kugler, 1984). Central to this approach are both invariants and 
affordances. Invariants are higher-order characteristics that are permanently available 
despite any transformations related to the person and the environment in a given 
situation (e.g., for golf putting: the green, the hole, the putter). Affordances reflect the 
opportunities for a particular action, as perceived by a person in a given environment, 
and as such guide motor action. Affordances can be objective (e.g., for golf putting: the 
surface of the green invites to putt) or subjective (e.g., for golf putting: the putt and its 
success depend on the person’s capability to identify the optimal target line; e.g., 
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Davids, Button, & Bennett, 2008). The characteristics of the person in her/ his 
particular environment and the perceived affordances (i.e., possibilities to act) therein 
result in the realization of a particular affordance (i.e., motor action). In turn, during 
the realization, thus while acting, the person perceives her-/ himself in her/ his 
environment accordingly. From this performer-environment relationship perspective, 
the interaction of the performer and the environment becomes more elaborate with 
practice such that the performer becomes better able to attune to higher order 
invariants. Accordingly, practice results in the setting up of direct perception-action 
relations. Thus, motor learning reflects the growth and the refinement of the 
perception-action coupling that guides the realization of affordances (i.e., motor 
action). In other words, motor learning is considered as the establishment of laws for 
an elaborate coupling of perception and action (Newell, 1991; Schmidt & Fitzpatrick, 
1996). 
Related to this view is the dynamical systems approach to motor action (e.g., 
Davids et al., 2008; Glazier, Davids, & Bartlett, 2003; Kelso, 1981, 1995; Walter, Lee, 
Sternad, 1998). Originating from the areas of mathematics and physics, the approach 
aims at identifying formal descriptions (i.e., rules) which can describe behavior of 
complex dynamical systems in space and time. The basic idea is that, based on 
dynamics of the system and its sub-systems, self-organization leads to order. 
According to this approach, motor action emerges from the interaction of and the 
coordination between various sub-systems of the human motor action system (e.g., the 
perceptual system and the skeletomuscular system). This emergence of motor action is 
seen as a result of self-organizing processes. Of particular importance to this approach 
are attractors. Attractors are tendencies to coordinate the various components of the 
system in order to achieve stable coordination patterns (for types of attractors, see e.g., 
Beek, Schmidt, Morris, Sim, & Turvey, 1995). In other words, when being in an 
attractor state, order appears (i.e., dynamic stability: Kelso, 1981; stability-variability 
paradox: Handford, Davids, Bennett, & Button, 1997). By way of self-organization, 
attractor states emerge and disappear, depending on changes of the person and the 
environment. These changes, and as such the re-establishment of order, are dependent 
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on factors limiting the interaction of the individual in her/ his environment regarding a 
particular task (i.e., constraints). According to Newell (1986), there are three main 
classes of constraints: organismic (e.g., in the case of golf putting: height of the golfer), 
environmental (e.g., the quality of the green), and task constraints (e.g., the size of the 
hole), that influence both stability and variability, and as such guide the emergence of 
motor action. Motor learning, according to dynamical systems theory, is reflected by 
the changes in and the acquisition of dynamics, resulting from elaborating the 
perceptual-motor workspace, and leading to improved self-organization and thus 
refined coordination patterns (e.g., Davids, Renshaw, Pinder, Adaújo, &Vilar, 2012; 
Mitra, Amazeen, & Turvey, 1998; Newell, Mayer-Kress, & Liu, 2001). 
Any prescriptive account, such as a centrally stored representation of the motor 
action in memory, is not discussed, neither in ecological nor in dynamical systems 
approaches to motor learning. Rather, the performer-environment relationship is 
considered the most appropriate level of analysis in order to approach motor learning 
(e.g., Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999). 
1.1.2.3 Perceptual-cognitive perspective on motor learning 
More recently, perceptual-cognitive approaches have received growing 
research interest in the area of motor control and learning (e.g., theory of anticipative 
behavioral control: Hoffmann, 1993; theory of event coding: Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; simulation theory: Jeannerod, 2001). Dating back to the 
original idea of a bidirectional link between an action and its effects (i.e., ideomotor 
theory: Herbart, 1825; James, 1890; for an overview, see Koch, Keller, & Prinz, 2004; 
Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010), perceptual-cognitive approaches emphasize the role 
that the effects of an action have during the selection, planning, and execution of an 
action. The basic idea of perceptual-cognitive approaches is that motor actions are 
guided by way of representations holding information about the perceptual effects of 
motor actions. In this sense, actions are primarily guided by cognitively represented 
effects. Specifically, motor actions serve the individual to cause changes within the 
environment (i.e., perceptual effects), and these perceptual effects, in turn, serve as an 
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essential control variable to guide future motor action. Thus, perceptual-cognitive 
approaches to motor action assume a close functional relationship between motor 
action and the corresponding, cognitively represented perceptual effects (e.g., 
Mechsner, 2004; Nattkemper & Ziessler, 2004). While skilled action is thought to rely 
on well-developed effect representations, motor learning is a result of the constitution 
and the development of effect representations. As a motor action is executed, the 
effects thereof are being perceived by the person, and this information is stored in 
terms of effect representations. Future motor action, in turn, is then guided and 
controlled by way of these effect representations. Accordingly, practice leads to more 
detailed effect representations, which more efficiently guide and control our actions. 
Thus, while peripheral or ecological approaches de-emphasize the role of the 
person in favor of the environment and central or cognitive approaches underestimate 
the role the environment plays in motor action, perceptual-cognitive approaches 
acknowledge a major role in motor action to cognition, and, at the same time, put 
emphasis on the environment in terms of the effects the person causes therein. In this 
sense, perceptual-cognitive approaches focus both on the bidirectional link between the 
person and the environment (i.e., ecological component) and on the centrally 
represented information (i.e., cognitive component) that guides perception and action 
and their development during motor learning. One such perceptual-cognitive approach, 
arising in the tradition of Bernstein (1947, 1971, 1996), and being situated at the 
interface of cognitive psychology and movement science, is the cognitive action 
architecture approach (CAA-A; Schack, 2002, 2010). As the CAA-A is central to the 
objective of the present work, the essential tenants of this approach are going to be 
introduced and elaborated upon in more detail in chapter 1.4. 
1.2 Mental practice and motor learning 
1.2.1 Mental practice and its influence on the motor action system 
Among the various types of practice which have been suggested to affect 
motor performance and to promote learning, physical and mental practice have 
received the greatest attention, both in basic and applied research, as well as in sports. 
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While physical practice is concerned with the overt rehearsal of a motor action (i.e., the 
planning, the execution, and the evaluation of a motor action), and thus with the actual 
experience, mental practice represents the covert rehearsal of a motor action, and thus 
the imagined experience with the motor task at hand.  
The ability to practice mentally, that is to “perform” an action repeatedly in 
one’s mind, is a powerful means of human beings, and the potential of mental practice 
to influence the performance and the learning of a motor action has been both 
fascinating and puzzling to researchers in the field. Mental practice in the sense of 
motor imagery training (as opposed to other forms of mental practice such as self-talk, 
for instance; for classification, see e.g., Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994; Morris, 
Spittle, & Watt, 2005) can be understood as the covert rehearsal of a motor action by 
way of motor imagery, whereas actual or physical practice implies overtly rehearsing a 
motor action: 
“Imagery, in the context of sport, may be considered as the creation or re-
creation of an experience generated from memorial information, involving 
quasi-sensorial, quasi-perceptual, and quasi-affective characteristics, that is 
under the volitional control of the imager, and which may occur in the 
absence of the real stimulus antecedents normally associated with the actual 
experience.” (Morris et al., 2005, p. 19) 
Thus, in contrast to perception, imagery relates to the creation or re-creation of 
a real-world experience, with this process taking place in the absence of the actual 
sensory stimulus (e.g., Annett, 1995a; Farah, 1984; Morris et al., 2005). To explain, 
one can “see” an image, “hear” a sound or “feel” a touch in one’s mind, although the 
actual image, sound, or touch is not present at that time. Analogous to imagery in 
general, motor imagery denotes imagining oneself performing a particular motor action 
without actually executing it at the same time (e.g., Jeannerod, 1994, 1997; Jeannerod 
& Decety, 1995; for a discussion on its conceptualization, see Morris et al., 2005), and 
the repeated use of motor imagery results in what is called mental practice (i.e., motor 
imagery training). 
While physical practice has been acknowledged to be the most effective means 
to induce motor learning, mental practice and its effect on motor performance has been 
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debated extensively. So far, both physical and mental practice are considered to be 
effective to some extent in improving performance, and, more importantly, in 
promoting the learning of a motor action (e.g., Corbin, 1967a, 1967b; for reviews and 
meta-analyses, see Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz & Landers, 1983; Feltz, Landers, & 
Becker, 1988; Grouios, 1992; Hinshaw, 1991; Richardson, 1967a, 1967b). Meta-
analyses on the effectiveness of mental practice have investigated the magnitude of 
effect that mental practice in comparison to physical practice has on the performance 
of a motor action (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz & Landers, 1983; Feltz et al., 1988). 
For instance, Driskell et al. (1994) conducted a meta-analysis on the effects of mental 
practice in comparison to irrelevant practice and physical practice. The authors 
reported small to moderate effect sizes from their analysis of 35 studies, with an 
overall average effect size of d = .53 for mental practice. In contrast, moderate to 
strong effect sizes were reported for physical practice, with an average of d = .78. 
From their meta-analysis, the authors concluded that mental practice is not as effective 
as physical practice, but that it can have a positive effect on performance. Furthermore, 
combined mental and physical practice has been suggested to be as effective as 
physical practice or even superior to physical practice only (e.g., McBride & Rothstein, 
1979). In general, mental practice is considered a potentially effective means to 
improve performance and to promote learning. Thereby, the main factors influencing 
the effectiveness of mental practice are imagery ability (e.g., Goss, Hall, Buckolz, & 
Fishburne, 1986; Guillot & Collet, 2005; for a review, see McAvinue & Robertson, 
2009), imagery perspective (e.g., Epstein, 1980; White & Hardy, 1995; for a review, 
see Morris & Spittle, 2012), imagery modality (e.g., Féry, 2003; for an overview, see 
Lacey & Lawson, 2013), type of task (e.g., McBride & Rothstein, 1979; Ryan & 
Simons, 1983; for a meta-analysis, see Driskell et al., 1994), and level of expertise 
(e.g., Corbin, 1967b; for a meta-analysis, see Driskell et al., 1994; for an overview on 
factors that influence the effect of mental practice, see Morris et al., 2005; Schuster et 
al., 2011). 
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1.2.2 Theoretical perspectives on mental practice 
In attempting to answer the question why mental practice influences the motor 
action system and what the underlying mechanisms are, researchers have provided a 
variety of possible explanations, of which the psychoneuromuscular theory (Jacobson, 
1931), the symbolic learning theory (Sackett, 1934), and the simulation theory 
(Jeannerod, 1995, 2001) have been the most prominent ones (for an overview, see e.g., 
Heuer, 1985; Morris et al., 2005; Murphy, 1990; Murphy, Nordin, & Cumming, 2008; 
Schack, 2006). In the following, both traditional as well as recent approaches are 
presented, thereby maintaining the distinction between central, peripheral, and 
perceptual-cognitive perspectives as has been introduced previously for motor learning 
(see chapter 1.1). Whereas peripheral hypotheses spotlight peripheral processes during 
motor imagery (e.g., within the person such as muscular activity or between person and 
environment such as affordances, see chapter 1.2.2.2), central hypotheses emphasize 
the central processes during motor imagery (e.g., neural correlates and symbolic 
representations within the person, see chapter 1.2.2.1). 
1.2.2.1 Central perspective on mental practice 
Central hypotheses of mental practice have in common the assumption of some 
form of representation. Information processed during motor imagery is thought to be 
stored in a representational format (for details on the imagery debate, see e.g., Kosslyn, 
Thompson, & Ganis, 2010; Pylyshyn, 2003), and accessed and retrieved again while 
imagining. This imagery process incorporates the generation of an image by way of the 
retrieval from long-term memory as well as the maintenance and transformation of an 
image in working memory (for more details on the specific processes, see Farah, 1984; 
Munzert, 2001; Munzert & Zentgraf, 2009). 
One of the early, centrally focused explanations for mental practice was the 
cognitive hypothesis emerging from the field of cognitive psychology (cf. symbolic 
learning theory; Sackett, 1934). According to this hypothesis, the sequence of a 
movement is coded by way of symbols, and thus imagery helps to code a movement 
sequence symbolically. Specifically, the repeated imagining of a movement sequence 
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is suggested to aid the encoding of the symbolic components of the sequences (e.g., the 
sequence of sub-movements of the golf putt). Thus, mental practice is suggested to 
improve motor performance through the repetition of symbolic components of the 
movement sequence during imagery, thereby resulting in a better symbolic 
representation that, in turn, facilitates subsequent motor performance. The symbolic 
learning theory has clearly proven valuable as it stimulated groundwork research on 
the cognitive-motor hypothesis (for more details, see chapter 3.4). Nowadays, 
however, the cognitive hypothesis is regarded insufficient, as it cannot explain the 
effects of mental practice on tasks with little cognitive demands such as strength tasks 
(e.g., Yue & Cole, 1992; Reiser, Büsch, & Munzert, 2011). 
To account for this, the programming hypothesis, tracing back to Schmidt’s 
schema theory (Schmidt, 1975), has been proposed more recently (Heuer, 1985). This 
hypothesis suggests that the central processes (i.e., the motor programming) associated 
with the peripheral concomitants of motor imagery (i.e., the neuromuscular activation) 
are responsible for the mental practice effects. Mental practice is effective because it 
induces internal feedback which, in turn, causes corrections of the motor programming. 
Specifically, the efferent commands for muscle activation are specified during motor 
imagery similar to motor execution, but do not take full effect in terms of actual 
muscle activation and resulting movement. In this sense, internal knowledge of result 
is available during motor imagery and allows for corrections of the motor program. 
This internal feedback serves to refine the motor program and to improve the 
programming of the motor action. In sum, mental practice according to the 
programming hypothesis serves to activate and to refine a motor program by way of 
internal feedback. Evidence in favor of the basic assumptions of this hypothesis comes 
mainly from the neuroscientific perspective on mental practice (for a review, see e.g., 
Guillot & Collet, 2010). 
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1.2.2.2 Peripheral perspective on mental practice 
A direct opponent of the early cognitive hypothesis was the ideomotor 
hypothesis2
More recently, mental practice has been approached from an ecological 
perspective, proposing the ecological hypothesis as a possible explanation (cf. action-
based imagery; Boschker, 2001; Boschker, Bakker, & Michaels, 2002). This 
 (cf. the psychoneuromuscular theory; Jacobson, 1931), stemming from the 
field of psychophysiology. Originating from what is known as the carpenter effect 
(Carpenter, 1894), the psychoneuromuscular theory focuses on the activation of 
muscles, and thus more peripheral processes, during imagery. Specifically, the 
psychoneuromuscular theory states that muscular activity occurs in body parts 
involved (e.g., flexors of the upper arm) in the movement that is being imagined (e.g., 
bending the arm). Although being not as strong as during the execution of a movement, 
the muscular activity is suggested to be identical in its activation pattern during covert 
imagery to that during overt execution, thereby leading to neuromuscular feedback. 
Accordingly, mental practice is suggested to improve motor performance in the way 
that a similar pattern of muscles like the one during movement execution is activated 
during imagery. This is thought to allow for adjustments within the motor action 
system via neuromuscular feedback, leading to changes in subsequent movement 
execution, and thus resulting in motor learning. However, as neuromuscular feedback 
during the execution and the imagery of a motor action differs severely, and since 
mental practice effects have been found in studies controlling for and preventing 
muscular activity during imagery (e.g., Lutz, 2003; Yue & Cole, 1992), the ideomotor 
hypothesis does not hold as an explanation (e.g., Heuer, 1985; Mulder, deVries, & 
Zijlstra, 2005; Munzert, Reiser, & Zentgraf, 2014). While this hypothesis has taken a 
backseat in recent years as an explanation for mental practice, the role of muscle 
activation during imagery is still highly debated (e.g., Guillot, Di Rienzo, MacIntyre, 
Moran, & Collet, 2012; Lutz, 2003; for an overview, see Guillot, Lebon, & Collet, 
2010). 
                                                     
2 The term ideomotor hypothesis has been introduced by Heuer (1985), and must not be 
confused with the ideomotor theory (James, 1890) and the perceptual-cognitive perspective on mental 
practice (for details, see next chapter) 
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hypothesis is rooted in the theory of direct perception, and the basic idea of a 
reciprocal relation between the person and the environment (Gibson, 1977, 1979), and 
thus focuses on the person-environment relation in general, and the affordances an 
environment offers in particular. Specifically, the possibilities to act offered by the 
environment and the subsequent realization of a possibility during motor action are 
being imagined during motor imagery. That is, motor imagery is concerned with 
imagining affordances and their realization. Accordingly, mental practice is thought to 
induce motor learning by way of mentally rehearsing the relation between affordances 
and their realization, leading to changes within the motor action system, and thus 
motor learning. Importantly, according to the ecological hypothesis, so-called action-
evoked information (i.e., perceptual effects) is lacking during the imagination of a 
motor action, and as such reflects the main difference between mental and physical 
practice (Boschker et al., 2002). This hypothesis delivers a new and interesting 
perspective within the theoretical debate of basic mechanisms that underlie mental 
practice. Importantly, however, although the focus on affordances and their realization 
widens the view on mental practice and its effects, it remains unclear from this 
hypothesis how the creation of an image shall take place without considering a 
memory that stores the information and, accordingly, a representation that allows for 
the re-creation of an image. 
1.2.2.3 Perceptual-cognitive perspective on mental practice 
Arising from the neuroscientific perspective on motor imagery and mental 
practice, and originating from the principle of functional equivalence (Finke, 1979; 
Jeannerod, 1994, 1995; Johnson, 1980), the simulation hypothesis has attracted many 
researchers’ attention (cf. simulation theory; Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). According to the 
principle of functional equivalence, the imagery and the execution of a motor action 
are considered functionally equivalent. Specifically, both are suggested to adhere to the 
same principles such as temporal regularities as well as neural processes and structures 
involved in both imagined and actual action (e.g., Decety, 1996, 2002; Grèzes & 
Decety, 2001; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). As a continuation of this principle, Jeannerod 
proposed the simulation theory of action as a framework for motor cognition 
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(Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). According to simulation theory, actual and simulated (e.g., 
imagined or observed) actions are all actions, as each involves a covert stage of action 
(i.e., simulation stage; s-stage). In other words, actual actions imply a covert and an 
overt stage of action, while simulated actions imply a covert stage of action. To this 
extent, all of these different types of s-states to some degree involve the activation of 
the motor action system. Along these lines, mental practice is suggested to be effective 
as it is functionally equivalent to physical practice, activating and inducing changes 
within the motor action system. 
This theory clearly provides an overarching framework to investigate 
properties that are functionally equivalent across overt and covert stages of action, such 
as the imagery and the execution of an action. As such, the simulation hypothesis 
delivers an explanation for mental practice suggesting that mental practice can be 
effective to the degree that there is a functional equivalence in both stages of action. 
Up to now, the simulation hypothesis is considered the most integrative approach to 
mental practice effects (e.g., Murphy et al., 2008). 
More recently, originating from a perceptual-cognitive approach to motor 
action (i.e., the cognitive action architecture approach; CAA-A), the perceptual-
cognitive hypothesis has been proposed (Schack, 2002, 2004, 2006). Following a 
general introduction to the CAA-A in chapter 1.4, this hypothesis is introduced in more 
detail in chapter 1.4.4. Beforehand, empirical approaches to motor learning and mental 
practice as well as the current state of research addressing the functional role of mental 
representation in particular are going to be described in the following chapter. 
1.3 Mental representation, motor learning and mental practice 
1.3.1 Empirical approaches to motor learning and mental practice 
Up to now, the phenomenon of motor learning as induced by (mental or 
physical) practice has been approximated by a variety of empirical approaches (e.g., 
Seidler & Meehan, 2013). After introducing and discussing in short the two most 
commonly used indicators of motor learning, namely changes in motor performance 
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and changes in brain activation (i.e., behavioral and neural changes3
More recently, the adaptation of the brain (i.e., neural changes) as a result of 
motor learning has received a great deal of attention as an indicator of motor learning 
(e.g., Wadden, Borich, & Boyd, 2012). From a neuroscientific view, motor learning 
has been approached by way of changes in the brain, both in its anatomy and its 
physiology. From this, insights into central changes within the motor action system 
), research directly 
addressing the role of mental representations (i.e., cognitive changes) is summarized in 
the next few chapters. 
Traditionally, motor learning as induced by physical practice has been 
operationalized as changes in motor performance (i.e., behavioral changes). 
Specifically, as learning itself cannot be observed, researchers have agreed on 
persisting changes in motor performance to be a valid indicator of motor learning (e.g., 
Schmidt & Lee, 2011). Accordingly, in cases that (a) changes in motor performance 
occur and persist over time (i.e., retention) or that (b) changes in motor performance of 
a particular task lead to changes on a related task (i.e., transfer), it is concluded that 
motor learning has taken place (for details on the performance-learning distinction, see 
e.g., Kantak & Winstein, 2012). Interestingly, it is assumed that underlying 
representations have developed to some extent together with improvements in motor 
performance. To put it differently, conclusions about motor learning that are inferred 
from motor performance inherit the assumption that representation and performance 
directly relate to one another. To give an example, based on schema theory (Schmidt, 
1975), research on the variability of practice has measured the degree of learning by 
way of changes in motor performance both directly after acquisition phase and after a 
retention interval (e.g., Shea & Kohl, 1990). Based thereon, conclusions have been 
drawn with respect to underlying representations of the motor action. Specifically, if 
practice leads to better retention performance, and thus in this sense greater learning, 
then it is suggested that varied practice leads as well to better developed 
representations compared to specific practice. 
                                                     
3 For the sake of convenience, both changes in overt motor performance and changes in covert 
brain activation will be referred to as behavioral and neural changes in the following. 
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have been provided, and conclusions have been drawn regarding the neural aspects of 
motor control and learning, and the neural plasticity of the brain respectively (for a 
recent meta-analysis, see Hardwick, Rottschy, Miall, & Eickhoff, 2013; for reviews, 
see also e.g., Dayan & Cohen, 2011; Doyon & Benali, 2005; Doyon & Ungerleider, 
2002; Halsband & Lange, 2006; Kelly & Garavan, 2005; Ungerleider, Doyon, & 
Karni, 2002). Interestingly, by employing a neuroscientific approach to motor learning, 
conclusions about the representation of a motor action are being inferred from neural 
parameters. For instance, Doyon et al. (2009) reviewed research on dynamic changes 
taking place within the cortico-striatal system and the cerebellum during motor 
learning. From this, the authors drew conclusions about representations such that the 
anterior part of the putamen is critical for spatial representation development, while the 
posterior part of the putamen is critical for motor representation development. Hence, 
from the involvement of particular brain areas during motor learning and thus their role 
within the learning process, conclusions are drawn with respect to the representation of 
motor action. 
Similar to motor learning by physical practice, researchers investigating the 
influence of mental practice on the motor action system traditionally have focused on 
behavioral changes as a variable to measure the degree of learning. That is, the 
effectiveness of mental practice in comparison to physical practice, or the combination 
of both in comparison to physical practice only, has been investigated with regard to 
the motor performance of an action (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994). In more recent years, 
motor imagery and mental practice have been approached as well from a 
neurophysiological perspective, thereby investigating the adaptations within the human 
brain. Specifically, neurophysiological correlates of both actual and imagined actions 
have been examined, and conclusions regarding the functional equivalence of real and 
simulated actions have been drawn (e.g., Grèzes & Decety, 2001; for an overview, see 
Decety, 2002). Particularly, in the realm of simulation theory (Jeannerod, 2001, 2006), 
the study of action representation from a neurophysiological point of view has received 
tremendous research interest (e.g., Guillot, Di Rienzo, & Collet, 2014). More recently, 
researchers started to examine the effects of mental practice on brain activation, both in 
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comparison to no practice, and to physical practice (e.g., Allami et al., 2014; Jackson, 
Lafleur, Malouin, Richards, & Doyon, 2003; Pascual-Leone, Dang, Cohen, Brasil-
Neto, Cammarota, & Hallett, 1995; Zhang, Long, Ge, Xu, Jin, Yao, & Liu, 2014; 
Zhang, Xu, Zhang, Hui, Long, Zhao, & Yao, 2012). From this, conclusions about the 
representation of a motor action and its development are drawn. For instance, Zhang et 
al. (2014) recently investigated changes in functional connectivity in resting state as a 
result of mental practice. The authors found alterations in cognitive and sensory resting 
state networks in various brain systems after learning by way of motor imagery (i.e., 
mental practice), while no alterations in connectivity were found in the control 
condition (i.e., no practice). From this, the authors concluded that modulation of 
resting-state functional connectivity as induced by mental practice may be associated 
with functional reorganization in the brain. Moreover, the authors stated that “these 
alterations in resting-state functional connectivity after learning potentially subserved 
the establishment of motor schema (…)” (Zhang et al., 2014, p. 4). Thus, from changes 
in particular brain areas as a result of mental practice, it is concluded that the 
representation of motor action has changed. 
Although both behavioral and neural changes have proven to be valuable 
indicators of motor learning as induced by mental or physical practice, they do not 
cover the whole phenomenon and bear several limitations (e.g., Rose & Christina, 
2006). Most importantly, employing behavioral or neural changes as an indicator of 
motor learning, thereby drawing conclusions about underlying representations of 
action, inherits the assumption of an isomorphic relationship between the indicator and 
mental representation development. Specifically, if the indicator of motor learning 
(here: motor performance or brain activation) changes, the underlying representation is 
suggested to do so as well, and to the same degree. However, this kind of logic poses 
several problems and limits the study of motor learning and the conclusions drawn 
from findings in the field. For instance, in case of obvious performance changes, 
performance is not entirely determined by permanent factors such as level of skill, but 
also by temporal factors such as motivation. Therefore, changes in performance do not 
necessarily represent learning, and mental representation development respectively. 
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Conversely, in case of the lack of performance changes, learning may have taken place 
such that the representation may have changed, but it may not have resulted in 
observable changes in performance, and thus does not become evident on the 
performance level that is being measured. Furthermore, although the neuroscientific 
approach to motor learning is essential in contributing to our understanding of central 
processes taking place in the brain during motor learning, neural changes do not 
necessarily allow for conclusions regarding the cognitive adaptations within the motor 
action system. Specifically, from findings elucidating neural changes associated with 
motor learning as induced by mental and physical practice, it is not clear what these 
neural changes stand for on a cognitive representational level. As such, they do not 
allow for specific conclusions regarding the cognitive representation of a particular 
motor action in long-term memory and its development over the course of learning. 
Given these limitations it seems crucial to go beyond either behavioral or neural 
changes and to highlight the role of mental representation itself, if the aim is to 
thoroughly understand the complexity of the adapting motor action system during 
learning. 
Taken together, as for motor learning in general and mental practice in 
particular, both behavioral and neural variables have mainly been employed to measure 
the degree of learning within the motor action system, and to draw conclusions with 
respect to underlying representations of an action (e.g., Hodges & Williams, 2012; 
Rose & Christina, 2006). Learning thus has usually been inferred from and empirically 
approached by either changes in motor performance or changes in the brain. At the 
same time, conclusions about underlying representations are drawn based on these 
changes, inheriting the assumption of an isomorphic relationship between both. If 
representations are considered the basis of action organization, however, approaching 
the mental representation itself in the organization and during the learning of motor 
action is a more precise indicator of motor learning. Accordingly, having a closer look 
at the functional role of representations may shed further light on the learning 
processes inherent in the adapting motor action system during motor learning as 
induced by mental and physical practice. An overview of research lines directly 
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addressing the functional role of representation in motor control and learning will 
therefore be given in the following. 
1.3.2 Evidence on mental representation of complex action across skill levels 
Research addressing questions relating to the functional role of mental 
representation in motor action, has mainly been conducted in the field of expertise, 
thereby drawing comparisons across skill levels (for overviews, see Hodges, Huys, & 
Starkes, 2007; Schack, 2010). For instance, Allard and Burnett (1985) found basketball 
experts to classify problems according to functional principles, while novices did so 
adhering not to functional, but to superficial features. Specifically, expert players 
classified pictures representing various aspects of the game into distinct and 
discriminating meaningful categories (e.g., offensive and defensive fundamentals), 
whereas novices classified pictures by way of obvious characteristics such as number 
of players (e.g., individual and team). Moreover, French and Thomas (1987) were 
among the first to show that skill-related knowledge differs according to skill level. 
Specifically, expert basketball players differed not only in their superior performance 
(e.g., shooting skill) from their novice counterparts, but also in their basketball-specific 
knowledge (e.g., position of the players). In addressing differences in problem 
representations between elite and non-elite athletes, Huber (1997) found that more 
features defined the central concepts of elite athletes, and the interrelations between the 
concepts were more numerous compared to non-elite athletes. Furthermore, the 
organization of movement related knowledge has been systematically investigated 
addressing problem representations and condition-action-goal linkages across skill 
levels by McPherson and colleagues analyzing verbal reports. From this research, 
experts’ problem representations differed from those of novices. For instance, the 
authors reported more elaborate conceptual networks of declarative and procedural 
knowledge (i.e., condition-action-goal linkages), regarding both skills and tactics (e.g., 
McPherson, 1993; for an overview, see McPherson & Vickers, 2004; French & 
McPherson, 2004). 
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In the realm of the cognitive action architecture approach (for details, see 
chapter 1.4), Schack and Mechsner (2006) investigated the structuring and 
dimensioning of mental representations across skill levels, employing the structural 
dimensional analysis of mental representations (SDA-M) as an experimental approach 
to mental representations of complex action that does not depend on individuals’ 
explicit statements. The authors examined representational networks of the tennis serve 
in experts and non-experts, eliciting distinct differences in mental representations 
across skill levels. Specifically, skilled individuals held functionally structured 
representations of the tennis serve (i.e., reflecting well the three movement phases pre-
activation, strike, and final swing), whereas unskilled individuals did not have such 
structured representations available. Such differences in mental representations across 
skill level have been shown to generalize to various motor skills in a variety of sports 
such as dance (e.g., Bläsing, 2010; Bläsing, Tenenbaum, & Schack, 2009), volleyball 
(e.g., Velentzas, Heinen, Tenenbaum, & Schack, 2010), judo (e.g., Weigelt, Ahlmeyer, 
Lex, & Schack, 2011), and windsurfing (e.g., Schack & Hackfort, 2007), and have as 
well been reported in the area of manual action (e.g., Braun et al., 2007; Stöckel, 
Hughes, & Schack, 2012). 
Accordingly, the results of research investigating the structure of mental 
representation of complex action can be condensed into three main findings: (1) the 
mental representation of skilled individuals can be characterized by a distinct structure, 
with the representation reflecting a particular formation of basic action concepts, (2) 
the structure of a skilled individual’s mental representation is functional in the sense 
that the formation of basic action concepts corresponds to the biomechanical and 
functional task demands, and (3) mental representation structures are similar across 
skilled individuals. Instead, mental representation structures of unskilled individuals 
differ remarkably, and their representations do not hold a distinct, functional structure. 
From this and other research, skilled action in comparison to unskilled action is 
thought to be based on well-developed representations, thereby assisting to control the 
motor action system during action execution. In this sense, elaborate representations 
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allow for refined movement execution, resulting in appropriate actions and thus stable 
performance in a given situation. 
1.3.3 Evidence on mental representation of complex action and motor learning 
While much attention has been directed towards differences between skilled 
and non-skilled individuals in both their observable performance and their underlying 
representations, less research has addressed questions relating to mental representation 
development and the functional role of mental representations during motor learning. 
Körndle and colleagues (Körndle, 1983a, 1983b; Zimmer & Körndle, 1988) 
were among the first to show that cognitive units of action-related knowledge evolve 
during motor learning and are being integrated into hierarchies during this process. For 
instance, Körndle (1983a) compared individuals learning quickly (i.e., fast learners) to 
those learning slowly (i.e., slow learners) and showed that fast learners differed from 
slow learners during the learning process, both in their pedaling performance (i.e., as 
measured by way of effective forces and velocity) as well as in their representations 
(i.e., as measured by way of feature-ratings and interviews). Specifically, fast learning 
individuals were able to give precise statements (e.g., keep upper body still; place 
whole feet on footboard), while slow learning individuals gave no more than global 
statements (e.g., keep balance; go rapidly) on the learning process after practice, 
indicating different degrees of hierarchy in their representation structures. Continuing 
this work, Lippens (1992, 2001) examined subjective theories during motor learning. 
Subjective theories as cognitions of the self and the world during rowing were 
investigated by way of a sorting task (for details on the task, see Lippens, 2001). From 
this work, Lippens (1992) reported distinct differences between fast and slow learning 
individuals. Specifically, fast learning individuals were better able to identify relevant 
knowledge (e.g., sound of oar blade and water) and to quickly and more efficiently 
access their knowledge. Instead, slow learning individuals spent more time on their 
knowledge search, and used more numerous terms in their descriptions, thereby getting 
lost in details more often. From this, the authors concluded that representations of 
rowing become hierarchically integrated during learning. Similarly, Seiler (1995; 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
25 
1997) researched the nature and change of representational frames during motor 
learning, thereby supporting the idea of hierarchical structuring of representations 
during motor learning (for related work, see also e.g., Blaser, Stucker, Körndle, & 
Narciss, 2000; Kromer, 2007; Wiemeyer, 2001). 
Overall, compared to research addressing differences in experts’ and novices’ 
representations of complex action, relatively little research has been conducted that 
investigates the functional role of representations during motor learning (for an 
overview, see Schack, 2003; for a discussion, see Lippens, 2009). From research 
directly testing for changes in underlying representations of complex motor action 
during learning, action-related knowledge has been shown to change over the course of 
learning such that representations of complex action adapt and become hierarchically 
structured. 
1.3.4 Evidence on mental representation of complex action and mental practice 
While some research has been directed toward the functional role of mental 
representations during motor learning as induced by physical practice, research on the 
functional role of mental representations during motor learning as induced by mental 
practice is scarce. 
A first step in direction of considering the influence of mental practice on both 
the (covert) level of representation and the (overt) level of performance was taken by 
Narciss and colleagues (Narciss, 1993, 1996, 2001; Narciss, Reischle, & Eberspächer, 
1994). Narciss (1993) examined the change of internal representations and 
biomechanical characteristics of the breaststroke in swimming over the course of 
practice. In their study, one group of students practiced physically, while another group 
of students practiced mentally in addition to physical practice. The authors found that 
both groups improved their breaststroke performance over time. Interestingly, the 
combined mental and physical practice group revealed a more developed internal 
representation in comparison to the physical practice only group after practice. Narciss 
(1993, 2001) did not further discuss this somewhat unexpected finding, but concluded 
that it may prove fruitful to consider both the covert level of representation and the 
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overt level of performance in future studies. Although the study reflects seminal work 
on the influence of mental practice on the mental representation of a complex action, 
the effects of mental and physical practice have not been investigated systematically 
within this study. However, if one aims to thoroughly understand the motor action 
system, and to approach motor learning as well as mental practice from within, it is 
essential to isolate the distinct contributions of each practice type to each level of the 
adapting motor action system. 
Taken together, to our knowledge, there is only one study that directly 
addresses the functional role of mental representation during motor learning as induced 
by mental practice4
1.4 The cognitive action architecture approach to motor learning 
. Apart from this work, evidence on the influence of mental practice 
on mental representation development, especially in comparison to physical and no 
practice, is lacking. The work at hand aims at systematically investigating the influence 
of mental and physical practice on the motor action system with a particular focus on 
the perceptual-cognitive level of action organization and the functional role of mental 
representation (for details, see chapter 1.5). Therefore, the cognitive action architecture 
approach is going to be introduced in the following. 
1.4.1 Hierarchical organization of actions 
Central to the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A; Schack, 2002, 
2004, 2010) is the idea of a hierarchical organization of motor action. According to this 
perceptual-cognitive approach, motor actions are organized in a stratified manner, with 
two main systems (i.e., the mental system and the sensorimotor system) contributing to 
the construction of motor action (see also Table 1.1). Each of the two systems 
encompasses two levels of action organization. Specifically, from the higher to the 
lower levels in the hierarchy, the mental system is comprised of the level of mental 
control (i.e., level IV) and the level of mental representation (i.e., level III), and the 
sensorimotor system is composed of the level of sensorimotor representation (i.e., 
                                                     
4 For details on mental training based on mental representation (MTMR), see chapter 5.3 
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level II) and the level of sensorimotor control (i.e., level I). Thus, the motor action 
system is thought to operate on four different levels: two levels with regulatory 
functions (i.e., the level of mental control and the level of sensorimotor control) 
serving as control entities, and two levels with representational functions (i.e., the level 
of mental representation and the level of sensorimotor representation) serving as 
reference entities. While the sensorimotor system, being the “sub”-part (i.e., the lower 
part) of both systems within the hierarchy, is concerned with the direct transformation 
of intentions into actions, i.e., the transformation of the intent to move into actual 
movement [direkte Absichtsrealisierung], the mental system, being the “super”-part 
(i.e., the higher part) within the hierarchy, is concerned with the indirect 
transformation, i.e., the transformation of the intent to move into real movement is 
mediated via plans, strategies etc. [indirekte Absichtsrealisierung] (cf. Goschke, 1996). 
When a motor action is being performed, all four levels of the system are involved, 
with each level contributing in its specific manner.  
Table 1.1 
Levels of action organization according to the cognitive action architecture approach 
Code Level Main function Subfunction Means 
IV Mental  control Regulation 
Volitional initiation; 
Control strategies 
Symbols;  
Strategies 
III Mental  representation Representation 
Effect-oriented 
adjustment 
Basic action 
concepts 
II Sensorimotor  representation Representation 
Spatial-temporal 
adjustment 
Perceptual effect 
representations 
I Sensorimotor  control Regulation Automatization 
Functional systems; 
Basic reflexes 
Note:This table is adapted from Schack, 2004, p. 408. 
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According to Schack (2002, 2010), the level of mental control is primarily 
concerned with the voluntary control of action. On this level, the action goal is set and 
the intended action effect is coded via symbols and strategies. The level of mental 
representation serves as a cognitive reference system for subsequent action control, 
mediated via basic action concepts. Specifically, on this level, the intended effect is 
transferred into a model of the motor action to be executed, by delivering reference 
values for action execution. On the level of sensorimotor representation, modality-
specific afferent and re-afferent information is represented, thereby delineating the 
corresponding effects of the action. Accordingly, this level is mediated by way of 
perceptual information. Finally, the level of sensorimotor control is concerned with 
action execution, and as such it directly relates to the environment. Action control on 
this level operates by way of synthesis of afferent information ([Afferenzsynthese]; cf. 
Anochin, 1967) and the comparison of actual effects to the intended effects, resulting 
in adequate executive commands for control purposes, and thus action (for an overview 
of the CAA-A, see also Schack, 2004; Schack, Bläsing, Hughes, Flash, & Schilling, 
2014). 
To illustrate, in the case of golf putting, the goal to sink the ball is established 
by the golfer on the level of mental control. Moreover, a strategy is laid out how this 
goal is going to be achieved (e.g., the breaks, the speed of the green and many other 
factors are considered during the process of setting the target line for a particular putt). 
The golfers’ mental representation of the putt serves to transfer the action goal into a 
model of the putting movement to be executed in order to perform a successful putt. 
Modality-specific information of the putt (e.g., the feel of grip pressure during the 
swing or the sound of the impact when the club hits the ball) is available from the level 
of sensorimotor representation. Sensorimotor control during the putt itself is then 
guaranteed by comparing the actual effects (e.g., the actual speed of the downswing) to 
the intended effect (e.g., the intended speed of the downswing), and by correcting the 
putting movement accordingly (e.g., reducing the acceleration of the club during 
downswing). 
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As described above, the realization of a movement necessitates the 
involvement of each level and the interaction of the four levels. Likewise, each level 
fulfills distinct functions. Of particular importance within the CAA-A is the role that 
mental representations play within the organization of actions, and thus in motor 
control and motor learning. Therefore and for the specific purpose of the present work, 
the construct of mental representations within the CAA-A is described in more detail. 
1.4.2 Mental representation and the organization of actions 
According to the CAA-A, the organization of an action, and thus the 
controllability of the motor action system, is thought to be closely tied to 
representational networks of action concepts (i.e., mental representations). Well-
developed mental representations form the basis of well-organized actions and as such 
ensure that actions can be controlled within the motor action system (e.g., Bläsing, 
2010; Schack & Mechsner, 2006; see also chapter 1.3.2). Analogous to the idea that 
objects are being represented by way of object concepts in long-term memory (e.g., 
Ach, 1921; Hoffmann, 1986, 1993; Rosch, 1978), actions are thought to be represented 
by way of action concepts (Schack, 2002, 2010). Basic action concepts (i.e., BACs) 
represent cognitive compilations or chunks with regard to the realization of an action 
goal. Specifically, these compilations are thought to be comprised of body postures and 
movement elements together with their sensory consequences. To illustrate, grip check 
as a BAC of the golf putt is a cognitive chunk serving a particular action goal (i.e., to 
ensure an optimal grip during the preparation of the putting movement before initiation 
of the backswing). As such it is comprised of the corresponding body posture (e.g. 
standing up right, hips slightly flexed, upper body leaning forward, holding the putter 
in hands) and movement elements (e.g., take grip, move fingers until in right position) 
together with their sensory consequences (e.g., feel hands touching the surface of club; 
sense slight pressure in fingers, see both hands touch each other; for examples on the 
tennis serve, see Schack & Mechsner, 2006). 
Accordingly, mental representations of actions are considered representational 
frameworks comprised of basic action concepts. The structuring of the mental 
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representation is defined by the relations between the basic action concepts. The 
relations between the BACs, in turn, are feature-based. That is, each proximity or 
distance between the concepts of a given set is determined by corresponding features 
(i.e., type, number, and relevance of features), both functional and sensory ones that 
are closely interconnected. While the functional features relate to the action goals (i.e., 
they are closely linked to level IV), the sensory features relate to the afferent and re-
afferent information of sub-components of the action (i.e., they are closely linked to 
level II). To illustrate, the BAC “accelerate club” pertaining to the forward swing of 
the putting movement is determined by functional features (e.g., increase velocity, 
build energy, create force) and sensory features (e.g., feel the rotation of arms and 
shoulders, sense the pendulum motion of the club, see the club moving into one’s field 
of vision). This feature-binding is referred to as the dimensioning of the mental 
representation (Schack, 2002, 2010).  
Methodologically, the structural dimensional analysis of mental 
representations (SDA-M) has been developed as a means to measure the distance and 
the grouping of BACs (i.e., the structuring) as well as the binding of features to BACs 
(i.e., the dimensioning) within the representation of a complex action (Schack, 2002, 
2010; for details, see Schack, 2012). Whereas traditional methods such as interviews 
and questionnaires require explicit statements from the interviewee (for a 
methodological overview, see Hodges et al., 2007), the SDA-M approaches 
representational frameworks from an experimental approach, thereby grasping more 
implicit knowledge than that gained from the measurement of explicit statements (e.g., 
Schack, 2012; Schack, 2010; for a discussion, see Kromer, 2007; Kromer & Schack, 
2002; Lippens, 2009). 
1.4.3 Motor learning and the modification of mental representation 
According to the CAA-A, the level of mental representation is of particular 
importance during motor learning. Whereas the organization of skilled motor action is 
suggested to be based on a well-developed mental representation, no such well-
developed representation is available during the organization of a motor action that is 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
31 
new to an individual. Instead, representations develop during the learning process. In 
other words, for intelligent and thus stable motor action, a cognitive reference on the 
level of mental representation is essential. However, such a cognitive reference is 
lacking in the beginning of the learning process, being no more (if at all) than a simple, 
unrefined version of a reference estimated based on prior experience with a similar 
motor action. During the process of motor learning, this cognitive reference is thought 
to develop from a simple and general representation to a more elaborate and refined 
version: 
“Within this system, learning could be a product of modifying the mediating 
conceptual (BAC) structures. These modifications would then impact the total 
system, so that new constellations are also generated between a level of 
mental and a level of sensorimotor control through the integration or 
rearrangement of sensorimotor representation units (perceptual effect-codes). 
This enables the system to perform an effect-related optimization of relations 
between intentions and elementary operations depending on the starting 
conditions.” (Schack, 2004, p. 413) 
Motor learning, according to the CAA-A (Schack, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2010), 
reflects an adaptation on the level of mental representation such that the relations and 
the groupings of action concepts (i.e., mental representation structure) are modified 
over the course of the learning process (for more details, see chapter 1.5.1). 
1.4.4 Mental practice and the modification of mental representation 
According to the CAA-A, and the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis 
respectively, mental practice serves to stabilize representational networks of complex 
action (Schack, 2004, 2006). Specifically, mental practice serves to tie the mental and 
the sensorimotor representation of a motor action more closely together by simulating 
a motor action and its effects: 
“Our findings on the cognitive architecture of complex movement (…) open 
up a new explanation for the effects of mental training: the perceptual-
cognitive hypothesis. This posits a representation system in which more 
strongly cognitive representation units (nodes) are linked to perceptual 
representations (e.g., kinesthetic-, optical-, or acoustic-effect codes)” (Schack, 
2004, p. 429) 
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According to the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis, mental practice activates and 
stabilizes the perceptual-cognitive representational networks of complex motor action. 
Thus, similarly to the central hypotheses, the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis ascribes 
mental practice effects to the refinement of internal representations. However, 
according to the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis, mental practice serves to stabilize a 
representation system of perceptual effect representations allowing for a direct, 
architecture-based translation of intention into movement (as opposed to the idea of 
additional representations such as motor programs specifying muscle commands; cf. 
Heuer, 1985; for a detailed discussion, see Schack, 2002, 2010). That is, the 
perceptual-cognitive hypothesis differs from the programming hypothesis such that 
mental practice effects are not based on the refinement of motor programs and thus 
refined muscle commands, but on the refinement of effect representations and their 
structures in long-term memory.  
The perceptual-cognitive hypothesis opens up an alternative perspective on 
mental practice. While both peripheral and cognitive accounts of mental practice hold 
distinct views on the question how mental practice works and by this very fact explain 
mental practice effects either “from the outside” or “from the inside”, the perceptual-
cognitive hypothesis entails both central and peripheral aspects by its focus on effect 
representations, that is by emphasizing the cognitively represented perceptual effects of 
the action. As such, a perceptual-cognitive approach may shed further light on mental 
practice and on how it affects the motor action system, holding an integrative view and 
taking into consideration different levels of action organization and various 
opportunities of communication and interaction between them (for more details, see 
chapter 1.5.1). 
1.5 Purpose of the present work 
1.5.1 Mental representation and its development with mental and physical 
practice 
As has been described above in more detail, research directly addressing 
mental representations of complex actions has mainly been conducted in the field of 
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expertise, thereby comparing representations across skill levels (see chapter 1.3.2). By 
contrast, remarkably little longitudinal research exists on the development of 
representations over the course of learning. While the influence of physical practice on 
mental representation development has at least received some research attention (see 
chapter 1.3.3), research systematically investigating the change and the development of 
mental representation as a result of mental practice, both in comparison to physical and 
no practice, is lacking (see chapter 1.3.4). Research has yet to systematically 
investigate and compare the influence of mental and physical practice on mental 
representation of complex action. 
To systematically examine mental representation development may prove 
valuable in advancing our understanding of the adapting motor action system. If 
representations are considered the basis of action organization, it is pivotal to focus on 
the functional role of representations during motor control and learning. Such a 
perceptual-cognitive, representation-based perspective seems promising both for motor 
learning in general and mental practice in particular, as it goes beyond traditional, 
indirect approaches, and directly addresses the basis of action organization, namely the 
underlying representation of the action. Therefore, a closer look at representational 
networks of action concepts and their development during early skill acquisition as a 
result of mental and physical practice may help to further understand the phenomenon 
of motor learning as well as the similarities and differences of both types of practice 
regarding their effect on the motor action system. In addition, comparing both mental 
and physical practice, and potentially shedding further light on the differential effects 
of both, may help to better understand or at least approach the basic mechanisms of 
motor imagery and mental practice. 
The cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A; see chapter 1.4) seems an 
appropriate framework for this endeavor as it allows for a hierarchical view on the 
motor action system, and the experimental testing of mental representation of complex 
action. In short, the organization of skilled motor action, according to the CAA-A, is 
based on a well-developed mental representation which is elaborate both in its 
dimensioning and in its structuring. Instead, no such elaborate mental representation is 
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available in the case of unskilled motor action, and thus during action organization of a 
new motor action (see chapter 1.4.2). Motor learning, from this point of view, is 
considered the change and functional development of representational networks of 
complex action in long-term memory, and thus reflects the adaptation of the structuring 
and dimensioning of mental representations (see chapter 1.4.3). Similarly, mental 
practice effects are thought to be reflected in terms of order formation in memory (see 
chapter 1.4.4). Thus, according to the CAA-A, both mental and physical practice 
should result in more elaborate, and functionally developed representational networks 
of complex action.  
However, it is conceivable that mental and physical practice influence the 
motor action system and the levels of action organization therein in a different way. 
Although both practice types are suggested to rely on the same action representation 
(see chapter 1.2.2.3), they may differ in their influence on the development of mental 
representation. Drawing on elaborations by Schack (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010) on 
motor learning and mental practice from the CAA-A point of view (see chapters 1.4.3 
and 1.4.4), the present work aims at taking one step further with regard to different 
types of practice and their influence on the motor action system during motor learning. 
In the following, the influence of mental and physical practice on the motor action 
system, and on the perceptual-cognitive level of action organization in particular, will 
be sketched. 
Whereas skilled action organization relies on well-developed representations, 
with automatized processes taking place primarily within the sensorimotor system (for 
more details, see Schack, 2002), no representation is available during unskilled motor 
action. During early stages of skill acquisition (cf. cognitive stage: Fitts & Posner, 
1967; Entwicklung der Grobkoordination: Meinel & Schnabel, 1987), the motor action 
system is being challenged, with all levels of action organization being in charge (see 
Figure 1.1). Specifically, according to Schack (2002), the direct interaction of the 
person with the environment with regard to a particular motor task allows lower 
sensorimotor patterns and higher conceptual structures to evolve (as indicated by the 
circles on the right, see Figure 1.1), and as such helps to stabilize the perceptual-
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cognitive system within the human motor action system during early stages of motor 
learning. 
The particular influence of mental and physical practice on the levels of action 
organization, however, may be different. It is conceivable that both types of practice 
differ in the levels they primarily influence within the motor action system, with 
mental practice primarily operating on the higher levels, and physical practice 
primarily operating on the lower levels within the motor action system. Specifically, 
the primary influence of mental practice on the motor action system may be centered 
between the mental and the sensorimotor representational levels, while the primary 
influence of physical practice on the system may be centered between the sensorimotor 
representational and regulatory levels. 
 
Figure 1.1. The levels of action organization within the motor action system during early stages of motor 
learning (adapted from Schack, 2002, p. 59). 
To explain, physical practice as an “online” type of practice is concerned with 
the actual experience (for online/offline cf. Beilock & Lyons, 2009) and as such with 
the integration and storage of sensorimotor information (i.e., feedback) available from 
actual movement execution. This actual experience may serve to enrich sensorimotor 
representations, and to refine sensorimotor control (see Fig. 1.1; see also Schack, 
CHAPTER 1 
36  
2002). Accordingly, physical practice is likely to influence the motor action system 
mainly by way of the sensorimotor system. These changes within the sensorimotor 
system might transfer to the mental system, leading to changes on the level of mental 
representation and on the level of mental control. 
In contrast, mental practice as an “offline” type of practice simulates the actual 
experience, and as such is concerned with a “quasi-experience” and the retrieval and 
storage of “quasi-sensorimotor information” (i.e., “quasi-feedback”) based on the 
action representation available. This simulated experience may serve to link 
sensorimotor to mental representations, thereby leading to a refinement of 
representation structure. Accordingly, mental practice may influence the motor action 
system mainly through the representational levels at the interface of the mental and the 
sensorimotor system. These changes on the representational levels of both the mental 
and the sensorimotor system might transfer to the regulatory levels of both systems, 
leading to changes on both the mental and the sensorimotor control levels. 
Accordingly, from the cognitive action architecture point of view, it is 
conceivable that mental and physical practice differ in their influence on mental 
representation of complex action. It may be the case that mental practice influences the 
level of mental representation within the organization of an action even more so 
compared to physical practice, as it directly centers around the representational levels 
and addresses the interface of the mental and the sensorimotor system. Instead, 
physical practice may influence more so the sensorimotor system, as it centers around 
the sensorimotor representational and regulatory levels, and as such causes changes on 
the level of mental representation by way of a refinement of sensorimotor 
representations. 
Thus, while the CAA-A allows for predictions about the role of mental 
representations within action organization and their development with mental and 
physical practice, these predictions remain to be empirically tested. So far, mental and 
physical practice and the development of mental representations of complex action 
during early phases of motor learning have not been addressed. While research in the 
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realm of the CAA-A, employing the SDA-M, has mainly been conducted using an 
expert-novice paradigm, thereby comparing mental representation structure across skill 
levels (between-subject design), no research exists in this area that systematically 
investigates the change and development in novices’ mental representation structure of 
a complex action during motor learning (within-subject design), thereby examining the 
influence of both mental and physical practice on mental representation development. 
In other words, what remains to be examined is the question whether the structure of 
one’s representation of an action changes in a functional way with practice such that 
the relations of action-related concepts in long-term memory develop in direction of an 
expert representation. Furthermore, the unique contributions of mental and physical 
practice, that is both the repeated imagery and the repeated execution of a motor 
action, to this functional change in mental representation of complex action remain to 
be explored. 
Taken together, research in the field of motor learning, either through mental 
or physical practice, so far has mainly addressed the behavioral or the neural level, 
whereas the perceptual-cognitive level of action organization has rarely been looked at. 
This is somehow surprising as, from a perceptual-cognitive perspective, 
representations reflect the basis of action organization, and as such the starting and end 
point of motor learning. If one aims to thoroughly understand the motor action system 
and its adaptations over the course of learning, one must have a closer look at both the 
covert and overt levels of a complex action, thereby focusing on the functional role of 
representations. To learn more about the development of mental representations during 
motor learning may strongly contribute to a more detailed understanding of the 
processes taking place within the motor action system during skill acquisition. 
Accordingly, an integrative understanding of the motor action system may be advanced 
by shifting the focus toward the level of mental representation of complex action and 
its role within the organization of action, and by considering learning and the 
corresponding adaptations as induced by cognitive and motor types of practice (i.e., 
mental and physical practice) from a representational point of view. 
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1.5.2 Aims 
The overall goal of the present work is to investigate motor learning in general 
and the relationship between practice and the functional change and development of 
mental representation of complex action in long-term memory in particular from an 
architectural, representation-based point of view. Specifically, the influence of two 
types of practice, mental practice (i.e., covert practice) and physical practice (i.e., overt 
practice) are considered in the present work. Both types of practice have shown to lead 
to performance improvements, and thus reflect motor learning. However, motor 
learning as induced by mental and physical practice has rarely been approached with a 
specific focus on the perceptual-cognitive adaptations within action organization. To 
date, research has yet to systematically investigate the influence that mental and 
physical practice have on the motor action system in terms of the development of 
mental representation of complex action. The present work aims at bridging this 
particular research gap. 
According to the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A; for details, 
see chapter 1.4), motor learning is regarded from a perceptual-cognitive, hierarchical 
viewpoint, and as such is based on the functional change and development of action 
representation in long-term memory. Holding a hierarchical view of action 
organization, it is possible to investigate the motor action system from different levels 
of action organization, thereby accounting for similarities and differences in structures 
and processes between the two types of practice during motor learning (for details, see 
chapter 1.5.1). Accordingly, the work at hand focuses on exploring the distinct 
influence of mental and physical practice on mental representation structure of 
complex action. 
In this sense, the present work aims at gaining a deeper understanding of motor 
learning through the investigation of mental representations of complex action and 
their development during motor learning. Looking closer at the motor action system in 
terms of a permanently adapting, complex system may advance a thorough 
understanding of motor learning and the processes associated with it. In respect 
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thereof, insights into perceptual-cognitive adaptations (i.e., changes in mental 
representation structure and gaze behavior) that go along with behavioral adaptations 
(i.e., changes in motor performance) as a result of mental and physical practice will 
shed further light on the covert processes during motor learning. Furthermore, 
investigating perceptual-cognitive adaptations together with behavioral adaptations 
may allow for a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences of covert and 
overt practice effects onto the motor action system. That is, approaching both mental 
and physical practice and their (similar or differential) influence upon the motor action 
system, may widen our understanding of both types of practice, their influence and 
their limits, and take us a step further in direction of establishing a comprehensive 
theory of the underlying mechanisms of mental and physical practice. 
In short, the main expected outcome of the present work is to gain insights into 
the perceptual-cognitive adaptations that occur within the motor action system during 
early skill acquisition as a result of both mental and physical practice. Gaining a 
detailed understanding, particularly of how mental representations develop during 
motor learning, will, from a theoretical point of view, shed further light on the covert 
adaptations that occur with mental and physical practice, and, from an applied point of 
view, will be the basis for practical work such that basic knowledge can be transferred 
to the field. 
1.5.3 Research questions 
The overall purpose of the present work is to examine perceptual-cognitive 
adaptations within the motor action system as induced by mental and physical practice, 
with a particular focus on the level of mental representations. To this extent, motor 
learning is considered as the modification of representational networks of action 
concepts in memory. Accordingly, the overarching research question is to what extent 
the mental representation of a complex action changes and develops over the course of 
learning. Specifically, the structuring of mental representation and its development 
toward a more elaborate structure with mental and physical practice is being 
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investigated. Along these lines, the present work seeks to answer three main research 
questions: 
1. Does the structure of mental representation change as a result of 
physical practice and do these changes reflect a development toward a 
functional structure? Specifically, does the development in mental 
representation structure differ between practice and no practice during 
early skill acquisition? (see chapter 2) 
2. Does mental representation structure change and develop as a result of 
mental practice? Specifically, does the development in mental 
representation structure differ between mental, physical and combined 
mental and physical practice in early skill acquisition? (see chapter 3) 
3. Is the development in mental representation structure as a result of 
mental and physical practice associated with perceptual changes? 
Specifically, do mental and physical practice differ in terms of the 
perceptual-cognitive background of performance changes during early 
skill acquisition? (see chapter 4) 
1.5.4 Predictions 
According to the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A), the motor 
action system changes during motor learning, with the two subsystems (i.e., the mental 
and the sensorimotor system) developing. Specifically, together with performance 
improvements, motor learning is thought to be associated with functional changes in 
mental representation of the action. As predicted by the CAA-A, changes in mental 
representation structure should be evident as a result of practice, and these changes 
should reflect a development toward a more elaborate structure matching more so with 
the functional and biomechanical demands of the task. Furthermore, and more 
specifically, the CAA-A allows for specific predictions about the development of 
mental representation during motor learning, as induced by mental and physical 
practice. 
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Accordingly, it was predicted (a) that physical practice would lead to both 
improvements in performance and functional changes in mental representation 
structure toward an expert structure in comparison to no practice (study 1, 2, 3), (b) 
that mental practice would lead to both performance improvements and a functional 
development of representation structure toward an expert structure in comparison to no 
practice (study 2, 3), and (c) that the development in mental representation structure as 
induced by mental and physical practice would be associated with perceptual changes, 
that is functional changes in quiet eye duration (study 3). Importantly, we were 
interested in whether mental and physical practice would have differential effects 
regarding the perceptual-cognitive adaptations within the motor action system (for 
details, see chapter 1.5.1; for specific hypotheses of each learning study and further 
details on the rationales, see chapters 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1). 
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2 PHYSICAL PRACTICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL 
REPRESENTATION STRUCTURE 
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This chapter is based on the manuscript  
Frank, C., Land, W. M., & Schack, T. (2013). Mental representation and learning: The 
influence of practice on the development of mental representation structure in 
complex action. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 14, 353-361. 
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Abstract 
Recent research has elicited distinct differences in mental representations 
between athletes of different skill levels. Such differences suggest that the structure of 
mental representations changes as a function of skill level. However, research 
examining how such mental representation structures develop over the course of 
learning is lacking. In the present study, we examine the effects of practice on the 
development of one’s mental representation of a complex action during early skill 
acquisition. For this purpose, we created a controllable learning situation, using a 
repeated-measures design with a control group. More specifically, novice golfers were 
randomly assigned to either a practice group (n = 12) or a control group (n = 12). Both 
groups were tested before and after an acquisition phase of three days as well as after a 
three day retention interval. Mental representation structures of the putt were recorded, 
employing the structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M), 
which provides psychometric data on the structure and grouping of action concepts in 
long-term memory. In addition, outcome performance of the practice group was 
measured, using two-dimensional error scores of the putt. Findings revealed a 
significant improvement in task performance, as well as functional changes in the 
structure of the practice group’s mental representation. In contrast, no functional 
adaptations were evident in the mental representation of the control group. Our 
findings suggest that motor skill acquisition is associated with functional adaptations of 
action-related knowledge in long-term memory. 
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2.1 Introduction 
During the last 50 years, researchers from cognitive psychology have identified 
a close relationship between performance and mediating cognitive mechanisms (e.g., 
Allard & Burnett, 1985; Allard, Graham, & Paarsalu, 1980; Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi 
& Rees, 1983; French & Thomas, 1987; De Groot, 1965). Along with superior 
performance, research on expertise has shown that the expert advantage is associated 
with numerous cognitive adaptations. For instance, experts are better able to recall 
domain-specific information (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973), to anticipate future events 
(e.g., Mowbray & Rhoades, 1959), and to make fast and accurate decisions (e.g., 
Tenenbaum, 2003). In addition, a long-standing discussion within this field of research 
has addressed the role of mental representations within the organization of actions. 
According to this, expert performance has been suggested to rely on well developed 
mental representations (e.g., Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Specifically, highly-skilled 
individuals are thought to differ from low-skilled individuals both in their reproducibly 
superior performance and in their underlying representation of the skill in long-term 
memory (e.g., Ericsson, 2007).  
According to skill acquisition theories, cognitive mechanisms governing task 
performance develop over the course of learning (e.g., Anderson, 1982, 1993, 1995; 
Fitts & Posner, 1967; Magill, 2011). To this extent, motor skill acquisition is suggested 
to be accompanied by changes in the cognitive control structures that mediate the 
reliance on attention and working memory. More specifically, novice motor 
performance has been suggested to rely heavily on working memory with movements 
attended to in a stepwise fashion. In contrast, expert performance is suggested to be 
supported by integrated task control structures that allow for movements to be 
automated, thereby placing fewer demands on attention and working memory 
processes (for an overview, see Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2003). Accordingly, expert 
performance is suggested to be supported by proceduralized representations, which do 
not rely on attentional control, as opposed to representations of novices that are more 
declarative in nature. During skill acquisition, these mechanisms are proposed to 
change based on changes in the learner’s representation of the skill. Specifically, 
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during skill acquisition and development, the representation of a novice is thought to 
change toward the proceduralized representation of an expert (Beilock, Wierenga, & 
Carr, 2002).  
In addressing this, Beilock and Carr (2001) investigated attention and memory 
processes that support motor skill execution. Specifically, in order to learn about 
differences in underlying representations, generic knowledge (i.e., general memory: 
prescriptive information about a movement) and episodic knowledge (i.e., specific 
memory: autobiographical record of a particular performance) of novices and 
experienced golfers on the putting movement were explored. These different types of 
skill knowledge served as indicators of the degree of elaboration and proceduralization 
seen in the golfers’ underlying representations. According to the authors’ rationale, 
with increasing expertise, generic knowledge of the putt was thought to increase as the 
representation of a movement becomes more elaborate. At the same time, episodic 
knowledge of the putt was suggested to decrease as the representation becomes more 
proceduralized, running primarily outside of working memory, and thus not leaving a 
retrievable episodic record of the task performance. Consistent with these assumptions, 
findings revealed that, indeed, experienced golfers gave more detailed generic 
descriptions of the putt, but less detailed episodic descriptions of particular putts, while 
the opposite was true for novices. From this, the authors concluded that automatized 
execution of a movement is controlled via proceduralized representations that reduce 
attention and working memory demands, thereby resulting in greater generic memory 
but reduced episodic recall.  
Similarly, after having trained novices for 650 practice putts, Beilock et al. 
(2002) found episodic descriptions of trained novices to be similar in the number of 
reported steps to their generic descriptions. Specifically, whereas the generic 
descriptions of trained novices were similar to those of untrained novices, episodic 
descriptions were in between those of untrained novices and experienced golfers. This 
suggests that trained novices’ representations became more proceduralized with 
practice. From this and other research, the cognitive mechanisms underlying skill 
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execution are thought to change with skill development, with experienced performers 
relying on more proceduralized mental representations compared to novices.  
To date, the mental representations underlying performance have been studied in 
a variety of disciplines using a broad spectrum of methods (see Hodges et al., 2007). 
One of the first studies in sport addressing the question whether domain-specific 
knowledge and task performance relate was that of French and Thomas (1987). In their 
study, the authors examined the relationship of basketball-specific knowledge and 
basketball skills in children using paper-and-pencil test. Based on their findings, 
namely better shooting skill and more basketball knowledge in expert players in 
comparison to novice players, the authors were one of the first to highlight the salient 
role of knowledge in skilled performance. More recently, in his work on differences in 
the classification and representation of context-specific problem states using specific 
sorting techniques and interview methods, Huber (1997) found that experts’ nodes (i.e., 
central concepts) of representations possess more features compared to novices. 
Besides that, fewer connections between concepts have been found in novices. 
Furthermore, by way of categorization tasks, Allard and Burnett (1985) could show 
that experts adhere to functional principles when classifying problems while novices 
rather rely on superficial features. With the help of questionnaire methods and 
interviews, McPherson et al. have been able to reveal the organization of movement 
knowledge for tennis (e.g., McPherson & Kernodle, 2003; McPherson & Thomas, 
1989) and a variety of other sport domains (e.g., French & McPherson, 1999, 2004). 
From this and other research, findings suggest that experts maintain more refined 
mental representations for specific domains, and that such elaborate representations 
allow for a more refined execution of appropriate actions relative to novices (e.g., 
Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Towne, 2010). 
Early research on object representations (e.g., Hoffmann, 1986; Rosch, 1978; 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975) suggests that knowledge is represented in taxonomies of 
hierarchically organized memory structures. Furthermore, these representations are 
suggested to provide the functional basis for the everyday interaction with objects (e.g., 
Hoffmann, 1990). Similarly, the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A, 
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Schack, 2004; Schack & Mechsner, 2006; Schack & Ritter, 2009) suggests that the 
mental representations of high-level motor skills are also organized within hierarchical 
memory structures comprised of basic action concepts (BACs). Analogous to the well-
established notion of basic concepts in the world of objects (e.g., Mervis & Rosch, 
1981), BACs denote the cognitive compilation of body postures along with their 
sensory consequences that are functionally related to the attainment of action goals. 
From such an action architecture perspective, mental representations can be 
characterized by well integrated networks of action concepts that serve as tools to 
facilitate the controllability of the motor action system (e.g., Bläsing, Schack, & 
Brugger, 2010; Bläsing et al., 2009; Schack & Ritter, 2009). 
By way of an experimental approach, Schack and Mechsner (2006) studied the 
tennis serve in high-level experts compared to low-level and non-tennis players in 
order to investigate the nature and role of long-term memory in skilled athletic 
performance. Employing structural dimensional analysis of mental representation 
(SDA-M; Schack, 2004, 2012), the authors analyzed representational frameworks for 
the tennis serve, and found that the structures of the experts’ representations were 
organized in a distinctive tree-like hierarchy, were remarkably similar across 
individuals, and were well matched with the functional and biomechanical demands of 
the task. In comparison, the structures of mental representations in low-level players 
and non-players were organized in a less distinctive tree-like hierarchy, were much 
more variable across individuals, and were not as well matched with the functional and 
biomechanical demands of the task. 
These results have been shown to generalize across a variety of complex motor 
skills such as in dancing (e.g., Bläsing, 2010; Bläsing et al., 2009), judo (e.g., Weigelt 
et al., 2011), volleyball (e.g., Velentzas et al., 2010), wind surfing (e.g., Schack & 
Hackfort, 2007), and manual action (e.g., Stöckel et al., 2012). Moreover, recent 
research on mental representations in special populations such as children and stroke 
patients (e.g., Braun et al., 2007; Stöckel et al., 2012) suggests that cognitive structures 
differ across both skill-levels and age. For example, Stöckel et al. (2012) examined the 
development of mental representations of grasp postures in children of different ages. 
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Similar to the characteristics of experts’ mental representations, the authors found 9-
year-old children’s mental representations to be hierarchically organized according to 
the function of the grasp postures. Specifically, 9-year-old children’s mental 
representation structures reflected distinct differences between comfortable and 
uncomfortable grasp postures, whereas 7-year-old and 8-year-old children’s mental 
representations were less structured, and did not indicate any distinct differentiation 
between comfortable and uncomfortable grasp postures. From these results, the authors 
concluded that mental representations develop as a function of age, such that a child’s 
ability to successfully distinguish between a comfortable and an uncomfortable grasp 
posture seems to mature on the basis of developing cognitive structures.  
Differences in the mental representation across skill-levels and age suggest the 
idea that motor learning leads to functional adaptations in one’s mental representation 
of a motor skill. That is, novices’ unstructured mental representations are thought to 
develop into more refined and elaborate representations during the process of learning. 
This is in line with the general idea of learning within the cognitive architecture 
framework. From such a perspective, learning is a product of modifying and 
developing the mediating conceptual structures (BACs) within the memory system 
(Schack, 2004; Schack & Ritter, 2013). However, to date, research has largely focused 
on the differences between intact groups (e.g., novices and experts) using a between-
subjects approach. If we assume that learning results in the modification and 
development of mental representations, then changes in one’s representational 
structure should be evident over the course of skill acquisition. Therefore, we 
examined the potential for one’s mental representation to functionally adapt to the 
biomechanical demands of the task during early skill acquisition as a consequence of 
task practice. By creating an experimentally induced controllable learning situation, we 
examined whether performance improvement is accompanied by order formation of 
action-related knowledge in long-term memory. It was predicted that, along with 
performance improvements, changes to the underlying mental representation would be 
evident as a consequence of skill acquisition. Specifically, it was predicted that during 
the course of learning, the initial unstructured mental representation of a novice 
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practice group would elicit structural changes in the form of clusters of BACs which 
are related to the movement and its phases. Furthermore, it was predicted that the 
structural changes would reflect development toward the representation structure of 
expert performers (i.e., functional adaptations). In contrast, a novice control group, 
which does not partake in task practice, was predicted to show no changes to their 
initial unstructured mental representation. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four students (12 women, 12 men; Mage = 27.3 years, SD = 5.9) 
participated in the present study. All participants were novice golfers with no previous 
golf experience. They were randomly assigned to either a practice group (n = 12, Mage 
= 26.08 years, SD = 4.48, 6 male) or a control group (n = 12, Mage = 28.50 years, SD = 
6.95, 6 male), who did not practice the putting task. The study was conducted in 
accordance with local ethical guidelines, and conformed to the declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2.2 Structural dimensional analysis of mental representation 
Although various methods that allow for the study of knowledge-based mental 
representation structures of movements in long-term memory exist (for an overview, 
see Hodges et al., 2007), most of them are non-experimental and focus on explicit 
knowledge (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, paper-and-pencil tests). Aiming at an 
experimental approach in which subjects are not asked to give explicit statements on 
their representation structure, Schack (2012) introduced structural dimensional analysis 
of mental representation (SDA-M). This method provides psychometric data on the 
structure and dimension of mental representations of complex movements in long-term 
memory.  
The SDA-M consists of four steps: In a first step, a split procedure delivers a 
distance scaling between the BACs of a suitably predetermined set. In a second step, a 
hierarchical cluster analysis is used to outline the structure of the given set of BACs. In 
a third step, a factor analysis reveals the dimensions in this structured set of BACs, and 
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in a last step, the cluster solutions are tested for invariance within and between groups 
(for details, see Schack, 2012). 
2.2.3 Selected complex movement and its structure 
The putt in golf is considered one of the most important parts of the game as it 
represents 43% of all golf shots taken during a round of golf (Pelz & Frank, 2000). For 
the purpose of the present study, BACs of golf putting were utilized. In order to specify 
the BACs of the chosen movement, the following steps were necessary: First, the 
movement and movement phases were described in detail with the help of standard 
textbooks (e.g., Hamster, 2008; Pelz & Frank, 2000) and the biomechanical analysis of 
the golf putt. The parts of the movement considered most relevant resulted in a 
preliminary set of 27 meaningful body postures. The 27 body postures were further 
rated and verified by golf experts5
From a functional and biomechanical perspective (cf. Göhner, 1992, 1999), 
each of the 16 BACs can be assigned to a particular movement phase: preparation 
(BAC 1-4), backswing (BAC 5-7), forward swing (BAC 8-11), and attenuation (BAC 
12-16). In other words, the first phase (i.e., preparation phase) consists of the 
performer setting up and aligning her/ his body to the hole. The second phase (i.e., 
backswing) consists of the start of the backswing and transition between back and 
forward swing. The third phase (i.e., forward swing) relates to the acceleration of the 
clubhead as well as to the mechanical and functional qualities associated with 
 (n = 5). In a last step, a final set of 16 BACs were 
selected based on the experts’ ratings.  
Based on the procedure described above, the following 16 BACs for the putt 
were identified: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target 
line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) 
keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders toward the ball, 
(9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at 
impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate 
club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, (16) look to the outcome.  
                                                     
5 Teaching professionals from different golf clubs in Germany. 
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clubhead-ball impact. Finally, the attenuation phase consists of the follow through and 
evaluation of the outcome. 
2.2.4 Apparatus and task 
A standard putter and golf ball were used in the present study. Putts were 
performed on an artificial indoor putting green to a target three meters away from the 
starting point. Participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as accurately as possible 
to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop.6
2.2.5 Procedure 
 Instead of a hole, a target was 
chosen for the present study, in order to measure two-dimensional error scores as 
opposed to hits only. The target was marked by a circle 10.8 cm (4.25 in) in diameter 
in accordance with the size of a regulation golf hole. In order to record the outcome of 
each golf putt, a video camera was positioned above the target to capture a top-down 
view of the final ball position after each putt (field of view: 3.3 m × 1.8 m).  
Mental representation structure was assessed using a splitting task, first step of 
the above described SDA-M, in order to learn about the distance between BACs in 
memory. This splitting task was performed in front of a computer with the screen 
displaying the BACs of the golf putt. In detail, the splitting task proceeds as follows: 
one selected basic action concept is permanently displayed on the screen (anchor 
concept) while the rest of the basic action concepts are presented successively in 
randomized order; participants are asked to decide, one after another, whether a given 
basic action concept is related to the anchor concept or not during movement 
execution; once a given list of BACs is finished, the next BAC serves as an anchor 
concept and the procedure continues. The splitting task ends after each BAC has been 
compared to the remaining BACs in the list. 
The present study consisted of three test days (pre-, post-, retention-test) and 
an acquisition phase (see Table 2.1). 
                                                     
6 Although skilled golfers use a strategy of putting past the hole, requiring our novice 
participants to attempt to stop the ball on the target was not assumed to negatively interfere with 
performance, as the novices would have not previously developed the strategy of putting past the hole. 
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Table 2.1 
Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase 
 Pre-test Acquisition Post-test  Retention-test 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5  Day 8 
Practice group 
(n = 12) 
SDA-M 
Putting practice 
SDA-M  SDA-M 
Putting task Putting task  Putting task 
Control group 
(n = 12) 
SDA-M    SDA-M  SDA-M 
-  -  -  - 
Note: SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task: 3 x 20 putts, putting 
practice: 10 x 20 putts each day. 
2.2.5.1 Pre-test 
On the first day, participants signed informed consent forms. In order to 
become familiar with the movement, all participants watched a video of a skilled golfer 
performing the putting task. Next, the experimenter introduced the participant to the 
splitting task. First, each participant was presented a randomized list of the 16 BACs of 
the putt. The experimenter explained the meaning of each of the 16 BACs to the 
participant in order to ensure comprehension. Next, the participants read the 
instructions on the screen for how to complete the splitting task. Specifically, 
participants were instructed to decide whether the basic action concepts are related to 
one another or not during movement execution. Following, the participants completed 
the splitting task to determine their starting mental representation structures of the putt. 
Furthermore, the practice group then performed three blocks of 20 putts each to assess 
their starting performance level. Participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as 
accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. The control 
group did not perform the putting task. Finally, each participant was asked to not 
consult any information on golf in general and the putt in particular for the duration of 
the experiment. 
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2.2.5.2 Acquisition phase 
The next three days, participants of the practice group performed the putting 
task 10 blocks of 20 putts each day with a short break between every two blocks. No 
feedback on technical issues was given during putting. The only feedback available for 
the participant was that of the visible outcome (i.e., knowledge of result). The control 
group did not practice during this time. 
2.2.5.3 Post-test and retention-test 
During post-test (day five) and retention-test (day eight) all participants 
completed the splitting task again to determine their final mental representation 
structures of the putt movement. Next, participants of the practice group performed 
three blocks of 20 putts once more to assess their final outcome performance. The 
control group again did not perform the putting task. 
2.2.6 Data analysis 
2.2.6.1 Performance 
Putting performance was measured by (a) accuracy, (b) bias, and (c) 
consistency. The accuracy, bias, and consistency of outcomes were assessed using two-
dimensional error scores based on the x and y coordinates of each putt using the center 
of the target as the origin of the axes (see Hancock, Butler, & Fischman, 1995). More 
specifically, accuracy was measured by the mean radial error (MRE), which was 
defined as a subject’s average distance each putt came to the center of the target in 
mm. Bias was represented by subject-centroid radial error (SRE). SRE was defined as 
the radial distance of the subject’s centroid from the center of the target in mm. A 
subject’s centroid is a positionally typical shot whose coordinates are given by the 
average x and average y value of a subject’s shots in mm. Consistency was measured 
by bivariate variable error (BVE). BVE is analogous to variable error in one-
dimensional analyses, and was defined as the square root of a subject’s k shots’ mean 
squared distance from their centroids in mm. To examine performance during 
acquisition phase, a 3 (day) × 10 (block) within-subjects analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) was calculated for each of the dependent variables. Additionally, 
performance from pre- to post- and retention-test was examined using a 1 (group) × 3 
(time of measurement) within-subjects ANOVA for each of the dependent variables. 
For post-hoc analysis, paired t-tests were conducted employing a Bonferroni correction 
(α = .017) to account for the inflation of type I errors. Cohen’s d was used as an 
estimator of effect size (Cohen, 1992). 
2.2.6.2 Mental representation structure 
Mental representation structure was measured by calculation of mean group 
dendrograms via cluster analysis (i.e., by summing the Ζ-matrices of the individuals; 
for more details see Schack, 2012). For all cluster analyses conducted, an alpha-level 
of α = .05 was chosen, which resulted in a critical value dcrit = 3.41. Links between 
BACs above this critical value were considered as statistically irrelevant. In other 
words, BACs linked above this line were treated as being not related, while BACs 
linked below this line resulted in a cluster and therefore were treated as being 
statistically related. Analyses of invariance were conducted in order to compare 
differences between cluster solutions. According to Lander (1991, 1992; see Schack, 
2012), two cluster solutions are variant, that is significantly different, for λ < .68, while 
two cluster solutions are invariant for λ ≥ .68. In addition, the adjusted rand index 
(ARI; Rand, 1971; Santos & Embrechts, 2009) was used to examine the similarity 
between the practice groups’ mental representation and that of expert performers. The 
adjusted rand index serves as an index of similarity on a scale from -1 to 1. On this 
scale, the value “-1” indicates that two cluster solutions are different and the value “1” 
indicates that two cluster solutions are the same. Indices between these extremes rank 
similarity between two cluster solutions. As a reference structure, mental 
representations of two experts were used which reflected well the four movement 
phases (i.e., preparation, backswing, forward swing, and attenuation) of the putt. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Performance 
2.3.1.1 Acquisition phase 
A 3 × 10 within-subjects ANOVA on MRE indicated a significant main effect 
of day, F(2,22) = 23.76, p = < .001, ηp2= .68, as well as a significant main effect of 
block, F(9,99) = 13.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .55 (see also Figure 2.1). The day by block 
interaction, F(18,198) = 1.11, p = .384, ηp2 = .09, was not significant. For bias, a 3 × 
10 within-subjects ANOVA on SRE revealed a significant main effect of block, 
F(9,99) = 8.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. The main effect of day, F(2,22) = 2.49, p = .106, 
ηp2 = .19, as well as the day by block interaction, F(18,198) = 1.35, p = .163, ηp2 = .11, 
were not significant. For consistency, a 3 × 10 within-subjects ANOVA on BVE 
revealed a significant main effect of day, F(2,22) = 18.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, as well 
as a significant main effect of block, F(9,99) = 14.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. The day by 
block interaction, F(18,198) = 1.30, p = .189, ηp2 = .11, was not significant. Thus, for 
the two dependent variables MRE and BVE, performance improved both over 
acquisition days as well as within acquisition days, while for SRE performance 
improved only between acquisition days. 
2.3.1.2 Pre-, post-, and retention-test 
Table 2.2 presents means, standard deviations, and confidence intervals at pre-, 
post- and retention-test for the three dependent variables (accuracy, bias, and 
consistency) for the practice group. With respect to accuracy, a within-subjects 
ANOVA on MRE revealed a significant effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) = 
76.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. Post-hoc analyses indicated that MRE decreased 
significantly from pre-test to post-test, t(11) = 8.49, p < .001, d = 1.60, and from pre-
test to retention-test, t(11) = 11.61, p < .001, d = 2.53, but not from post-test to 
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Figure 2.1. Mean radial error in mm per block for the practice group during acquisition phase (i.e., three 
consecutive days of practice; a = day 1, b = day 2, c = day 3). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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retention-test, t(11) = 2.79, p = .018, d = .54. For bias, a within-subjects ANOVA on 
SRE revealed no significant effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) = .67, p = .500, ηp2 
= .06. Consequently, participants did not differ in their magnitude of bias after task 
practice. For consistency, a within-subjects ANOVA on BVE revealed a significant 
effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) = 73.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. Pairwise 
comparisons indicated that BVE decreased significantly from pre-test to post-test, t(11) 
= 8.06, p < .001, d = 1.37, and from pre-test to retention-test, t(11) = 11.72, p < .001, d 
= 2.08, as well as from post-test to retention-test, t(11) = 2.90, p = .014, d = .48. 
Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics for performance outcome variables across pre-test, post-test, and retention-test for 
the practice group in cm (n = 12) 
 Pre-test Post-test Retention-test 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
MRE 63.20 (11.92) [55.63, 70.77] 43.99 (12.04) [36.34, 51.64] 38.78 (6.65) [34.60, 43.01] 
SRE 13.23 (10.93) [6.29, 20.18] 8.95 (7.73) [4.04, 13.86] 10.60 (8.32) [5.31, 15.89] 
BVE 72.22 (15.99) [62.06, 82.38] 50.60 (15.53) [40.74, 60.74] 44.33 (10.26) [37.81, 50.85] 
Note: MRE = mean radial error (accuracy); SRE = subject-centroid radial error (bias); BVE = bivariate 
variable error (consistency); CI = confidence interval. 
2.3.2 Mental representation structure 
As can be seen in Figure 2.2, cluster analysis revealed little to no clustering in 
the mean group dendrograms of each group at pre-test (with critical value dcrit = 3.41). 
More specifically, the control group’s dendrogram revealed no significant clusters of 
BACs, while the practice group’s dendrogram displayed only a single cluster 
pertaining to aspects of movement preparation, that is to say BAC 2 (align club face 
square to target line) and BAC 3 (grip check). In comparison to the reference structure, 
both dendrograms reflected a very different structure, with the adjusted rand index 
being zero for the control group and close to zero (ARI = .11) for the practice group. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean group dendrograms of (a) the practice group (n = 12) and (b) the control group (n = 12) 
for the golf putt at pre-test. The numbers on the x-axis relate to the BAC number, the numbers on the y-
axis display Euclidean distances. The lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the Euclidean 
distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level (dcrit = 3.41; α = .05): links between 
BACs above this line are considered not related; horizontal grey lines on the bottom mark clusters. BACs: 
(1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the 
hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) 
rotate shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to 
target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) 
direct clubhead to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome. 
While no discernible structure existed for the practice group at baseline (i.e., 
pre-test), significant changes were observed after substantial task practice. More 
specifically, during pre-test examination, the group’s mean dendrogram displayed only 
one cluster of basic action concepts. However, post-test examination as well as for 
retention-test examination of the group’s mean dendrograms uncovered an increase in 
the number of functional clusters (see Figure 2.3). Statistical analyses of invariance 
revealed significant differences between pre-test and post-test (λ = .32) as well as 
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between pre-test and retention-test (λ = .31). The BACs have become clustered into 
three functional units pertaining to the movement preparation phase and the swing 
phase. One cluster denoted the preparation of the putt with BAC 1 (shoulders parallel 
to target line), BAC 2 (align club face square to target line), BAC 3 (grip check), and 
BAC 4 (look to the hole). A second cluster related to aspects of the forward swing with 
BAC 8 (rotate shoulders toward the ball) and BAC 9 (accelerate club). Lastly, a third 
cluster related to clubhead-ball impact as indicated by a cluster including BAC 10 
(impact with the ball) and BAC 11 (club face square to target line at impact). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Mean group dendrograms of the practice group for the golf putt at (a) post-test and (b) 
retention-test (n = 12; α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
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Although the dendrograms for the post-test and retention-test both displayed a 
three cluster solution, one slight difference existed between the post-test and retention-
test dendrogram. Namely, for the preparation phase, the post-test dendrogram consisted 
of three BACs (BAC 2: align club face square to target line; BAC 3: grip check; BAC 
4 - look to the hole), however, the dendrogram for the retention-test included one 
additional BAC (BAC 1: shoulders parallel to target line). Despite this slight 
difference, the two cluster solutions of post-test and retention-test are statistically 
considered the same (λ = .68). 
To assess the degree of functional adaptation, the mental representations of the 
practice group were compared to the mental representation of expert golfers (n = 2). 
The adjusted rand index indicated that over the course of practice, the mean 
dendrograms of the practice group became more similar to those of experts. 
Specifically, when being compared to an expert structure, the mean dendrograms of the 
practice group developed from pre-test (ARI = .11) to post-test (ARI = .49) and 
retention-test (ARI = .70), with the adjusted rand index approaching the value “1”. 
That is, the cluster solutions became more similar to the reference structure (i.e., expert 
structure) over time.  
For the control group, results revealed no changes in the group’s mental 
representation structure for the putt. More specifically, for pre-test as well as for post- 
and retention-test the group’s mean dendrograms indicated no clustering of basic 
action concepts (see Figure 2.4). When being compared to the expert structure, the 
mean dendrograms of the control group did not indicate any development over time 
(ARI = 0 for pre-, post-, as well as retention-test). Each of the 16 BACs of the putting 
movement were treated as independent across pre-, post-, and retention-testing. 
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Figure 2.4. Mean group dendrograms of the control group for the golf putt at (a) post-test and (b) 
retention-test (n = 12; α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
2.4 Discussion 
In the present study, we examined the development and change in both 
performance and the structure of the mental representation of a complex movement 
during early skill acquisition. The results clearly demonstrate order formation of 
action-related knowledge in long-term memory (i.e., changes in mental representation 
structure) that comes along with improvements in outcome performance over the 
course of practice. 
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With respect to outcome performance, accuracy as well as consistency 
increased significantly over the course of the study.7
These findings extend those of Schack and Mechsner (2006) as well as those of 
Bläsing et al. (2009) who showed differences in mental representation structure in 
relation to differences in skill level. In these studies, high skill-level was characterized 
by high order formation, whereas low skill-level was characterized by low order 
 That is, participants in the 
practice group did not only become more accurate, but also more consistent in their 
putting performance. Thus, as we expected, novice golfers’ outcome performance 
became better with practice. This result is in line with the power law of practice (e.g., 
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981; Schmidt & Lee, 2005). The power function and its 
logarithmic relationships between practice trials and performance state that 
performance increases as a function of practice. According to Schmidt and Lee (2005), 
this is especially true for novices since, when being new to a task, there is much room 
left for improvement. Moreover, since performance improvements recorded at post-test 
persisted throughout retention-test, it can be stated that improved outcome performance 
reflects skill acquisition as a result of motor learning.  
With respect to mental representation structure, the practice group’s structure 
elicited changes over the course of practice while the control group, without practice, 
did not show changes in their mental representation structure. Consistent with our 
predictions, following practice the group dendrogram of the practice group indicated 
several meaningful clusters relating to the functional phases of the movement (i.e., 
preparation and forward swing). Moreover, the observed changes revealed a trend 
toward the representational structure of experts as shown by increases in adjusted rand 
indices from pre-, to post-, and to retention-test. Thus, the results of the present study 
clearly demonstrate that practice results in functional adaptations in the mental 
representation of complex action. That is, motor learning in early skill acquisition is 
accompanied by order formation of action-related knowledge in the direction of a 
functional structure of the movement. 
                                                     
7 Although accuracy and consistency increased significantly, a change in bias was not 
significant. This finding was due to the distribution of putts being dispersed uniformly about the hole in 
both the pre-test and post-test. 
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formation. Contrary to such cross-sectional designs, a longitudinal design was chosen 
for the present study. In doing so, the present study was the first to show that the 
mental representation of a complex movement not only differs between subjects 
according to skill level, but develops over time within subjects during skill acquisition. 
The changes observed in the mental representation structures in the present study 
highlight initial functional order formation. In other words, preliminary increases in 
skill level were accompanied by initial changes in the mental representation structure 
toward an expert structure. 
The findings of the present study fit well into the large body of research on the 
learning of perceptual-motor skills, and especially the concept of different stages of 
skill acquisition (e.g., Anderson, 1982, 1995; Fitts & Posner, 1967). According to Fitts 
and Posner (1967) proposing three phases of skill learning (cognitive, associative, and 
autonomous), skill acquisition starts with an early cognitive phase in which a novice 
attempts to understand a task and its demands regardless of whether the attempts are 
guided or not. In collecting information and acquiring knowledge, rules may develop 
resulting in order formation of action-related knowledge, and thus in a functional 
mental representation structure. 
Interestingly, while mental representation structures developed over the course 
of practice, no information on the movement was given besides that provided by the 
video prior to the pre-test. That is, participants of the practice group received no 
explicit instructions in terms of movement technique. This gives rise to the assumption 
that changes in mental representation structure take place during the process of 
learning without explicit guidance on what to pay attention to and how to perform the 
movement. This observation is in line with findings from other studies, suggesting that 
novices are able to accumulate knowledge that directs their performance, even in the 
absence of explicit instructions (e.g., Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996). Relating to this, 
it is currently not clear to what extent explicit or implicit learning processes (cf. 
Masters, 1992) contribute to the development of mental representation structure of 
complex actions. Examining the effect of these learning strategies on skill 
representation may be a fruitful direction for future research. 
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It is also important to note that, besides showing that repeatedly executing a 
movement leads to functional adaptations in one’s mental representation, we were able 
to show, on the other hand, that not executing a movement does not lead to functional 
adaptations in one’s mental representation. Specifically, the mental representation of 
the control group did not reveal any structure, neither at pre-test, post-test, or retention-
test, and thus did not change. Hence, with the longitudinal design of the study, we were 
the first to show that participants, who were not practicing the task, revealed stable 
unstructured representations over time. Consequently, participants did not learn from 
the method itself. Taken together, by showing that the representation structure of the 
control group did not change over time, we were able to demonstrate that SDA-M is a 
reliable method for the investigation of representation structures over time. 
A potential limitation in the current study was that we did not examine whether 
the learned skill transfers to a related task. To this extent, we only focused on the 
persistence of the acquired skill over time, through the use of a retention-test. 
Specifically, we retested subjects after a retention interval of 72 h in order to 
differentiate between immediate performance improvements and persistent 
performance improvements (i.e., learning). However, it would be valuable to test for 
transfer in future studies, in order to examine whether the extent of skill transfer relates 
to mental representation structure. Moreover, investigating the relationship of 
performance and underlying mental representations on an individual level, rather than 
group level, may prove to be a valuable objective for future research. Specifically, 
future research should address the extent to which the degree of improvement in an 
individual’s performance over practice coincides with the degree of development in 
their individual mental representation. 
To conclude, with the present study it was possible to answer the question if, 
during early stages of skill acquisition, performance improvement of a complex 
movement is accompanied by changes in the structure of one’s mental representation 
in long-term memory. According to our results, order formation in mental 
representation structure develops in novices practicing a complex skill. Although the 
results of the present study exclusively relate to early skill acquisition, it is proposed 
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that such changes in mental representation structure will proceed during further skill 
acquisition. It would be of interest to learn more about the evolution and the progress 
of order formation of action-related knowledge, and its relation to learning curves, both 
on a group as well as an individual level. Therefore, changes in mental representation 
structure over the course of learning up to a suitable functional and high-level order 
formation will be a key issue for future research. Specifically, to examine ways to 
facilitate the development of mental representation structure during learning will be a 
main objective in the future. Focusing on the role of the structure of one’s mental 
representation will hopefully shed further light on how to pave the way to expertise, 
the way to both high-level order formation and high-level performance. 
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This chapter is based on the manuscript  
Frank, C., Land, W. M., Popp, C., & Schack, T. (2014). Mental representation and 
mental practice: Experimental investigation on the functional links between 
motor memory and motor imagery. PLoS ONE, 9, e95175. 
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Abstract 
Recent research on mental representation of complex action has revealed 
distinct differences in the structure of representational frameworks between experts 
and novices. More recently, research on the development of mental representation 
structure has elicited functional changes in novices’ representations as a result of 
practice. However, research investigating if and how mental practice adds to this 
adaptation process is lacking. In the present study, we examined the influence of 
mental practice (i.e., motor imagery rehearsal) on both putting performance and the 
development of one’s representation of the golf putt during early skill acquisition. 
Novice golfers (N = 52) practiced the task of golf putting under one of four different 
practice conditions: mental, physical, mental-physical combined, and no practice. 
Participants were tested prior to and after a practice phase, as well as after a three day 
retention interval. Mental representation structures of the putt were measured, using the 
structural dimensional analysis of mental representation. This method provides 
psychometric data on the distances and groupings of basic action concepts in long-term 
memory. Additionally, putting accuracy and putting consistency were measured using 
two-dimensional error scores of each putt. Findings revealed significant performance 
improvements over the course of practice together with functional adaptations in 
mental representation structure. Interestingly, after three days of practice, the mental 
representations of participants who incorporated mental practice into their practice 
regime displayed representation structures that were more similar to a functional 
structure than did participants who did not incorporate mental practice. The findings of 
the present study suggest that mental practice promotes the cognitive adaptation 
process during motor learning, leading to more elaborate representations than physical 
practice only. 
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3.1 Introduction 
According to skill acquisition theories, cognitive mechanisms governing skill 
execution develop over the course of learning (e.g., Anderson, 1982, 1993, 1995; Fitts 
& Posner, 1967; Magill, 2011). To this extent, skill acquisition is known to be 
accompanied by both overt changes (i.e., performance improvements) and covert 
changes (i.e., cognitive improvements) over time. Of particular interest for skill 
acquisition is the role that mental representations play in the learning and control of 
actions. Individuals of different skill levels have been suggested to differ not only in 
their overt performance (e.g., Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), but also in their 
underlying skill representations in long-term memory (e.g., Allard & Burnett, 1985; 
Ericsson & Smith, 1991; French & Thomas, 1987; Huber, 1997; McPherson & 
Thomas, 1989). Consequently, an individual’s mental representation of a motor skill is 
thought to change on his/her way to expertise, namely in the direction of an elaborate, 
well-developed representation (e.g., Ericsson, 2007). 
Knowledge-based mental representation structures in long-term memory have 
been measured using a variety of different methods (for an overview, see Hodges et al., 
2007). One approach, which specifically takes into account the cognitive level of 
motor actions, is the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A; e.g., Schack, 
2004; Schack & Mechsner, 2006; Schack & Ritter, 2009). According to this approach, 
motor learning can be characterized as the modification and adaptation of 
representational frameworks of complex actions in memory. Representational 
frameworks are comprised of basic action concepts (BACs; i.e., cognitive chunks of 
movement postures and their sensory consequences within the realization of an action 
goal), which reflect the building blocks of an action in long-term memory. 
Early research on representational frameworks of complex action has elicited 
distinct differences in the mental representation between experts and novices. Schack 
and Mechsner (2006), for example, investigated representational frameworks of the 
tennis serve in expert and non-expert tennis players using structural dimensional 
analysis of mental representation (SDA-M; e.g., Schack, 2004, 2012). Findings 
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revealed distinct differences between the mental representation of expert and novice 
tennis players such that experts’ structures were more elaborate than novices’ 
structures. More specifically, whereas the mental representations of experts were 
organized hierarchically and structured in a functional way (i.e., BACs being grouped 
according to the functional and biomechanical demands of the tennis serve), the mental 
representations of novices were not. Moreover, novices’ mental representations varied 
greatly in their structure, while those of experts were more similar. From this, the 
authors concluded that such elaborate skill representations in long-term memory play a 
salient role in skilled action. Up to now, distinct differences in representational 
frameworks of complex action have been demonstrated across a variety of sports, such 
as dance (e.g., Bläsing et al., 2009), volleyball (e.g., Velentzas et al., 2010), and 
windsurfing (e.g., Schack & Hackfort, 2007). Furthermore, the results have been 
shown to generalize to developmental aspects of manual action (e.g., Stöckel et al., 
2012), and to special populations (e.g., Braun et al., 2007). 
More recently, Frank, Land, and Schack (2013) examined if and how 
representational frameworks of complex action change over the course of practice in 
early skill acquisition. Specifically, a group of novices practiced a putting task over the 
course of three days, whereas a control group did not putt at all. Mental representation 
structures were recorded prior to and after practice as well as after a three-day retention 
interval. Results indicated that neither of the groups’ mental representations revealed 
any meaningful structure of the putt prior to practice. However, along with 
performance improvements, changes in the mental representation structure were 
evident for the practice group. Specifically, after substantial putting practice, the 
mental representation of the practice group revealed a structure that reflected key parts 
of the movement phase pertaining to the functional and biomechanical demands of the 
task. For the control group, however, no changes in mental representation of the putt 
were evident from pre-, to post- and to retention-test. From this, it was concluded that 
the acquisition of motor skills is associated with functional adaptations of the 
representational frameworks in long-term memory. In addition to the research showing 
the changes in mental representation over the course of skill acquisition, more recently, 
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Land, Frank, & Schack (2014) demonstrated that the type of instructions given to 
novices during learning (here: internal vs. external focus) can influence the rate of 
representation development. Results indicated that learners instructed to adopt an 
external focus of attention performed with greater putting accuracy and consistency, 
while also revealing a greater degree of development in their mental representation of 
the putting task. 
Interestingly, while instructional type has been shown to influence the 
development of mental representations during skill acquisition, research to date has yet 
to consider the influence that mental practice can have on this process. As an important 
means to promote motor skill acquisition, mental practice has received a great deal of 
attention in the last 50 years within cognitive sport psychology. Mental practice in the 
sense of motor imagery rehearsal refers to the act of repeatedly simulating (i.e., 
imagining) a motor action in one’s mind without actually executing it at the same time 
(e.g., Jeannerod, 1994, 1995, 2004; Moran, Guillot, MacIntyre, & Collet, 2012). 
Unlike perception, imagery can be understood as the creation or re-creation of real-
world experiences in the absence of the actual sensory stimuli (e.g., Annett, 1995a; 
Farah, 1984; Morris et al., 2005). Accordingly, in contrast to actual or physical 
practice, which implies overtly rehearsing a motor action, mental practice in the sense 
of motor imagery rehearsal refers to the covert rehearsal of a motor action by way of 
imagery. 
Up to now, mental practice has proven to be an effective tool, both to improve 
performance and to promote learning (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz & Landers, 
1983; Feltz et al., 1988; Grouios, 1992; Hinshaw, 1991). Meta-analyses studying the 
effectiveness of mental practice have reported small to moderate effect sizes (i.e., d = 
.48 to d = .68), suggesting that mental practice, although not as effective as physical 
practice, significantly influences performance compared to no practice. While, to date, 
no meta-analysis exists that has thoroughly examined the effectiveness of a 
combination of physical and mental practice, findings from various studies support the 
superiority of such a combined type of practice on performance (e.g., Hall, Buckolz, & 
Fishburne, 1992; McBride & Rothstein, 1979; Stebbins, 1968). From this and other 
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research, mental practice can be considered as an effective means to improve 
performance and to promote learning. Specifically, comparing the effectiveness of 
each practice type (i.e., combined practice (CP) – physical practice (PP) – mental 
practice (MP) – no practice (NP)), combined practice has been shown to be most 
effective, followed by physical practice, while mental practice is less effective than its 
physical counterpart, but more effective than no practice (i.e., CP > PP > MP > NP). 
Researchers have suggested a variety of possible explanations for the 
underlying mechanisms of mental practice (for an overview, see Grouios, 1992; Morris 
et al., 2005). Two early theories offer two distinct perspectives, one focusing on more 
peripheral processes (i.e., psychoneuromuscular theory; Jacobson, 1931), and one 
focusing on more central mechanisms (i.e., symbolic learning theory; Sackett, 1934). 
The psychoneuromuscular theory (Jacobson, 1931) is centered around the activation of 
muscles during imagery. According to this theory, mental practice is thought to 
facilitate the performance and the learning of a movement such that it causes a similar 
activation pattern of muscles as during movement execution, which in turn aids 
subsequent movement execution. In contrast to this more peripheral motor explanation, 
the symbolic learning theory (Sackett, 1934), representing a cognitive explanation, 
proposes that the sequence of a movement is coded through symbols. Accordingly, 
mental practice is thought to facilitate performing a movement sequence through the 
repetition of symbolic components of the movement sequence resulting in a better 
symbolic representation. 
More recently, the increasing interest in and findings from neurophysiological 
research have led to an explanation for the effects of mental practice which is known as 
the principle of functional equivalence (Finke, 1979; Jeannerod, 1994, 1995; Johnson, 
1980). This principle focuses on central mechanisms as well, and as such proposes that 
the simulation of a movement (i.e., motor imagery) and the execution of a movement 
are functionally equivalent. Thus, as stated by the functional equivalence principle, 
mental practice to some extent involves the same underlying structures and covert 
processes as physical practice. Specifically, during motor imagery, the mental 
representation of a motor action is activated in order to enable the imager to imagine 
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the movement, and it is stabilized as a result of repeatedly imagining the movement. In 
this sense, mental practice is thought to help improve performance and learning in a 
functionally equivalent way as physical practice does. Up to now, findings from 
neurophysiological research mainly support the functional equivalence between the 
simulation and the execution of an action (e.g., Decety, 1996; Jeannerod, 1994; 
Jeannerod & Decety, 1995; for a review, see Lotze & Halsband, 2006). Moreover, 
neurophysiological studies have shown that both mental and physical practice lead to 
significant changes in neural networks during skill acquisition (e.g., Lafleur et al., 
2002; Ungerleider, Doyon, & Karni, 2002; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012). 
However, although neurophysiological studies elicit changes in brain activation 
following mental practice, it is not clear, what these changes stand for on a cognitive 
representational level. Such changes in neurophysiological variables point to the idea 
that functional changes on a cognitive level (i.e., concept formation in one’s mental 
representation) may take place during mental practice. 
Taken together, while the acquisition of a complex motor skill by way of 
physical practice has been shown to be accompanied by the formation of representation 
structures in long-term memory, it is currently unclear how mental practice affects this 
representation formation process. Analogous to changes in brain activation on a neural 
level, mental practice may lead to functional adaptations in mental representation on a 
cognitive level. That is, we expect mental practice to add to the development of 
representation structures. Moreover, examining the effect of mental practice on both 
the overt level of performance and the covert level of mental representations in novices 
might help to gain more detailed understanding of the covert processes that do or do 
not lead to performance improvements and learning in early skill acquisition. To date, 
research examining how mental practice affects both overt motor performance and 
covert mental representation is lacking. Hence, with the present study, recreating the 
typical four groups mental practice design (for more details, see Feltz et al., 1988; 
Taktek, 2004), we aim at bridging this gap by examining the effects of mental practice 
on both the performance level and the mental representation level. In short, we 
examined how physical practice, mental practice, and a combination of both affect the 
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performance and the development of one’s mental representation of a golf putting task. 
Based on previous findings, it was predicted that putting performance would change 
according to type of practice such that combined practice would be superior to physical 
practice, which in turn would be superior to mental practice (i.e., CP > PP > MP > NP). 
Furthermore, it was predicted that, along with performance improvements, changes to 
the underlying mental representation would be evident as a consequence of skill 
acquisition. Specifically, it was predicted that novices’ unstructured mental 
representation would turn into a more structured representation with practice. More 
importantly however, we were interested in what impact mental practice would have 
on mental representation development, and whether this related to performance. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-two students participated in the present study. All participants were 
novice golfers with no prior experience in golf. Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of four groups: mental practice group (n = 13, Mage =23.15 years, SD = 
2.28, 8 female), physical practice group (n = 13, Mage =24.54 years, SD = 3.64, 9 
female), mental-physical combined practice group (n = 13, Mage = 23.69 years, SD = 
2.93, 9 female) and no practice group (n = 13, Mage = 27.31 years, SD = 5.53, 8 
female). The experimental procedure and written consent form for this study were 
approved by the ethics committee at Bielefeld University, and adhered to the ethical 
standards of the sixth revision of the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave 
their informed written consent to participate in the study. 
3.2.2 Tasks and measures 
3.2.2.1 Performance 
A standard putter and a standard golf ball were used in the present study. Golf 
putts were performed on an artificial indoor putting green (size: 4 × 7 m). Participants 
performed putts to a target three meters away from the starting point. Specifically, 
participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on 
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which the ball was supposed to stop. The target was marked by a circle 10.8 cm (4.25 
in) in diameter in accordance with the size of a regular golf hole. The outcome of each 
golf putt was recorded by capturing the final ball position after each putt with a motion 
capture system. Specifically, 6 T10 CCD cameras captured and tracked the golf ball 
rolling and stopping, with a spatial resolution of approximately 0.25 mm and a 
temporal resolution of 200 Hz. 
3.2.2.2 Mental representation structure 
In order to assess mental representation structure, we employed structural 
dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M). This method provides 
psychometric data on the structure and dimension of mental representations of complex 
movements in long-term memory. More specifically, the SDA-M proceeds in four 
steps: (1) a split procedure delivering a distance scaling between the BACs of a 
suitably predetermined set, (2) a hierarchical cluster analysis used to outline the 
structure of the given set of BACs, (3) a factor analysis revealing the dimensions in 
this structured set of BACs, and (4) an analysis of invariance within- and between-
groups in order to compare different cluster solutions (for details, see Schack, 2012). 
More specifically, in order to determine distances between BACs in memory, mental 
representation structure was assessed by way of a splitting task, first step of the SDA-
M described above. The splitting task operates as follows: one BAC of the putt is 
permanently displayed on a computer screen (i.e., the anchor concept), while the rest of 
the concepts are presented one after another in randomized order. Participants are 
instructed to indicate whether a given BAC is related to the anchor concept or not 
during movement execution. As soon as a list of BACs is finished, another BAC takes 
the anchor position and the procedure continues. The splitting task is completed after 
each BAC has been compared to the remaining BACs (n-1).  
In order to examine the underlying representation structure of the putt, the 
BACs of the movement have been adopted from Frank et al. (2013). Accordingly, the 
following 16 BACs for the putt were used in the present study: (1) shoulders parallel to 
target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, 
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(5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth 
transition, (8) rotate shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with 
the ball, (11) club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate 
shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned 
position, (16) look to the outcome. Each of these 16 BACs of the putt can be 
designated to one movement phase: preparation (BAC 1-4), backswing (BAC 5-7), 
forward swing (BAC 8-9), impact (10-13) and attenuation (BAC 14-16). 
3.2.2.3 Imagery ability 
Visual and kinesthetic imagery ability was measured using the revised version 
of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ-R; Hall & Martin, 1997). Accordingly, 
participants were asked to perform, imagine and finally rate their imagery experience 
of a series of movements. More specifically, after having performed a given 
movement, participants were instructed to either “see” or “feel” the movement without 
actually performing it. Next, they were asked to rate the ease or difficulty of imagining 
the movement on a 7-point Likert scale. This procedure was repeated for four different 
movements, and for both visual and kinesthetic imagery, resulting in eight items. 
3.2.2.4 Manipulation check 
For the two groups involving mental practice in their practice regime, as 
suggested by Goginsky and Collins (1996), a post-experimental questionnaire was 
administered following each practice session in order to investigate whether 
participants performed the imagery as instructed. Specifically, participants of the 
mental practice groups were asked to describe the content of their imagery in detail. In 
addition, they had to indicate on 7-point Likert scales (1= very difficult, 7= very easy), 
how easy it was for them to follow the instructions in general, as well as how easy it 
was to “see” and how easy it was to “feel” the movement in particular. Also, 
participants were asked how often they used an external perspective and how often 
they used an internal perspective (7-point Likert scales; 1= never, 7= always) during 
their imagery. Furthermore, they were asked whether they had experienced any 
problems, and whether they had any previous experience with imagery. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
The present study consisted of a pre-test, an acquisition phase on three 
consecutive days, followed by a post-test and a retention-test 72 hours later (see Table 
3.1). 
Table 3.1 
Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase 
 Pre-test Acquisition Post-test 
 
Retention-test 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5  Day 8 
Combined 
practice group 
(n = 13) 
SDA-M Putting practice  
(executed and  
imagined putts) 
SDA-M  SDA-M 
Putting task Putting task  Putting task 
Physical 
practice group 
(n = 13) 
SDA-M 
Putting practice  
(executed putts only) 
SDA-M  SDA-M 
Putting task Putting task  Putting task 
Mental 
practice group 
(n = 13) 
SDA-M 
Putting practice 
(imagined putts only) 
SDA-M  SDA-M 
Putting task Putting task  Putting task 
Control group 
(n = 13) 
SDA-M 
No putting practice 
(reading) 
SDA-M  SDA-M 
Putting task Putting task  Putting task 
Note: SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task on test days: 3 x 20 
putts; putting practice during acquisition phase: 3 x 20 (imagined or/ and executed) putts per day (practice 
groups) or 20 min of reading per day (control group). 
3.2.3.1 Pre-test 
On the first day, each participant signed informed consent forms. In order to 
become familiar with the movement, each participant watched a video of a skilled 
golfer performing the putting task. An introduction to the splitting task by the 
experimenter followed (for details on the SDA-M, see chapter 3.2.2). Before 
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completing the splitting task, each participant was presented a randomized list of the 
16 BACs of the putt. In order to ensure comprehension of the concepts, the 
experimenter explained the meaning of each of the 16 BACs to the participant. Next, 
the participants read the instructions on how to complete the splitting task. 
Specifically, participants were asked to decide whether the presented BACs are related 
to one another or not during movement execution. Following, the participants 
completed the splitting task. This procedure served to determine their starting mental 
representation structure of the putt. In order to assess their starting performance level, 
each participant then performed three blocks of 20 putts each. They were instructed to 
putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed 
to stop. As a measure of imagery ability, each participant completed the MIQ-R. 
3.2.3.2 Practice phase 
The next three days, participants of each practice group performed three blocks 
of twenty putts each (either physically or mentally or a combination of both), while 
participants of the control group did not practice the putt at all.  
Physical practice (PP) group. Physical practice consisted of three blocks of 20 
actual putts on each day of the practice phase. Specifically, participants were instructed 
to putt as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. 
No additional information (e.g., technical feedback) was given. The visible outcome of 
the putt (i.e., knowledge of result) was the only feedback available for the participants.  
Mental practice (MP) group. Mental practice on each practice day was 
comprised of specific motor imagery (i.e., putting imagery). Participants in this group 
did not physically execute the putt during practice. The motor imagery consisted of 
three blocks of 20 imagined putts each with a short break between the blocks. More 
specifically, each participant was asked to take the starting position as if they were 
going to actually putt. That is, participants stood upright on the green with the putter in 
their hands and their eyes closed. Next, the imagery script was read out loud to each 
participant, both at the beginning and before each block. Predefined by the script, 
participants were asked to imagine both the putting movement as well as the ball 
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rolling toward the target and stopping on the target. In order to control for as many 
aspects during imagery as possible and to optimize the efficacy of the imagery 
intervention, participants were further told to imagine from an internal perspective (i.e., 
imagery perspective), to incorporate all the senses in their imagery (i.e., imagery 
modality), and to try and imagine as clear and as vivid as possible (i.e., imagery 
vividness) (cf. Holmes & Collins, 2001). After the script was read, participants 
imagined repeatedly the putting movement on their own. In order to enable the 
experimenter to control for the intended number of putts, participants were asked to 
indicate when having finished one putt in their imagery by slightly raising their index 
finger. Following imagery, participants of the mental practice group filled out a 
postexperimental questionnaire.  
Combined practice (mental and physical practice; CP) group. The combined 
practice consisted of three blocks of twenty putts on each day of the practice phase, 
with each block consisting of 10 imagined followed by 10 actual putts (for specific 
instructions for each of the two types of practice, see both the physical practice group 
and mental practice group descriptions).  
No practice (control; NP) group. The control group neither imagined nor 
executed the putting movement during the practice phase. Instead, participants in the 
control group were asked to read about golf in general in “Dream on: one hack golfer’s 
challenge to break par in a year” (Richardson, 2011). The reading lasted for twenty 
minutes each day, which is approximately the time needed to imagine three blocks of 
20 putts. 
3.2.3.3 Post-test and retention-test 
In order to determine their final mental representation structures of the putting 
movement, all participants completed the splitting task again, one day after acquisition 
phase as well as after a retention interval of three days. In addition, each participant 
performed three blocks of 20 putts once more to assess their final outcome 
performance for post- and retention-test. 
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3.2.4 Data analysis 
3.2.4.1 Mental representation structure 
The structure of mental representations was assessed by way of cluster analysis 
resulting in mean group dendrograms (for more details, see Schack, 2012). For all 
cluster analyses conducted, an alpha-level of α = .05 was chosen, resulting in a critical 
value dcrit = 3.41. BACs linked above this critical value were considered irrelevant. 
That is, links between concepts above this value were considered not related, while 
concepts linked below this value were considered related and thus resulted in a cluster. 
In order to compare differences between cluster solutions, analyses of invariance were 
conducted (Lander, 1991, 1992; see Schack, 2012). Accordingly, cluster solutions are 
variant (i.e., differ), for λ < .68, while cluster solutions are invariant (i.e., do not differ) 
for λ ≥ .68. Moreover, the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI; Rand, 1979; Santos & 
Embrechts, 2009) was used to further investigate the degree of similarity between 
mean group dendrograms and a reference dendrogram reflecting the different 
movement phases. The Adjusted Rand Index is an index of similarity, ranging on a 
scale from -1 to 1. As the value “-1” denotes that cluster solutions are different and the 
value “1” denotes that two cluster solutions are the same, indices between “-1” and “1” 
mark the degree of similarity between two cluster solutions. 
3.2.4.2 Performance 
Putting performance was measured by two outcome variables (i.e., accuracy 
and consistency) for each time of measurement. Specifically, accuracy and consistency 
were calculated using two-dimensional error scores based on the x and y coordinates of 
each putt with the center of the target being the origin of the axes (see Hancock et al., 
1995). Accuracy was measured by mean radial error (MRE), defined as a subject’s 
average distance each putt came to the center of the target in mm. Consistency was 
measured by bivariate variable error (BVE), analogous to variable error in one-
dimensional analyses, and defined as the square root of a subject’s k shots’ mean 
squared distance from their centroids in mm. A subject’s centroid is a positionally 
typical shot whose coordinates are given by the average x and average y value of a 
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subject’s shots in mm. Learning over time was analyzed by way of two separate one-
way MANCOVAs on both the post-test scores and the retention-test scores of the two 
dependent variables MRE and BVE. Specifically, a one-way MANCOVA on post-test 
scores with group as a between-subjects factor and pre-test scores as a covariate was 
conducted in order to examine whether the groups differed in their performance after 
acquisition phase as a result of practice condition, thereby controlling for potential 
differences in their pre-test performance. Regarding retention, a one-way MANCOVA 
on retention-test scores with group as a between-subjects factor and pre-test scores as a 
covariate was performed in order to examine whether the groups differed in their level 
of performance after a three day period of no practice, while controlling for the level of 
performance at baseline. Next, separate one-way ANCOVAs were conducted for each 
of the dependent variables. As directional effects had been specified a priori (CP > PP 
> MP > NP), one-tailed pairwise comparisons based on estimated marginal means 
served as tests of significance. A Holm-Bonferroni correction was employed in order 
to account for the inflation of type I errors (Holm, 1979). Cohen’s d was used as an 
estimate of effect size (Cohen, 1992). 
3.2.4.3 Imagery ability 
In order to compare imagery ability between groups, three separate one-way 
ANOVAs on overall imagery ability (i.e., both scales together) as well as on visual and 
kinesthetic imagery ability were conducted. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Imagery ability 
Overall, participants reported acceptable visual imagery ability (M = 21.46, SD 
= 3.84.; 5.37 per item) as well as acceptable kinesthetic imagery ability (M = 19.77, SD 
= 4.47.; 4.94 per item). Specifically, on average participants scored approximately 5 on 
both scales (i.e., somewhat easy to see/ feel), which is considered as sufficient imagery 
ability for subsequent mental practice sessions (e.g., Smith & Collins, 2004; Smith, 
Wright, & Cantwell, 2008). In addition, one-way ANOVAs on imagery ability 
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revealed no main effect of group, neither for overall imagery ability, F(3,48) = .273, p 
= .845, ηp2 = .017, nor for visual imagery ability, F(3,48) = .170, p = .916, ηp2 = .011, 
or kinesthetic imagery ability, F(3,48) = .198, p = .897, ηp2 = .012, indicating that 
imagery ability was similar for each of the four groups. 
3.3.2 Manipulation check 
In order to ensure that participants of the mental and mental-physical combined 
practice group had performed the imagery as instructed, participants’ manipulation 
check responses were analyzed. None of the participants had prior imagery experience. 
In addition, none of the participants reported any problems during imagery sessions. 
Relating to the content of imagery, each participant mentioned the putting movement 
as well as the ball rolling in their descriptions of imagery content. Furthermore, for 
imagery perspective, mean scores during practice phase were 6.40, very often (SD = 
.53) for internal perspective and 1.80, almost never (SD = .85) for external perspective, 
indicating that participants of the mental practice and the mental-physical combined 
practice group had adopted an internal perspective during imagery. For ease of visual 
and kinesthetic imagery, participants scored an average of 4.37, neither easy nor 
difficult (SD = 1.40) for visual imagery and 4.67, somewhat easy to feel (SD = 1.49) for 
kinesthetic imagery, meaning that they had been able to “see” and to “feel” the 
movement while imagining. For instructions in general, mean scores were 4.73, 
somewhat easy (SD = 1.29), indicating that participants had been able to follow the 
instructions during imagery. Thus, participants had been able to perform the imagery 
as instructed, which was considered a prerequisite for subsequent data analyses. 
3.3.3 Mental representation structure 
While cluster analysis revealed little to no clustering in the mean group 
dendrograms of each group for pre-test, each practice group’s dendrograms revealed 
changes over time (see Figures 3.1-3.3). 
Mental practice group. While no distinct structure existed for the mental 
practice group at pre-test, a more elaborate mental representation structure was evident 
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Figure 3.1. Mean group dendrograms of the mental practice group (n = 13) for the golf putt. The 
dendrograms refer to (a) pre-test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test. The numbers on the x-axis relate to 
the BAC number, the numbers on the y-axis display Euclidean distances. The lower the link between 
related BACs, the lower is the Euclidean distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level 
(dcrit = 3.41; α = .05): links between BACs above this line are considered not related; horizontal grey lines 
on the bottom mark clusters. BACs: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target 
line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder 
triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with 
the ball, (11) club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through 
the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome. 
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after acquisition phase (see Figure 3.1). More specifically, four functional clusters 
were observed in the mental practice group’s mean dendrogram at post-test, pertaining 
to three phases of the putt: preparation (i.e., BAC 2, 3), forward swing and impact (i.e., 
BAC 8, 9 as well as BAC 10, 11, 13), and attenuation (i.e., BAC 14, 16). The same 
was true for retention-test with some minor differences for impact phase (i.e., two 
separate clusters: BAC 10, 11 as well as 12, 13). Thus, for the mental practice group, 
an increase in the number of functional clusters was apparent in their mental 
representation structure over the course of the study. Statistical analyses of invariance 
confirmed the above presented descriptive results, revealing significant differences in 
representation structure between pre- and post-test, pre- and retention-test, as well as 
between post- and retention-test (λ < .68). What is more, increasing adjusted rand 
indices from pre-test (ARI = .17) to post-test (ARI = .44) and to retention-test (ARI = 
.44) indicated that, over the course of mental practice, the mean dendrograms of the 
mental practice group became more similar to the reference dendrogram (for an 
overview of ARIs, see Table 3.2). Hence, the changes in representation structure of the 
mental practice group are functional, and reflect a development towards an optimal 
structure. 
Combined practice group. Similar to the mental practice group, the mental 
representation structure of the combined practice group was more elaborate after 
acquisition phase (see Figure 3.2). Again, four functional clusters were evident in the 
combined practice group’s mean dendrogram at post-test, pertaining to preparation 
(i.e., BAC 2, 3), forward swing and impact phase (i.e., BAC 8, 9 as well as BAC 10, 
11), and attenuation (i.e., BAC 14, 16). For retention-test, the mean group dendrogram 
revealed basically the same structure with some minor differences in the preparation 
(i.e., comprised of one additional concept: BAC 2, 3, 4) and the forward swing and 
impact phase (i.e., BAC 8, 9 and BAC 10, 11, 13). Hence, for the combined practice 
group, the number of functional clusters increased as well over the course of the study. 
Statistical analyses of invariance indicated significant differences in representation 
structure between pre- and post-test, pre- and retention-test, as well as between post- 
and retention-test (λ < .68). When being compared to the reference structure, 
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Figure 3.2. Mean group dendrograms of the combined practice group (n = 13) for the golf putt. The 
dendrograms refer to (a) pre-test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
increasing adjusted rand indices from pre-test (ARI = .09) to post-test (ARI = .31) and 
retention-test (ARI = .50) were evident, confirming that the mental representation 
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structure of the combined practice group developed towards the reference structure 
over the course of the study. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean group dendrograms of the physical practice group (n = 13) for the golf putt. The 
dendrograms refer to (a) pre-test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
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Physical practice group. In contrast to the mental and the mental-physical 
combined practice groups, only minor changes in the mental representation structure of 
the putt were evident for the physical practice group (see Figure 3.3). Specifically, 
while the mean group dendrogram of the practice group revealed no cluster at pre-test, 
the dendrograms revealed one cluster for post-test (i.e., attenuation: BAC 14, 16). For 
retention-test, one meaningful cluster pertaining to the impact phase (i.e., BAC 10, 11, 
13) was evident. Statistical analyses of invariance revealed significant differences 
between pre- and post-test, pre- and retention-test, as well as between post- and 
retention-test (λ < .68). Interestingly, the practice group’s structure revealed only small 
changes toward the reference structure, with ARI increasing from pre-test (ARI = 0) to 
post-test (ARI = .09), and to retention-test (ARI = .24). 
Control group. For the control group, changes in mental representation 
structure were small (see Figure 3.4). Specifically, while there were no clusters evident 
at pre-test, the control group’s dendrogram revealed one cluster pertaining to aspects of 
attenuation of the putting stroke (i.e., BAC 14, 16) at post-test. After the retention 
interval, the mean dendrogram additionally revealed a second cluster reflecting parts of 
the preparation (i.e., BAC 2, 3). Statistical analyses of invariance indicated significant 
differences in representation structure between pre- and post-test, between pre- and 
retention-test, as well as between post- and retention-test (λ < .68). Furthermore, in 
comparison to the reference structure, the control group’s structure showed only a 
slight trend towards that structure over time, with ARI increasing from pre-test (ARI = 
0), to post-test (ARI = .08), and to retention-test (ARI = .17). 
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Figure 3.4. Mean group dendrograms of the control group (n = 13) for the golf putt. The dendrograms 
refer to (a) pre-test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
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Table 3.2 
Degrees of change in adjusted rand indices over the course of the study 
  Degree of change in adjusted rand indices 
  Pre- to 
post-test  
Pre- to 
retention-test  
Post- to 
retention-test 
Combined practice 
group 
(n = 13) 
 .22  .41  .19 
Mental practice group 
(n = 13) 
 .27  .27  .00 
Physical practice group 
(n = 13) 
 .09  .25  .15 
No practice group 
(n = 13) 
 .08  .17  .09 
Note: The adjusted rand index serves as an index of similarity on a scale from -1 to 1. On this scale, the 
value “-1” indicates that two cluster solutions (here: mean group dendrograms and the reference) are 
different and the value “1” indicates that two cluster solutions are the same. Indices between these 
extremes rank similarity between two cluster solutions. 
Thus, each group’s mental representation changed over the course of practice. 
Moreover, each group’s structure developed to some extent in direction of the 
reference structure. More importantly, whereas the control and the physical practice 
groups’ mental representations elicited only minor changes over the course of the study 
and showed only a small development towards the reference structure, the 
representation structures of the mental and the mental-physical combined practice 
group changed more, and approached more so an optimal representation. 
3.3.4 Outcome performance 
For the four groups, putting performance from pre-, to post- and to retention-
test is displayed in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. As seen in Figure 3.5 and 3.6, the physical and 
the mental-physical combined practice groups performed more accurately and 
consistently after the acquisition phase, followed by the mental practice group, whereas 
CHAPTER 3 
96  
the control group performed worst. After a three day retention interval, however, the 
mental-physical combined practice group performed with the greatest accuracy and 
consistency followed by the physical and the mental practice groups, while the control 
group again performed worst (see Figure 3.5 and 3.6).  
 
Figure 3.5. Putting accuracy. Mean radial error (i.e., accuracy) in mm from pre-test to post- and retention-
test. The different lines relate to the different groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Regarding the acquisition phase, a one-way MANCOVA on post-test scores of 
MRE and BVE revealed a significant main effect of group, Wilks’ Lambda = .750, 
F(6,90) = 2.326, p = .037, ηp2 = .133, 1-β = .784. Subsequent one-way ANCOVAs 
revealed a main effect of group for MRE, F(3,46) = 3.218, p = .031, ηp2 = .173, 1-β = 
.704 as well as for BVE, F(3,46) = 3.416, p = .025, ηp2 = .182, 1-β = .733. For MRE, 
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pairwise comparisons incorporating a Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed no 
significant differences among the groups. For BVE, pairwise comparisons revealed 
that the combined practice group performed with more consistency compared to both 
the mental practice group (p = .005; αcrit = .008) and the control group (p = .009; αcrit = 
.010) post practice. The physical practice group, however, did not perform significantly 
different compared to either the mental practice group (p = .032; αcrit =.013), or the 
control group (p = .052; αcrit = .017). Regarding retention, a one-way MANCOVA on 
retention-test scores of MRE and BVE revealed no significant main effect of group, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .849, F(6,90) = 1.279, p = .275, ηp2 = .079, 1-β = .479. 
 
Figure 3.6. Putting consistency. Bivariate variable error (i.e., consistency) in mm from pre-test to post- 
and retention-test. The different lines relate to the different groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Taken together, although the groups did not show differences in learning in 
terms of putting accuracy, clear differences were observed in terms of putting 
consistency such that the combined practice led to more consistent putting compared to 
both mental practice only and no practice. However, these differences between groups 
did not persist over the three day retention interval. 
3.4 Discussion 
In the present study, we investigated the effect of three different types of 
practice (mental practice, physical practice and their combination) in comparison to a 
no practice control group on both the performance and the mental representation 
structure of a complex movement during early skill acquisition. Overall, findings 
clearly denote order formation of basic action concepts of the putt together with 
improvements in putting performance. Interestingly, both types of practice involving 
imagery rehearsal (i.e., mental practice and combined practice) led to more structured 
and more elaborate representations, compared to physical practice and no practice.  
While the mental representation structure of the control group and the physical 
practice group changed only marginally over time, the representation structure of the 
mental practice and the combined practice group elicited distinct changes over 
practice. Both after acquisition and after a retention interval of three days, the 
dendrograms of the mental practice as well as the combined practice group revealed 
four meaningful cluster, pertaining to functional aspects of the movement, and 
assignable to three movement phases in a golf putt (i.e., preparation, forward swing 
and impact, attenuation). Furthermore, changes in representation structures reflected a 
development towards a reference structure as indicated by increases in adjusted rand 
indices from pre-, to post-, and to retention-test. In contrast, the dendrograms of the 
control and the physical practice group revealed only minor changes over time. While 
for both groups one cluster relating to attenuation was evident after acquisition, the two 
dendrograms differed after a retention interval of three days. Specifically, the control 
groups mean dendrogram reflected two clusters pertaining to the beginning and the end 
of the movement (i.e., preparation and attenuation), whereas the physical practice 
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group’s dendrogram consisted of a cluster pertaining to the main phase of the 
movement (i.e., forward swing and impact). However, the small increases in adjusted 
rand indices from pre-, to post-, and to retention-test reflect only minimal development 
towards the reference representation. Thus, the mental and mental-physical combined 
practice led to more elaborate representation structures, more closely resembling an 
optimal representation, compared to the physical and no practice.  
The results of the present study extend research on mental representations of 
complex action. Early research in this field, relating mental representation structure 
and skill level, has shown that high skill-level is associated with high order formation, 
and that low skill-level is associated with low order formation in long-term memory 
(e.g., Schack & Mechsner, 2006). Recently, Frank et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
practice leads to functional adaptations in one’s mental representation of a complex 
action. Employing a similar design, the present study both replicates and extends 
findings reported by Frank et al. (2013). Similar to the study of Frank et al. (2013), 
mental representation structure were found to develop over the course of practice. 
More importantly, however, the present study extends findings obtained by Frank et al. 
(2013) by showing that mental practice adds to the adaptation process leading to even 
more elaborate mental representations compared to physical practice alone. 
Specifically, mental practice as well as combined mental-physical practice led to more 
structured representations than physical practice only and no practice. More 
specifically, mental representations of the putt were more similar to the reference 
structure for the practice groups involving mental practice of the skill than for the 
groups involving either physical practice only or no practice of the skill. From this, 
mental practice seems to lead to more developed mental representations than physical 
practice during early skill acquisition.  
Interestingly, the mental representations of the four groups revealed slightly 
different patterns prior to the acquisition phase (see Figures 3.1a, 3.2a, 3.3a, 3.4a). To 
what extent this might influence the rate of representation development is unclear. To 
date, no research has examined whether the rate of development is influenced by the 
degree of structure in one’s initial mental representation. In other words, it is 
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conceivable that more or less structured initial representations may relate to the speed 
at which the structures change over the course of a practice interval. Consequently, 
future research is needed to clarify this point and help shed light on the learning 
process.  
With respect to outcome performance, the combined practice led to more 
consistent putting performance over the course of learning compared to both mental 
practice only and no practice in the present study. This is in line with findings from 
previous research suggesting that a combination of physical and mental practice is 
most effective for the learning of a new motor skill (e.g., Hall et al., 1992). While the 
degree to which the groups learned during skill acquisition was influenced by practice 
type in the present study, these differences did not persist over the course of three days 
of no practice. Similar to other studies investigating the effect of mental practice on the 
retention of a motor skill (e.g., Spittle & Kremer, 2010), the groups did not differ in 
their retention performance of the acquired putting skill over the course of the retention 
interval.  
While differences in putting consistency according to practice type were 
obvious after acquisition phase, no differences were found in putting accuracy in the 
present study. That is, participants differed in how consistent their putting was, but not 
in how accurate each putt came to the target. Moreover, physical practice did not 
significantly differ from either mental or no practice, neither in terms of accuracy nor 
in terms of consistency. Two main reasons may have caused the lack of differences 
during acquisition phase. First, as reflected by the minor changes in mental 
representation structure, participants in the control group seem to have learned from 
test trials. Thus, increases in putting performance for the control group may be due to 
repeatedly executing the putt during test days. Second, the lack of differences may also 
be due to the relative short length of the study. Specifically, too few practice sessions 
during acquisition phase may have resulted in the lack of clear differences between the 
groups. This may also be a reason for the finding that the four groups did not differ in 
their ability to retain their level of putting skill over three days of no practice. It is 
likely that larger differences would emerge over a greater length of practice. Future 
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studies, therefore, should consider utilizing fewer trials during test days and more 
practice sessions during the acquisition phase to prevent this possible confound.  
Whereas the groups involving physical practice (i.e., PP + CP) elicited the best 
putting performance after practice, those groups practicing mentally (i.e., MP + CP) 
revealed more elaborate representation structures after practice compared to groups 
who did not practice mentally. These differences pertain to distinct mechanisms 
underlying mental practice and physical practice. In other words, each of the groups 
may have learned in different ways. Learning induced by mental practice may 
primarily operate through and find expression on the cognitive level, whereas learning 
via physical practice may primarily operate through and find expression on the motor 
output level. In this light, it seems plausible that the two groups involving mental 
practice elicited more developed mental representations than the groups not practicing 
mentally. To explain, mental practice can be considered an “offline” process requiring 
primarily the re-creation of an experience from memory while covertly imagining a 
movement (cf. distinction between online task performance (i.e., real-time skill 
execution) and offline task performance (i.e., no real-time skill execution, no overt 
act); cf. Beilock & Lyons, 2009). As there is no online information available during 
imagery, this process is thought to rely on memorial information only (Farah, 1984). 
Thus, we propose that mental practice may work via the structuring of memorial 
information (i.e., the structuring of mental representation), and as such causes 
adaptation processes within the motor action system. In contrast, physical practice, 
being an online process, requires the online integration of perceptual feedback during 
overt movement execution, and therefore does not primarily rely on the offline 
reconstruction of an experience from memory. Accordingly, physical practice applies 
via the integration of sensory information and as such promotes adaptation processes in 
this manner. Taken together, we propose that, while physical practice causes feedback-
induced online adaptation, mental practice may cause memory-induced offline 
adaptation. In this regard, the memory-induced offline adaptation may have led to a 
cognitive structuring advantage in the sense of more structured memorial information 
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on the movement (i.e., more developed mental representations of the putt) in the two 
groups that involved mental practice.  
It seems quite interesting that, whereas mental and mental-physical combined 
practice led to more elaborate representation structures compared to physical and no 
practice, this difference was not fully expressed on the performance level in the present 
study. Specifically, although the findings of the present study point to the idea that 
mental practice in early skill acquisition may help to structure mental representation 
more than physical practice, this cognitive structuring advantage itself does not seem to 
transfer one-to-one to the motor output level. Being an “offline” process, this cognitive 
structuring itself seems to not immediately lead to better motor performance. It might 
be the case that this cognitive advantage does not turn into a performance advantage, 
unless online feedback is available and is being integrated. Accordingly, although the 
mental-physical combined practice group performed equally to physical practice in the 
present study, a closer look at the data points to the possibility that combined practice 
may be even superior to physical practice after a greater amount of practice. In fact, the 
combination of mental and physical practice has been suggested to be most effective in 
improving performance (e.g., Hall et al., 1992). In this sense, one might speculate that 
the controllability of the motor action system can best be achieved via both memory-
induced offline adaptation (i.e., mental practice) and feedback-induced online 
adaptation (i.e., physical practice). Accordingly, future research might focus on long-
term and transfer effects of mental and physical practice on both the performance and 
the representation of a motor skill.  
What’s more, the findings of the present study fit well into the body of 
research on the cognitive-motor hypothesis (e.g., Smyth, 1975; Ryan & Simons, 1981, 
1983; Wrisberg & Ragsdale, 1979), and even extend it as we will elaborate in the 
following. The cognitive-motor hypothesis states that mental practice is more effective 
in cognitive tasks compared to motor tasks. That is, while mental practice is suggested 
to be effective both for cognitive and motor tasks, this hypothesis differentiates such 
that cognitive tasks are suggested to benefit even more from mental practice compared 
to motor tasks. Thus, the more cognitive a task is, the more it might benefit from 
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mental practice. Up to now, findings largely support this hypothesis: although mental 
practice has been found to be effective in motor tasks (e.g., Yue & Cole, 1992), effect 
sizes reported in the meta-analysis conducted by Driskell et al. (1994) were greater for 
cognitive tasks (d = .69) than for motor tasks (d = .34). To explain, the typical design 
of these studies examining the cognitive-motor hypotheses consists of two groups 
practicing mentally, each practicing a different task: one group practicing a cognitive 
task, and one group practicing a motor task. That is, two different tasks (i.e., one motor 
and one cognitive task) are employed in order to examine the influence of mental 
practice on resulting performance (e.g., Ryan & Simons, 1981, 1983). However, to our 
knowledge, no study has been conducted so far that takes into account both the 
cognitive and the motor level within one task. Thus, no statements can be made so far 
whether mental practice affects more the cognitive compared to the motor level within 
a motor task. In the present study, we employed one task (i.e., golf putting) and 
examined the effect of mental practice on two different variables, one “cognitive” 
variable (i.e., mental representation structure) and one “motor” variable (i.e., putting 
performance). Thus, we used a within-task design, taking into account both the 
cognitive and the motor level of the golf putt. If we related the research question of the 
present study back to the cognitive-motor hypothesis, one would expect that mental 
practice would affect the cognitive structures to a larger degree than the motor output 
of a motor task. That is exactly what we found in the present study.  
It seems important to note that oftentimes in mental practice studies, a potential 
lack of differences in performance according to practice type results in conclusions 
such that mental practice is not effective in novices. This is, of course, true with 
respect to performance. However, these studies do not take into account covert 
processes. Yet, according to learning theories, proposing that first stages of learning 
are primarily cognitive in nature, one might expect that changes evoked by mental 
practice (i.e., a cognitive type of practice) primarily take place on the cognitive level in 
early skill acquisition, and that these changes may not be transferred one-to-one on to 
the motor level without additional physical practice (i.e., a motor type of practice 
during which the performer repeatedly receives actual perceptual feedback). 
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Accordingly, one would expect mental practice to especially affect the development of 
these cognitive processes. For the host of studies reporting no differences according to 
practice type, this would not necessarily mean that there were no differences between 
groups, but perhaps that the variables that may elicit these differences had not been 
measured. With the present study, we were able to show that, although not obvious 
from overtly observable putting performance, mental practice covertly helped to 
develop mental representation structure in novices.  
In sum, the results of the present study clearly demonstrate that practice leads 
to functional adaptations in the representation structure of complex action, and that 
mental practice supports this adaptation, leading to even more elaborate 
representations. While research in the field of mental practice has largely focused on 
overtly observable performance effects during early skill acquisition, thereby mostly 
neglecting the investigation of covert cognitive effects, we showed that repeatedly 
imagining a movement affects the development of one’s underlying mental 
representation structure. Building on these findings, it would be of interest to learn 
more about the adaptation of mental representation structure on the way to expertise. 
From a theoretical point of view, future research might focus on the question how 
different (mental) practice conditions (e.g., duration, scheduling, composition of 
practice) contribute to the development of mental representation structure, and, even 
more importantly, what conditions are most effective in contributing to the formation 
of an expert structure. From an applied point of view, a valuable future objective 
would be to examine whether practice and mental practice tailored to the one’s current 
skill representation (i.e., individualized physical and mental practice; e.g., Schack, 
Essig, Frank, & Koester, 2014) is more effective than standard type of practice not 
considering one’s cognitive prerequisites. To conclude, during early phases of skill 
acquisition, motor learning is associated with order formation of action-related 
knowledge in long-term memory, and this order formation seems to be promoted by 
mental practice. 
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This chapter is based on the manuscript  
Frank, C., Land, W. M., & Schack, T. (under review). Perceptual-cognitive changes 
during motor learning: The influence of mental and physical practice on mental 
representation, gaze behavior, and the performance of a complex action. 
Psychological Research. 
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Abstract 
Despite the wealth of research on the learning of a motor action, little is known 
about the perceptual-cognitive background of motor learning. In the present study, the 
influence of mental and physical practice on putting performance, mental 
representation of the putt, and gaze behavior during the early stages of skill acquisition 
was examined. Novices (N = 45) were assigned to one of three conditions: combined 
mental and physical practice, physical practice, and no practice. Participants in the 
practice groups trained on a golf putting task over the course of three days either by 
repeatedly executing and imagining or by executing it. Putting performance was 
measured using error scores. Mental representations were assessed by way of structural 
dimensional analysis of mental representation providing psychometric data on the 
relation of action concepts in long-term memory. Gaze behavior was measured using 
eye-tracking. Dependent variables were measured prior to and post practice as well as 
after a retention interval. For combined practice, findings revealed both perceptual-
cognitive changes (i.e., more elaborate representation structures and longer quiet eye 
durations) and changes in motor performance (i.e., better accuracy and consistency). In 
contrast, although putting performance improved with physical practice, neither any 
substantial changes in representation structures or longer quiet eye durations were 
evident. These findings suggest that the combination of mental and physical practice 
best promotes the covert perceptual-cognitive adaptation process within the motor 
action system during motor learning. In respect thereof, potential benefits of adopting a 
multilevel approach for examining the motor action system are discussed. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Movement can be regarded as a product of the interplay between perceptual, 
cognitive, and motor processes. Consider, for instance, a highly-skilled golfer 
performing a golf putt toward a hole that is several meters away from her. She takes 
her time to read the green and to estimate the distance from the ball to the hole. Based 
on this information, she performs a putting stroke that is thought to hit the ball with the 
appropriate force in the appropriate direction in order to sink the putt. Success at such a 
task can be viewed as involving a perceptual-cognitive component (e.g., estimating and 
reading the green) and a motor component (e.g., performing the putting stroke). In fact, 
research has shown that experts do not only differ from novices in their reproducibly 
superior performance, but also in their gaze behavior (e.g., Campbell & Moran, 2014; 
Vickers, 1992; Williams, Singer, & Frehlich, 2002) as well as in their underlying skill 
representation (e.g., Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Hill, 2007; Schack & 
Mechsner, 2006). Both variables have been shown to mediate performance. From this 
it becomes evident that, on the way to skilled motor action, not only directly ob-
servable components of motor action change, but also the perceptual-cognitive 
components of the motor system develop. 
According to perceptual-cognitive approaches to motor control and learning, 
motor actions are guided by way of representations holding information about the 
perceptual effects of the actions (e.g., theory of anticipative behavioral control: 
Hoffmann, 1993; theory of event coding: Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 
2001). In this sense, actions are primarily guided by cognitively represented effects. To 
explain, as the individual acts in her environment in order to attain a particular goal 
(e.g., to sink a putt), she perceives the effects of her action (e.g., the putt was too long). 
These perceived and cognitively represented effects, in turn, serve as an essential 
control variable to guide her future motor action. In this sense, perceptual-cognitive 
approaches to motor action assume a close functional relationship between motor 
action and the corresponding, cognitively represented perceptual effects (for an 
overview, see e.g., Mechsner, 2004; Nattkemper & Ziessler, 2004). Skilled action, in 
this sense, relies on well-developed effect representations, and motor learning, 
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accordingly, is associated with the constitution and the refinement of effect 
representations. 
One such perceptual-cognitive approach, arising in the tradition of Bernstein 
(for more details, see Schack, 2004; Bernstein, 1947, 1967, 1996), and being situated at 
the interface of cognitive psychology and movement science, is the cognitive action 
architecture approach (CAA-A; for an overview, see Schack, 2004; Schack & 
Mechsner, 2006). According to this approach, motor actions are represented in 
memory as well-integrated representational networks comprised of basic action 
concepts (BACs). Analogous to object representations and the idea of basic object 
concepts (e.g., Hoffmann, 1986, 1990; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975), the BACs represent cognitive compilations of movement elements, 
body postures, and their corresponding perceptual effects that are closely tied to the 
attainment of action goals (e.g., Schack, 2004; Schack, 2012). For instance, grip check 
as a BAC of the golf putt is a cognitive chunk serving a particular action goal (i.e., to 
ensure an optimal grip during the preparation of the putting movement before initiation 
of the backswing). As such it is comprised of the corresponding body posture (e.g. 
standing up right, hips flexed, upper body leaning forward, holding the putter in hands) 
and movement elements (e.g., take grip, move fingers until in right position) together 
with their sensory consequences (e.g., feel hands touching the surface of club; sense 
slight pressure in fingers, see both hands touch each other). As such, these 
representational networks comprised of BACs allow controlling the motor system 
during motor action. Consequently, motor learning, according to the CAA-A, is 
associated with the modification of representational networks of the action to be learnt 
(e.g., Schack, 2004; Schack & Ritter, 2013). 
The most common means to acquire a motor skill and to induce persisting 
improvements in performance is through physical practice, mental practice, or both. 
While physical practice involves the repeated overt execution of the movement to be 
learned, mental practice in the form of motor imagery rehearsal relates to the covert 
repeated simulation of a movement in one’s mind without subsequent movement 
execution (e.g., Jeannerod, 2004; Moran, Guillot, MacIntyre, & Collet, 2012). Both 
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types of practice have shown to influence performance and to promote motor learning 
(e.g., Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz & Landers, 1983; Feltz et al., 1988; Grouios, 1992; 
Hinshaw, 1991). By comparing the effect of these two types of practice on motor 
performance, meta-analyses have reported strong effect sizes for physical practice and 
moderate effect sizes for mental practice (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994) in comparison to 
no practice. Furthermore, various studies examining the effect of a combination of 
mental and physical practice have found combined practice to be the most effective 
practice type (for an overview, see Hall et al., 1992). From this, three main conclusions 
with respect to motor performance have been drawn: (1) physical practice is superior to 
mental practice, (2) mental practice is better than no practice, and (3) a combination of 
mental and physical practice is most effective in improving performance and thus in 
promoting learning of motor actions. 
Despite the wealth of research on the influence that mental and physical 
practice have on the performance of a motor action, the perceptual-cognitive 
components of motor action, and the perceptual-cognitive changes associated with 
motor learning, respectively, are less clear. Regarding underlying mental 
representations of motor actions, both mental and physical practice have shown to 
influence the development of mental representations (Frank et al., 2013; Frank, Land, 
Popp, & Schack, 2014; Land et al., 2014). During motor learning, the mental 
representation of a motor action functionally adapts in the direction of an elaborate 
representation, thereby relating more so to the biomechanical task demands. 
Specifically, Frank et al. (2013) investigated the changes in skill representation during 
motor learning. The authors found that skill representation of novices practicing (i.e., 
repeatedly executing without technical instructions) a golf putting task for several days 
changed over the course of practice such that the novices’ representations developed in 
the direction of that of an expert. More specifically, novices’ unstructured 
representations became more structured over time, with the groupings of BACs 
pertaining to the movement phases of the putt (i.e., the preparation, the forward swing 
and the impact). In contrast, novices who did not practice the putt revealed no changes 
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in their underlying representation structure, and thus their representation remained 
unstructured. 
In a more recent study, the adaptation of mental representation according to 
type of practice was investigated (Frank et al., 2014). Novices practiced the golf putt 
under one of four conditions: mental practice, physical practice, combined mental and 
physical practice, and no practice. Both putting performance and mental representation 
of the putt were assessed prior to and after three days of practice, and again after a 72 
hour retention period. While the putting performance of the groups reflected 
improvements as expected (i.e., the combined practice group performing best, followed 
by the physical practice group, while the mental practice group performed worst after 
practice), mental representations developed differently between the groups. While the 
physical practice group showed only marginal changes in representation structure over 
time, both the mental practice and the combined practice group revealed major changes 
in their representations of the putt after the acquisition phase. That is, after mental 
practice and after combined mental and physical practice, the trained novices elicited 
elaborate representation structures, reflecting the functional phases of the movement 
(i.e., the preparation phase, the swing and the impact phase, and the attenuation phase). 
Thus, representation structures seem to develop differently during motor learning, 
depending on the type of practice. To this extent, mental practice facilitates the 
functional adaptation of skill representation (i.e., the cognitive adaptation; for a 
detailed discussion, see Frank et al., 2014) during skill acquisition. From these 
findings, motor learning is associated with improvements in motor performance along 
with the refinement of underlying representational structures of the task. These skill 
representations are vital to the perceptual-cognitive component of skill execution by 
allowing skilled performers to better encode, process, store, and retrieve movement-
related information. 
A further important factor associated with the perceptual-cognitive component 
of motor performance is gaze behavior. One can distinguish between several gaze 
strategies: saccades, fixations, and pursuit tracking. In sports, much attention has been 
directed towards a specific type of gaze, the quiet eye. According to Vickers (2009, p. 
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280), the quiet eye is defined as “the final fixation or tracking gaze that is located on a 
specific location or object in the visuomotor workspace within 3° of visual angle for a 
minimum of 100 ms. The onset of the quiet eye occurs prior to the final movement in 
the task and the offset occurs when the gaze deviates off the object or location by more 
than 3° of visual angle for a minimum of 100 ms (…)”, and is thought to be an 
indicator of information processing prior to movement onset. Specifically, the quiet 
eye period has been suggested to be the period of time during which the environmental 
information the performer attends to is being processed cognitively. More specifically, 
visual input is being processed in order to prepare an adequate motor response. Thus, 
the quiet eye phenomenon is suggested to reflect the time necessary for optimal motor 
programming prior to the onset of the movement. 
The quite eye has been found in various tasks across various sports (for 
reviews, see Vickers, 2007, 2009), including golf (e.g., Vickers, 1992). To date, 
research has elicited distinct differences in this type of gaze behavior between skilled 
and non-skilled performers. Compared to non-skilled performers, the quiet eye 
duration of skilled performers is longer (e.g., Janelle, Hillman, Apparies, Murray, 
Meili, Fallon, & Hatfield, 2000; Vickers, 1992, 1996; Williams et al., 2002). 
Moreover, skilled performers have been shown to perform with an optimal duration of 
the quiet eye depending on the type of task (Vickers, 2007; Williams et al., 2002). In 
the specific case of golf putting, experts’ quiet eye period lasted in between 2 and 3 
seconds, while non-experts’ quiet eye durations lasted around 1.5 seconds (Vickers, 
1992; Vickers, 2007). Furthermore, performance has been shown to be directly related 
to quiet eye duration. For example, longer quiet eye periods have been reported for 
successful putts compared to unsuccessful putts (Wilson & Pearcy, 2009). In fact, the 
quiet eye has been found to be a major factor related to perceptual-cognitive expertise, 
differentiating between experts and non-experts (Mann, Williams, Ward, & Janelle, 
2007). From this, it seems that skilled performance is accompanied by longer quiet eye 
durations, indicating more extensive information processing during motor preparation. 
While quiet eye duration has been repeatedly linked to skilled performance, to date, 
research has yet to investigate the change in quiet eye duration over the course of skill 
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development, particularly as it relates to different modes of learning (e.g., mental and 
physical practice). 
Taken together, while there has been a wealth of research on the influence of 
mental and physical practice on motor performance, the perceptual-cognitive 
background of performance changes induced by mental and physical practice is less 
clear. By investigating changes on both the motor output level as well as the 
perceptual-cognitive level, we hope to learn more about different types of practice and 
their relative influence on the motor system. Thus, the overall goal of the present study 
was to gain further insights into changes within the motor system during skill 
acquisition by investigating the perceptual-cognitive background of performance 
changes associated with learning a golf putting task. Specifically, the objective of the 
present study was to examine the influence of mental and physical practice on golf 
putting performance, mental representation of the golf putt, and quiet eye duration 
during golf putting. In line with previous research, we expect putting performance to 
improve as a result of practice, with putting accuracy and consistency being better after 
combined mental and physical practice (i.e., physical practice with additional mental 
practice) compared to physical practice only (i.e., physical practice without additional 
mental practice). Moreover, we expect mental representations to develop over the 
course of practice, with representation structures being more elaborate after combined 
practice compared to physical practice only. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
representations would be more similar to the mental representation of an expert golfer 
after combined practice compared to physical practice only. Of particular interest for 
the present study was the question whether, in addition to the development in mental 
representation structure, changes in quiet eye duration would be evident as a result of 
practice. As has been elaborated in more detail above, the duration of the quiet eye can 
be viewed as an indicator of the extent of pre-programming prior to movement 
execution. Since representations become more elaborate during motor skill acquisition, 
and since the pre-programming is heavily dependent on the representation available, 
more extensive information processing prior to movement onset may become evident 
based on more elaborate representations after practice. Thus, we expected quiet eye 
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durations to become longer together with representations becoming more elaborate 
over the course of practice. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the quiet eye period 
would be associated with practice condition, with longer quiet eye durations after 
combined practice compared to physical practice only. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Forty-five students participated in the present study. None of the participants 
had any prior experience with golf putting. In order to ensure comparable performance 
levels at baseline between conditions, participants were assigned to one of three 
conditions according to their pre-test performance: combined mental and physical 
practice (n = 16, Mage = 24.38 years, SD = 2.73, 8 female), physical practice (n = 15, 
Mage = 25.73 years, SD = 2.99, 10 female) and no practice (n = 14, Mage = 27.00 years, 
SD = 8.74, 9 female). The study was conducted in accordance with local ethical 
guidelines, and conformed to the declaration of Helsinki. 
4.2.2 Tasks and measures 
4.2.2.1 Performance 
Participants performed a golf putting task on an artificial indoor putting green 
(size: 4 × 9 m), using a standard putter and golf ball. The task consisted of putting the 
ball to a target three meters away from the starting point. The target, projected onto the 
surface of the green via an overhead projector, corresponded to the size of a regulation 
golf hole (i.e., 10.8 cm in diameter). Participants were asked to putt the golf ball as 
accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. Putting 
performance was recorded by way of a motion capture system. Specifically, 6 T10 
CCD cameras captured and tracked the ball rolling and stopping. The recordings were 
made with a temporal resolution of 200 Hz and a spatial resolution of approximately 
0.25 mm. 
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4.2.2.2 Mental representation structure 
As described elsewhere in detail (Frank et al., 2013), structural dimensional 
analysis of mental representation (SDA-M) was employed to assess mental 
representation structures of the putt. By way of this method, it is possible to obtain 
psychometric data on the structuring and dimensioning of mental representations of 
complex movements in long-term memory. In other words, the SDA-M serves to 
determine relations between and the grouping of basic action concepts (i.e., BACs) of a 
motor action. For the specific purpose of the present study, 16 BACs for the putt were 
used (see Table 4.1; for more details, see also Frank et al., 2013), each pertaining to 
one particular movement phase: preparation (BAC 1-4), backswing (BAC 5-7), 
forward swing (BAC 8-9), impact (10-13), and attenuation (BAC 14-16). 
The SDA-M consists of several steps. In a first step, a split procedure results in 
a distance scaling between the BACs of a predetermined set. Next, a hierarchical 
cluster analysis is used to outline the structure of the given set of BACs. Following 
this, a factor analysis can be used in order to determine the dimensions in the 
structured set of BACs. In a last step, an analysis of invariance within- and between-
groups serves to compare different cluster solutions (for details, see Schack, 2012). 
More specifically, the splitting task (i.e., first step of the SDA-M) proceeds as follows: 
while one BAC of the putt is permanently shown on a computer screen (i.e., the anchor 
concept), the rest of the BACs are displayed one after another in randomized order. For 
each of the BACs being displayed together with the anchor concept, participants are 
asked to decide whether the given BAC is related to the anchor concept or not during 
movement execution. Once the participant has finished a list of BACs, another BAC 
takes the anchor position and the procedure continues. After each BAC has been 
compared to the remaining BACs (n-1), the splitting task is completed. 
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Table 4.1 
Basic action concepts (BACs) of the golf putt 
N° Basic action concept (BAC) Movement phase Motor action 
1 Shoulders parallel to target line 
Preparation 
Golf putt 
2 Align club face square to target line 
3 Grip check 
4 Look to the hole 
5 Rotate shoulders away from the ball 
Backswing 6 Keep arms-shoulder triangle 
7 Smooth transition 
8 Rotate shoulders towards the ball 
Forward swing 
9 Accelerate club 
10 Impact with the ball 
Impact 
11 Club face square to target line at impact 
12 Follow-through 
13 Rotate shoulders through the ball 
14 Decelerate club 
Attenuation 15 Direct clubhead to planned position 
16 Look to the outcome 
Note: Each of the 16 basic action concepts (BACs) of the golf putt can be functionally assigned to one of 
the movement phases. The numbers on the left relate to the different BACs; they do not reflect a particular 
order, but serve to better display the concepts in Figures 3-5. 
4.2.2.3 Gaze behavior 
Gaze behavior was measured by way of eye-tracking while putting. 
Accordingly, eye-movements were recorded using a head-mounted portable eye-
tracking system with an eye and a scene camera. Specifically, the SMI iViewX HED 
mobile eye-tracker is a corneal reflex system that operates monocular at a sampling 
rate of 200 Hz, with a gaze position accuracy < 0.5°-1°. Each recorded scene video had 
a resolution of 376 x 240 pixels at 25 fps (1 frame = 40 ms). This system allows for the 
recording of eye-movements in natural environments in which participants move and 
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interact with their environment while performing complex movements (i.e., vision in 
action paradigm; see Vickers, 2007). 
4.2.2.4 Imagery ability 
To assess visual and kinesthetic imagery ability, the revised version of the 
Movement Imagery Questionnaire (MIQ-R; Hall & Martin, 1997) was administered. 
During this procedure, participants (a) perform, (b) imagine and (c) rate their imagery 
experience of four different movements. During the imagery, participants are 
instructed to either “see” or “feel” one of the four movements without actually 
performing. Following this, participants are asked to rate the ease or difficulty of 
imaging the movement on a 7-point Likert scale. Thus, participants imagine each of the 
four movements, by using both the visual modality and the kinesthetic modality 
separately by instruction, resulting in a final rating of eight items. 
4.2.2.5 Manipulation check 
In order to control whether participants performed the imagery as instructed 
(cf. Goginsky & Collins, 1996), a post-experimental questionnaire was administered 
after each practice session to those participants practicing mentally. Specifically, we 
asked participants of the combined mental and physical practice group to report their 
imagery in detail. First, participants were asked to describe the imagery content 
shorthand. Second, participants had to rate on a 7-point Likert scales (1 = very difficult, 
7 = very easy; 1 = never, 7 = always), how easy it had been to follow the instructions in 
general, how often they used an external perspective and how often they used an 
internal perspective. Third, participants were asked to indicate how easy it had been to 
“see” and how easy it was to “feel” the putt during their imagery. Finally, after 
completion of the splitting task, we asked participants whether they had experienced 
any problems and, if so, to describe them in detail. 
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4.2.3 Procedure 
The present study consisted of a pre-test, an acquisition phase of three 
consecutive days of practice, a post-test, and a retention-test after three days of rest 
(see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 
Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase of three days 
 Pre-test Acquisition Post-test  Retention-test 
 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5  Day 8 
Mental 
and 
physical 
practice 
group 
(n = 16) 
Eye-tracking 
Mental + physical 
practice  
(imagined and executed 
putts) 
Eye-tracking  Eye-tracking 
Putting 
task 
Putting 
task 
 Putting 
task 
SDA-M SDA-M  SDA-M 
Physical 
practice 
group 
(n = 15) 
Eye-tracking 
Physical practice 
(executed putts only) 
Eye-tracking  Eye-tracking 
Putting 
task 
Putting 
task 
 Putting 
task 
SDA-M SDA-M  SDA-M 
Control 
group 
(n = 14) 
Eye-tracking 
No practice 
(neither executed  
nor imagined putts) 
Eye-tracking  Eye-tracking 
Putting 
task 
Putting 
task 
 Putting 
task 
SDA-M SDA-M  SDA-M 
Note: SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task on test days: 2 warm- 
up putts followed by 20 putts; putting practice during acquisition phase: 3 x 20 imagined and executed 
putts (combined mental and physical practice group) or 3 x 10 executed putts (physical practice group) per 
day for the practice groups. 
4.2.3.1 Pre-test 
At the beginning of the study, participants signed informed consent forms. 
Next, in order to become familiar with the task at hand, participants watched a video 
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showing a skilled golfer performing the putting task. Following this, the eye-tracking 
system was calibrated, employing a standard five-point calibration procedure. In order 
to assess participants’ initial putting performance and gaze behavior, each participant 
performed two warm-up putts followed by 20 putts. Participants were asked to putt a 
golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. 
After the putting, an introduction to the splitting task was given. This procedure served 
to assess the participant’s initial mental representation structure of the putt. 
Accordingly, in order to ensure comprehension of the concepts, a randomized list of 
the 16 BACs of the putt was presented and explained to the participants. After having 
read general instructions on how to complete the splitting task, participants were 
explicitly instructed to decide whether the presented basic action concepts were related 
to one another or not during movement execution. Finally, each participant completed 
the MIQ-R as an indicator of imagery ability. 
4.2.3.2 Acquisition phase 
During the next three days, participants either practiced the putt (practice 
groups), or did not partake in putting practice (control group). 
Physical practice (PP) group. Three blocks of 10 putts were performed on 
each practice day in the physical practice condition. Prior to each block, participants 
were asked to putt as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was 
supposed to stop. Importantly, no other information than the visible outcome of the 
putt (i.e., knowledge of result) was available to the participants. That is, no additional 
information such as technical feedback (i.e., knowledge of performance) was given to 
the participants during the acquisition phase. 
Combined mental and physical practice (CP) group. Three blocks of 20 putts 
were performed on each practice day in the combined mental and physical practice 
condition, with each block consisting of 10 imagined and 10 actual putts. Prior to each 
block, participants were asked to take the starting position. While participants were 
standing upright on the green with the putter in their hands, the imagery script was read 
out loud to each participant. Participants were asked to imagine the putting movement 
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as well as the ball rolling toward the target and stopping on the target, as predefined by 
the script. They were further told to imagine from an internal perspective, to 
incorporate all the senses in their imagery, and to try and imagine as clearly and as 
vividly as possible. The information on imagery perspective, imagery modality, and 
imagery vividness was intentionally given in order to control for as many aspects 
during imagery as possible and to optimize the efficacy of the imagery intervention (cf. 
Holmes & Collins, 2001). As soon as the reading was finished, participants imagined 
repeatedly the putting movement on their own. Participants were asked to hold their 
eyes closed during their imagery and to slightly raise their index finger each time they 
had finished a putt in their minds. This procedure allowed the participant to 
concentrate on themselves and their imagery and, at the same time, to make it possible 
for the experimenter to control for the number of imagined putts per block without 
disturbing the participants’ imagery. Next, during actual putting, participants were 
instructed to putt as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was 
supposed to stop. No technical instructions were given. Finally, participants filled out a 
post-experimental questionnaire at the end of each practice session. 
No practice (NP; control) group. During the acquisition phase, the control 
group neither imagined nor executed the putt. 
4.2.3.3 Post- and retention-test 
Participants were retested after the acquisition phase, as well as after a 
retention interval of three days. Prior to post-test and retention-test assessment, the 
same standard five-point calibration procedure was used to calibrate the eye-tracking 
system. Next, each participant performed again the two warm-up putts followed by 20 
putts. Both their gaze behavior and putting performance were measured. Following 
this, all participants completed the splitting task in order to determine their final mental 
representation structures of the putting movement. 
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4.2.4 Data analysis 
4.2.4.1 Performance 
By capturing the final ball position after each putt, putting performance was 
assessed. From these data, two outcome variables were calculated for each test day. 
Specifically, based on the x and y coordinates of each putt with the center of the target 
as origin of the axes, two-dimensional error scores were determined (see Hancock et 
al., 1995). Accordingly, putting accuracy was measured by mean radial error (MRE). 
MRE is defined as a subject’s average distance each putt came to the center of the 
target in mm. Putting consistency was measured by bivariate variable error (BVE), 
analogous to variable error in one-dimensional analyses. BVE was defined as the 
square root of a subject’s k shots' mean squared distance from their centroids in mm. A 
subject’s centroid is a positionally typical shot whose coordinates are given by the 
average x and average y value of a subject’s shots in mm. 
Initial putting performance of the three groups was compared by way of two 
separate one way ANOVAs on each of the two performance variables (i.e., accuracy 
and consistency) at pre-test. For putting performance over time, a 3 × 3 (test day [pre, 
post, retention] × group [PP, CP, NP]) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor was performed on each of the dependent variables. For post-hoc analysis, 
independent t-tests were conducted. Cohen’s d was used as an estimate of effect size 
(Cohen, 1992). 
4.2.4.2 Mental representation structure 
Each participant’s mental representation structure was determined by way of a 
cluster analysis. With the help of this procedure, the information on the distances and 
grouping of BACs as obtained by the splitting task was transformed into dendrograms. 
These cluster solutions (i.e., dendrograms) outlined the structure of the BACs of the 
putt. For the purpose of the present study, mean group dendrograms were calculated 
(for more details see Schack, 2012). An alpha-level of α = .05 was chosen for all 
cluster analyses, resulting in a critical value dcrit = 3.41. To explain, BACs in a given 
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cluster solution were considered not related when being linked above this critical 
value, while BACs were considered related when being linked below this value and 
thus resulted in a cluster. To compare cluster solutions, two analyses were conducted. 
First, analyses of invariance were used to learn about differences between cluster 
solutions (Lander 1991, 1992; see Schack, 2012). Accordingly, cluster solutions are 
considered different (i.e., variant) for λ < .68, while cluster solutions are considered the 
same (i.e., invariant) for λ ≥ .68. Second, to further examine the similarity between 
cluster solutions and a reference, the adjusted rand index (ARI; Rand, 1971; Santos & 
Embrechts, 2009) was used. The ARI serves as an index of similarity, ranging on a 
scale from -1 to 1. Indices between “-1” and “1” mark the degree of similarity between 
two cluster solutions, with “1” indicating that two cluster solutions are the same. For 
the purpose of the present study, ARI was used to investigate the degree of similarity 
between mean group dendrograms and an expert dendrogram reflecting well the 
movement phases preparation, backswing, forward swing, impact, and attenuation (for 
more details, see chapter 4.2.2). 
4.2.4.3 Gaze behavior 
The quiet eye period was assessed by the duration of the final fixation before 
movement onset for each putt (for an overview, see Vickers, 2007, 2009). Accordingly, 
eye-tracking data were analyzed frame by frame. The number of frames for the final 
fixation prior to the initiation of the backswing was coded. From this, fixation duration 
for each putt was calculated. In line with previous studies (e.g., Vine & Wilson, 2010), 
the quiet eye analysis was performed on a subset of trials (i.e., every fourth); a total of 
675 putts. Due to problems during the tracking of eye movements resulting in poor 
data quality, the data of one subject were excluded from subsequent data analyses.  
In order to examine the quiet eye over time, a 3 × 3 (test day [pre, post, 
retention] × group [PP, CP, NP]) ANOVA with test day as within subjects factor and 
group as between subjects factor was performed on final fixation duration prior to 
movement onset. For post-hoc analyses, independent t-tests were conducted. Again, 
Cohen’s d was used as an estimate of effect size (Cohen, 1992). 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Imagery ability 
Participants scored 23.09 (SD = 3.15; 5.77 per item) on average for visual 
imagery ability, and 20.29 (SD = 4.96; 5.07 per item) on average for kinesthetic imager 
ability. Thus, participants’ average score per item was approximately 6, easy to see, for 
the visual imagery ability scale, and 5, somewhat easy to feel, for the kinesthetic 
imagery ability scale. This is considered as being sufficient for subsequent mental 
practice (e.g., Smith & Collins, 2004; Smith et al., 2008). Moreover, separate one-way 
ANOVAs on overall scores, as well as on both scales separately, revealed no main 
effect of group (overall imagery ability: F(2,42) = .866, p = .428, ηp2 = .040; visual 
imagery ability: F(2,42) = .807, p = .453, ηp2 = .037; kinesthetic imagery ability: 
F(2,42) = .404, p = .670, ηp2 = .019), indicating similar imagery ability for each of the 
three groups. Thus, novices in the three groups did not differ in their reported imagery 
ability. 
4.3.2 Manipulation check 
For the CP group, participants’ manipulation check responses were analyzed to 
control whether participants adhered to the instructions given during mental practice 
sessions. With respect to imagery content, each participant mentioned in their imagery 
descriptions both the putting movement and the ball rolling. For the internal imagery 
perspective, mean scores during acquisition phase were 6.29 (SD = .69), very often, 
and for external imagery perspective 2.36 (SD = 1.42), rarely. Thus, participants of the 
CP group performed their imagery mainly from an internal perspective. In addition, 
participants found it easy to “see” and to “feel” the movement while imaging. 
Specifically, participants scored an average of 5.47 (SD = .96), somewhat easy to see, 
for visual imagery and 4.78 (SD = 1.33), somewhat easy to feel, for kinesthetic 
imagery. Moreover, participants in general found it easy to follow the instructions 
during imagery, as indicated by mean scores of 5.52 (SD = 1.04). Also, none of the 
participants reported any problems during imagery sessions. From this, it can be 
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assumed that participants of the CP group had been able to perform the imagery as 
instructed. This was considered a prerequisite for subsequent data analyses. 
4.3.3 Performance 
Mean radial error (MRE) and bivariate variable error (BVE) of the three 
groups from pre-, to post- and to retention-test is displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
Details on the descriptive statistics are listed in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive statistics for performance outcome variables in cm across pre-test, post-test, and retention-
test for the no practice (n = 14), the physical practice (n = 15) and the combined practice (n = 16) groups 
 Pre-test Post-test Retention-test 
 
MRE 
M (SD) 
BVE 
M (SD) 
MRE 
M (SD) 
BVE 
M (SD) 
MRE 
M (SD) 
BVE 
M (SD) 
NP 70.75 (18.10) 80.68 (17.43) 54.18 (13.73) 61.58 (15.26) 60.07 (21.03) 69.88 (24.07) 
PP  71.31 (24.53) 84.23 (27.10) 44.02 (11.48) 53.71 (16.26) 41.64 (14.75) 50.31 (17.18) 
CP  71.76 (22.96) 82.06 (23.99) 41.01 (11.20) 47.04 (10.62) 37.50 (7.43) 46.43 (12.09) 
Note: NP = no practice; PP = physical practice; CP = combined mental and physical practice; MRE = 
mean radial error (accuracy); BVE = bivariate variable error (consistency). 
For accuracy, a repeated measures ANOVA on MRE indicated a significant 
test day × group interaction, F(4,84) = 4.042, p = .005, ηp2 = .161. Post-hoc analyses 
revealed that both the CP group, t(28) = -2.893, p = .007, d = 1.05, and the PP group, 
t(27) = -2.167, p = .039, d = .80, putted significantly more accurate than the NP group 
after acquisition phase. No significant differences were found between the PP and the 
CP group, t(29) = -.740, p = .465, d = .27. Similarly, after a retention-interval of three 
days, both the CP group, t(15.830) = -3.813, p = .002, d = 1.43, and the PP group, t(27) 
= -2.748, p = .011, d = 1.01, performed with greater putting accuracy compared to the 
NP group, while no difference was found between the PP and the CP group, t(29) = -
.998, p = .327, d = .35.  
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Figure 4.1. Mean radial error (i.e., accuracy) in mm from pre-test to post- and retention-test. The different 
lines relate to the different conditions (i.e., no practice, physical practice or combined mental and physical 
practice). Error bars represent standard errors. 
For consistency, a repeated measures ANOVA on BVE indicated a significant 
test day × group interaction, F(4,84) = 3.615, p = .009, ηp2 = .147. Post-hoc analyses 
revealed that the CP group putted more consistently compared to the NP group after 
acquisition phase, t(22.815) = -2.989, p = .007, d = 1.11, while this was not the case for 
the PP group, t(27) = -1.343, p = .191, d = .50. Furthermore, the CP and the PP group 
did not differ in their putting consistency, t(29) = -1.361, p = .184, d = .49. For 
retention-test, both the CP group, t(18.590) = -3.299, p = .004, d = 1.23, and the PP 
group, t(27) = -2.534, p = .017, d = .94, performed with greater consistency in 
comparison to the NP group, whereas the PP and the CP group did not differ, t(29) = -
.732, p = .470, d = .26. 
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Figure 4.2. Bivariate variable error (i.e., consistency) in mm from pre-test to post- and retention-test. The 
different lines relate to the different conditions (i.e., no practice, physical practice or combined mental and 
physical practice). Error bars represent standard errors. 
In sum, while the combination of mental and physical practice as well as 
physical practice only led to better putting accuracy in the present study, it was only 
the combined practice that led to more consistent putting after the acquisition phase. 
After a three day retention interval, however, both types of practice prove superior in 
improving putting accuracy and consistency compared to no practice (see also Figures 
4.1 and 4.2). 
4.3.4 Mental representation structure 
Mean group dendrograms of the three groups from pre-, to post- and to 
retention-test are displayed in Figures 4.3 to 4.5. 
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Combined mental and physical practice (CP) group. As seen in Figure 4.3, no 
structure was evident for the CP group prior to the acquisition phase. In detail, the 
mean group dendrogram of the CP group revealed only one cluster pertaining to the 
preparation phase (BAC 2 and 3). After the acquisition phase, however, the mean 
group dendrogram was comprised of four clusters relating to different phases of the 
movement (i.e., preparation phase (BAC 2, 3), forward swing (BAC 8, 9), impact 
(BAC 10, 11, 13), and attenuation (BAC 14, 16)). Cluster solutions of the CP group for 
post- and retention-test were similar, with the only difference being that after the three 
day retention interval, the cluster pertaining to preparation phase involved one more 
concept (BAC 2, 3, 4). Thus, for the CP group, the number of functional clusters 
increased over the course of acquisition phase, with the representation structure 
becoming more elaborate over time. The descriptive changes over time observed in the 
dendrograms were confirmed by analyses of invariance. Specifically, while the cluster 
solutions for pre- and post-test (λ = .24) as well as for pre- and retention-test (λ = .24) 
were variant (i.e., significant changes in the structures over practice), the two cluster 
solutions of post- and retention-test (λ = .71) were invariant (i.e., no meaningful 
differences between representation structures). Furthermore, increases in adjusted rand 
indices from pre-test (ARIpre = .12) to post-test (ARIpost = .35) and to retention-test 
(ARIretention = .50) indicate increasing similarity in comparison to the expert structure 
and as such emphasize that the changes in representation structure reflect a functional 
development. 
Physical practice (PP) group. In contrast to the CP practice group, the mean 
group dendrograms of the PP group revealed minimal clustering over time (see Figure 
4.4). Specifically, no clustering was evident for the PP group prior and after the 
acquisition phase. However, the retention test revealed one cluster pertaining to 
preparation phase (BAC 2 and 3). As there was no overlap in the clustering of the  
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Figure 4.3. Mean group dendrograms of the combined mental and physical practice group (n = 16) for the 
golf putt at (a) pre-test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test. The numbers on the x-axis relate to the BAC 
number, the numbers on the y-axis display Euclidean distances. The lower the link between related BACs, 
the lower is the Euclidean distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level (dcrit = 3.41; α 
= .05): links between BACs above this line are considered not related; horizontal grey lines on the bottom 
mark clusters. BACs: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip 
check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) 
smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) 
club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) 
decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome. 
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different cluster solutions, analysis of invariance resulted in values of 0. Interestingly, 
although not obvious at first glance, increasing adjusted rand indices over time (ARIpre 
= 0, ARIpost = 0, ARIretention = .12) suggest a minimal development in direction of the 
expert representation structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean group dendrograms of the physical practice group (n = 15) for the golf putt at (a) pre-
test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
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Figure 4.5. Mean group dendrograms of the control group (n = 14) for the golf putt at (a) pre-test, (b) post-
test and (c) retention-test (α = .05; dcrit = 3.41). 
No practice (NP) group. Prior to the acquisition phase, the mean group 
dendrogram of the NP group revealed one cluster relating to the preparation of the 
putting movement (BAC 2 and 3; see Figure 4.5). After the acquisition phase, 
however, a new structure emerged which reflected one cluster comprised of two 
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functionally unrelated concepts (BAC 4 and 16). Specifically, although being related in 
the sense that both concepts involve the word “look”, these concepts are not related 
during movement execution. Thus, this relation is based on superficial rather than on 
functional characteristics. After the three day retention interval, no clusters were 
evident in the mean group dendrogram of the NP group. Again, analysis of invariance 
resulted in values of 0, as there was no overlap in the clustering of the different cluster 
solutions. When being compared to the expert structure, ARIs revealed a slight 
decrease in the degree of similarity from pre-test (ARIpre = .12) to post-test (ARIpost = -
.02) to retention-test (ARIretention = .00). 
In sum, prior to the acquisition phase, mental representations revealed little to 
no structures. Over the course of practice, however, combined practice led to a 
significant development in mental representation structure, while physical practice 
only as well as no practice led to only minor or no changes in mental representation 
structure (see also Figures 4.3-4.5). 
4.3.5 Gaze behavior 
Mean durations of the final fixations prior to putting for the three groups across 
pre-, post- and retention-test are presented in Figure 4.6. A repeated measures ANOVA 
on final fixation duration indicated a significant test day × group interaction, F(4,82) = 
6.532, p < .001, ηp2 = .242. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the CP group demonstrated 
longer fixation durations compared to the NP group, t(20.928) = 2.079, p = .050, d = 
.74 after three days of practice. In contrast, no significant difference between the PP 
group and the NP group was evident, t(26) = 1.167, p = .254, d = .44. Furthermore, the 
CP group and the PP group did not differ in their fixation duration after acquisition 
phase, t(28) = .954, p = .348, d = .35. After three days of rest, the CP group once more 
demonstrated significantly longer fixation durations compared to the NP group, 
t(17.563) = 2.887, p = .010, d = 1.03. Again, fixation durations of the PP group were 
not different from those of the NP group, t(26) = 1.418, p = .168, d = .54. The 
difference in fixation duration between the CP group and the PP group failed to reach 
significance, t(28) = 1.753, p = .090, d = .65. 
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Figure 4.6. Mean quiet eye duration in ms from pre-test to post- and retention-test. The different lines 
relate to the different conditions (i.e., no practice, physical practice or combined mental and physical 
practice). Error bars represent standard errors. 
In sum, only the combined practice led to longer final fixation durations 
compared to no practice after acquisition phase. Similarly, after three days of rest, the 
duration of the final fixation remained longer for the combined practice compared to 
no practice, while this was not the case for physical practice. Interestingly, after the 
retention interval, a tendency was becoming evident that the combined practice had led 
to even longer fixation durations than the physical practice. Thus, combined mental 
and physical practice as opposed to physical practice only led to a longer quiet eye 
period during the acquisition of putting skill in comparison to no practice (see also 
Figure 4.6). 
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4.4 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the influence of physical 
practice and combined mental and physical practice on the mental representation of a 
golf putt, gaze behavior prior to putting, and putting performance. By doing so, we 
aimed at gaining further insights into the perceptual-cognitive background of 
performance changes during motor skill acquisition, both as a result of mental and 
physical practice. 
Overall, putting performance improved over time, with both types of practice 
leading to improved accuracy and consistency. Importantly, improvements in 
performance persisted over three days of no practice, reflecting permanence. In this 
sense, and according to the traditional view of motor learning, both practice types led 
to persisting performance improvements, and thus motor learning (e.g., Magill, 2011; 
Schmidt & Lee, 2011). Relatively permanent changes in putting performance as a 
result of practice as found in the present study are in line with the general idea that 
repeatedly executing a motor action leads to improved performance of that motor 
action (e.g., Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). Interestingly, the combined mental and 
physical practice did not lead to superior putting performance in comparison to the 
practice that did not involve the additional mental practice. This is surprising as a 
combination of both types of practice has been suggested to outperform practice that 
does not involve mental practice (e.g., Hall et al., 1992). 
One reason why additional mental practice might not have contributed to 
superior overt putting performance in the present study is the smaller relative 
magnitude of effect that mental practice has in comparison to physical practice. Meta-
analyses investigating the relative magnitude of effect between mental and physical 
practice emphasize the superiority of physical practice over mental practice (e.g., 
Driskell et al., 1994; Feltz et al., 1988). For instance, Driskell et al. (1994) reported 
strong effect sizes for physical practice (d = .78) and moderate effect sizes for mental 
practice (d = .53). Hence, the smaller magnitude of effect may be one reason why 
additional mental practice in the present study did not prove effective in further 
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enhancing motor performance and supporting motor learning on the motor output 
level. As a consequence, extending the practice phase (i.e., amount of sessions and/ or 
amount of trials) may elicit a distinct effect of additional mental practice. 
Related to that, a second plausible explanation for the lack of differences 
between combined practice and physical practice only may be that mental practice 
effects may not primarily become evident on the performance level during early skill 
acquisition. It is conceivable that, at an early stage of motor learning, mental practice 
affects the perceptual-cognitive level, but these changes do not necessarily have to 
transfer one-to-one to the motor output level, and thus may not or only minimally be 
reflected in overt outcome performance. This is in line with the general suggestion that 
novices may not benefit from mental practice as much as experts do in terms of overt 
performance (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994), and thus mental practice more likely proves 
beneficial for improving overt performance at a more advanced level of skill. As an 
extension, we suggest that, although mental practice is not as effective as physical 
practice in improving overt performance in novices, it does have an influence on the 
motor system, and on the perceptual-cognitive background of motor action in 
particular (for more details, see discussion below). 
With respect to the representation of the golf putt in long-term memory, mental 
representation structures developed over the course of practice, with the combined 
practice leading to the most elaborate representation structures relative to an expert 
structure. In contrast, physical practice led to only minimal changes in direction of an 
expert structure. No such changes in representation structures were observed in the 
control condition. The results of the present study are in line with previous research on 
differences in mental representation of complex action according to skill level, with 
well-experienced athletes revealing more structured representations than their less-
experienced counterparts (e.g., Bläsing et al., 2009; Schack & Mechsner, 2006; 
Velentzas et al., & Schack, 2010). Moreover, the present findings further support the 
development of representation structures over the course of learning (e.g., Frank et al., 
2013; Frank et al., 2014; Land et al., 2014). As expected, representation structures 
developed most during combined mental and physical practice, while during physical 
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practice, only minimal changes were evident. Hence, the present study replicates the 
findings from Frank et al. (2014). Similarly to Frank et al. (2014), representation 
structures of the group that incorporated mental practice into their practice regime 
revealed several functional clusters of BACs, pertaining to the different movement 
phases of the putt (i.e., preparation, forward swing/ impact, attenuation), both after 
practice and after a retention interval of three days. Instead, this was not the case for 
participants not incorporating mental practice into their practice regime. Thus, the 
results of the present study confirm the findings by Frank et al. (2014) such that when 
spending time practicing mentally during skill acquisition, the mental representation 
structure of a complex movement develops functionally (i.e., becomes more similar to 
the representation of an expert). In this sense, the present study further supports the 
idea that mental practice adds to the cognitive adaptation process during motor 
learning. 
A main aim of the present study was to further investigate the perceptual-
cognitive background of performance changes by examining perceptual changes during 
motor skill acquisition. With respect to gaze behavior, the combined mental and 
physical practice led to longer quiet eye periods (i.e., longer fixation durations prior to 
putting) compared to no practice. No differences were evident between the CP group 
and the PP group after the acquisition phase in the present study. However, while not 
statistically significant, the difference between the CP group and the PP group after the 
retention interval indicated a medium effect size (d = .65), with the combined practice 
leading to longest fixation durations. Overall, our findings fit well into the body of 
research on the quiet eye reporting longer quiet eye durations for higher-skilled 
athletes in comparison to lower-skilled athletes (e.g., Vickers, 1992; Vickers, 1996; for 
an overview, see Vickers, 2007). Moreover, our results extend findings on differences 
in quiet eye behavior by providing insight into the change in quiet eye behavior over 
the course of practice. To our knowledge, the present study is the first to show that 
quiet eye duration changes in novices practicing a complex movement. In the present 
study, the quiet eye period of the CP group became more similar to that of an expert. 
More specifically, while quiet eye durations of expert golfers have been reported to last 
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between two and three seconds on average (e.g., Vickers, 2007), the CP group revealed 
a mean duration of 2.1 s after the acquisition phase and 2.5 s after the retention 
interval. This last fixation period prior to movement onset is thought to serve to pick 
up environmental cues and to program the planned movement in an appropriate 
manner in order to prepare subsequent movement execution (Vickers, 2009). 
Accordingly, the present findings suggest that combined mental and physical practice 
contributes to a longer information-processing period during which the movement is 
pre-programmed. Furthermore, the fact that combined practice indicated a medium 
effect to produce longer quiet eye periods compared to physical practice after the 
retention-interval suggests that the mental component of the combined practice (i.e., 
repeatedly imagining the movement without overt movement execution) may 
contribute to longer information-processing prior to movement onset. However, future 
research has yet to test this proposition. In addition, a further valuable objective for 
future research would be to investigate the relationship between mental representation 
and quiet eye period. Taking into consideration the fact that both more elaborate 
representations in long-term memory and longer fixation durations were observed as a 
result of combined mental and physical practice in the present study, it is likely that 
more elaborate representations led to more elaborate information-processing during 
movement preparation. Therefore, future studies should look more closely at the 
causality of this relationship. 
Taken together, the combined mental and physical practice led to both 
perceptual-cognitive changes and changes in motor performance in the present study. 
That is, combined practice contributed to both better order formation in memory (i.e., 
more elaborate representation structures of the putt) and longer information processing 
prior to movement execution (i.e., longer quiet eye durations before initiation of the 
putting movement) as well as to improved putting performance (i.e., accuracy and 
consistency). In contrast, physical practice led to improved putting performance, but 
neither to any substantial changes in representation structures nor to longer quiet eye 
durations. From this, one may even speculate that it is the mental component of the 
CHAPTER 4 
140  
practice that promotes the perceptual-cognitive adaptation process during motor 
learning. 
The findings of the present study point to the differential effects of mental and 
physical practice on the perceptual-cognitive level and the motor output level during 
early skill acquisition. From this, it seems that the adaptation of these levels within the 
motor system is to some degree independent, and that mental practice during early skill 
acquisition influences more the ‘mental side’ (i.e., perceptual-cognitive level) and 
physical practice influences more the ‘sensorimotor side’ (i.e., the motor output level) 
of a motor action. However, if the objective is the acquisition of a motor skill and thus 
motor learning, why should the perceptual-cognitive adaptation within the motor 
system matter? Although both levels of the motor system seem to develop independent 
of each other to some degree, they are thought to interrelate. Although changes on the 
perceptual-cognitive level did not (yet) find expression on the motor output level after 
three days of practice in the present study, they may do so after a longer period of 
practice. Moreover, further improvements in performance are likely tied to the extent 
of previous perceptual-cognitive adaptation. It is likely that the rate of performance 
improvements will be much faster given a solid perceptual-cognitive basis (or top, 
respectively) compared to the rate of performance improvements without such a basis. 
One might even speculate that the perceptual-cognitive adaptation will prove important 
when it comes to transfer of what has been learnt to another task. Similarly, long-term 
retention may prove better, and thus, loss of motor skill may be reduced when having 
practiced mentally and having promoted the perceptual-cognitive background 
accordingly. Future studies will be necessary to test these hypotheses. 
From a more general point of view, the motor system can be viewed as being 
an entity composed of different levels interacting during the execution of a motor 
action. In other words, action organization can be considered to take place on different 
levels within the hierarchically organized motor system (e.g., CAA-A; Schack, 2004). 
In that sense, each level of the system may (or may not) change to a different degree 
during motor learning. To put it differently, motor learning may best be considered a 
multilevel process. An advantage of such a hierarchical view is that a system and its 
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components are being looked at both independently and together at the same time. 
From this point of view, it seems promising to further investigate the interdependence 
of the levels working together in the production of a motor action, and to learn more 
about the integration (or separation) of single levels within the motor system, both at 
earlier as well as at later stages of learning. 
Accordingly, motor action can be viewed as a result of perceptual, cognitive 
and motor components. As each of the components is part of the motor system, each is 
likely to change over the course of motor learning. As such, motor learning may 
involve learning processes both on the perceptual-cognitive and on the motor output 
level. With the present study, we sought to look closer at these changes during motor 
learning, and to draw conclusions for each of the components and the motor system as 
a whole. Our findings suggest that the motor system as a whole is influenced by both 
mental and physical practice. However, each type of practice likely influences the 
individual components, the perceptual-cognitive and the motor output components, to a 
different degree. That is, combined mental and physical practice seems to influence the 
motor system differently than physical practice only, with combined practice 
influencing the motor system more so on a perceptual-cognitive level. 
From this point of view, examining outcome performance may not provide 
sufficient insight to the adaptation processes associated with motor learning. A closer 
look into the motor system, thereby by considering perceptual-cognitive and motor 
output processes at the same time, might help to gain further insights into learning 
processes. If future studies approached motor learning from such a multilevel 
perspective, this may shed further light on open questions regarding the motor system. 
Such an approach may even help to solve existing contradictions, that originated by 
seemingly ambiguous results derived from studies that exclusively consider the motor 
output level of the motor system. For instance, mental practice has been found to 
influence performance of a motor action (1) not at all, (2) less than physical practice, 
(3) more than physical practice (for an overview, see Wohldmann, Healy, & Bourne, 
2007). Based on these results, ambiguous conclusions have been drawn regarding 
whether or not mental practice promotes the learning of a motor action. This illustrates 
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well that, in some cases, approaching motor learning from a one-dimensional view 
does not provide a satisfactory solution for seemingly ambiguous findings. 
Consequently, a closer look onto the motor system is necessary to resolve 
contradictions as the one described above. Approaching motor learning from a 
multilevel perspective, thereby considering both perceptual-cognitive changes as well 
as changes in motor performance may help to gain a more thorough picture of the 
processes taking place during motor skill acquisition. To this extent, future research in 
the field should consider motor learning both from the perceptual-cognitive and the 
motor point of view. 
To conclude, the present findings demonstrate that a combination of mental 
and physical practice brings about both perceptual-cognitive adaptations (i.e., 
functional adaptations in the representation structure of a complex action in memory 
and in the information processing prior to movement onset) and adaptations in motor 
performance. According to the results of the present study, repeatedly imagining and 
executing a movement prompts changes on both a perceptual-cognitive level and a 
motor output level within the motor system. Hence, with this study we were able to 
give comprehensive insights into the perceptual-cognitive background of performance 
changes during motor learning. Furthermore, by employing a multilevel approach to 
motor learning, we demonstrated the value of looking at motor skill acquisition from 
different angles. Future studies in the area of motor learning in general as well as the 
area of mental practice in particular might benefit from approaching the phenomena of 
interest in this way. In doing so, and by using a combination of methods, such a 
multifaceted view may contribute to bring forward research on some of the remaining 
unanswered questions in our field. 
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5.1 Key findings 
The first study of the present work aimed at shedding light on the development 
of one’s mental representation of a complex action during motor learning. Therefore, 
the question was examined whether the mental representation structure of a complex 
action changes over the course of practice, and if so whether this change reflects a 
development toward a more elaborate and functional structure, such as that of an 
expert. Together with improvements in putting performance, mental representations of 
the putt were found to change with practice, developing toward more functional ones. 
Specifically, mental representation structures of the (physical) practice group changed 
from pre-, to post- and to retention-test, and became more similar to a golf expert 
structure over the course of practice, reflecting distinct phases of the putting movement 
(i.e., preparation, forward swing, and impact). Instead, mental representation structures 
of the (no practice) control group, neither executing nor practicing the putt, did not 
change and remained dissimilar in comparison to an expert structure (for details on the 
results, see chapter 2). This study shows that, along with improvements in (overt) 
performance, the (covert) mental representation of a complex action develops as a 
result of practice. 
The goal of the second study was to provide further insights into the 
development of one’s mental representation of a complex action according to type of 
practice, with a particular emphasis on mental practice. Hence, the question was 
investigated whether the mental representation structure of a complex action changes 
as a result of both mental and physical practice as well as a combination of both, and if 
so whether the changes reflect a development toward a more elaborate and functional 
structure. In line with findings from study one, mental representations of the putt 
developed over the course of practice. Interestingly, mental practice, either solely or in 
combination with physical practice, led to even more elaborate representations 
compared to physical practice only. Specifically, mental representation structures of 
the groups practicing mentally became more similar to a functional structure, thereby 
reflecting well the functional phases of the putting movement, whereas those of the 
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physical practice group revealed less development toward a functional structure. 
Furthermore, putting performance improved over the course of practice, reflecting the 
well-known pattern of magnitude of improvement according to type of practice. 
Specifically, combined mental and physical practice was most effective, followed by 
physical practice, mental practice and no practice (i.e., combined practice > physical 
practice > mental practice > no practice). Statistically, the combined practice group 
proved more effective than mental practice only and no practice with respect to 
performance (for details on the results, see chapter 3). Hence, findings from the first 
study were replicated such that, along with improvements in performance, mental 
representation of a complex action developed as a result of practice. More importantly, 
however, the second study shows that mental practice adds to representation 
development leading to even more elaborate representations. Notably, these (covert) 
adaptations did not seem to transfer one-to-one to the (overt) motor output. 
The aim of the third study was to further examine the perceptual-cognitive 
background of performance changes that occur within the motor action system as a 
result of mental and physical practice, thereby providing insights into both mental 
representations and gaze behavior during complex action. Accordingly, the question 
was investigated whether mental representation structure of the putt and gaze behavior 
during putting change with both physical and combined mental and physical practice, 
and if so whether the changes reflect a functional development. Similar to findings of 
study two, combined mental and physical practice led to more developed 
representation structures of the putt compared to physical practice alone. As an 
extension, combined practice as well led to more elaborate gaze behavior prior to 
execution of the putt. Specifically, final fixations prior to the onset of the putting 
movement were longer after practice for the group practicing mentally in addition to 
physical practice in comparison to the control group. This was not the case for the 
group practicing physically only. Putting performance improved similarly in both 
practice groups over the course of practice (for details on the results, see chapter 4). 
Thus, the results of study three once more indicate that it is the mental component of 
the practice that led to more developed representation structures. Importantly, along 
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with mental representation development, gaze behavior seems to develop as well. 
However, similar to study two, these (covert) perceptual-cognitive adaptations were 
not evident on (overt) motor output. 
5.2 Implications 
5.2.1 The adapting motor action system 
5.2.1.1 Behavioral changes 
Regarding changes in motor performance, findings of the present work are in 
line with traditional and contemporary research on motor learning, reporting 
performance improvements as a result of both mental and physical practice. First, the 
findings of the present work match with the general finding that performance improves 
with practice. In each of the three studies conducted, performance improved over the 
course of practice (for details, see chapter 2.3, 3.3, and 4.3). Second, the findings of the 
present work are in line with the general pattern found for different practice types such 
that mental practice can improve performance, but in general not to the same extent 
than physical practice. Moreover, a combination of mental and physical practice has 
been found to be as effective as or even superior to physical practice. This pattern was 
reflected in the results of study 2 and 3, and as such further supports that performance 
improvements during motor learning are dependent on practice type (for details, see 
chapters 3.3 and 4.3). Thus, the changes in performance across the three learning 
studies reflect well the state of the art in motor learning research in general and mental 
practice research in particular. In accordance with previous research, our findings 
further support that changes on a motor output level as a result of both mental and 
physical practice take place within the motor action system and differ according to 
practice type (for detailed discussions, see chapters 2.4, 3.4, and 4.4). 
5.2.1.2 Perceptual-cognitive changes 
A main objective of the present work was to give comprehensive insights into 
the perceptual-cognitive adaptations within the motor action system, as a result of both 
mental and physical practice. Thus, in addition to behavioral adaptations as reflected 
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by motor performance, the perceptual-cognitive adaptations in terms of functional 
changes in mental representation and gaze behavior were of particular interest to the 
present work. 
Across the three studies, along with performance improvements, the structure 
of mental representations developed toward a more elaborate structure, reflecting 
action-related order formation in long-term memory. As has been described before, this 
finding fits well into and extends the body of research on the characteristic differences 
in mental representation structure between unskilled and skilled athletes. While 
novices’ representations have been found to be unstructured, experts rely on structured 
representations in the sense that they match well with the biomechanical and functional 
demands of the task. In the present work, representations of novices turned from 
unstructured into more structured ones over the course of practice, with the structures 
becoming more similar to an expert structure (for details, see chapters 2.3, 3.3, and 
4.3). Thus, along with changes in performance, a cognitive adaptation in terms of order 
formation in long-term memory within the human action system was evident (for 
detailed discussions, see chapters 2.4, 3.4, and 4.4). 
Furthermore, mental representation structure was found to develop differently 
during skill acquisition depending on practice type. It became evident that the 
influence of mental and physical practice differs in terms of the development of mental 
representation structure. Specifically, findings from study 2 and 3 revealed that mental 
representation structure became most elaborate with mental practice. When mental 
practice was part of the practice regime, mental representation structure developed 
even more toward an expert structure compared to the physical practice only condition 
(for details, see chapters 3.3 and 4.3), reflecting a higher degree of action-related order 
formation in long-term memory. Thus, findings on the cognitive adaptation within the 
motor action system as reported from study 1 could be further extended such that 
mental practice has been found to add to the functional development in mental 
representation structure. From this, it seems that mental practice adds to the cognitive 
adaptation within the motor action system (for detailed discussions, see chapters 3.4 
and 4.4). 
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Finally, findings from study 3 helped to shed further light on the perceptual-
cognitive background of performance changes as induced by physical and mental 
practice. It was shown that a combination of mental and physical practice led to both 
more elaborate mental representation structures and more functional gaze behavior 
prior to movement execution in comparison to physical practice alone (for details, see 
chapter 4.3), indicating that combined practice contributed to both a cognitive and a 
perceptual adaption during the learning of a motor action. This finding supports 
findings from study 1 and 2 and further extends them such that combined practice led 
not only to a cognitive, but to a perceptual-cognitive adaptation within the motor 
action system. In addition, this finding indicates that the perceptual-cognitive 
adaptation may be promoted by mental practice in particular (for a detailed discussion, 
see chapter 4.4). 
In sum, according to the results of the present work, perceptual-cognitive 
changes as a result of mental and physical practice take place within the motor action 
system. As has been discussed, changes in mental representation structure and gaze 
behavior as found in the present work both fit well into the body of existing research 
and extend it. From this, the motor action system functionally adapts from a 
perceptual-cognitive point of view during motor learning in general and mental 
practice in particular. 
5.2.2 Mental representation and its development with mental and physical 
practice 
By approaching the motor action system from an architecture point of view, it 
was possible to gain further insights into the adaptation processes therein, thereby 
extending the traditional view (see chapter 1.3.1) by a perceptual-cognitive view on the 
learning of a motor action (see chapter 1.5.1). The present work on the influence of 
mental and physical practice elicited both behavioral adaptations (in terms of motor 
performance) as well as perceptual-cognitive adaptations (in terms of mental 
representation structures and gaze behavior) that occur over the course of learning 
within the motor action system (see chapter 5.2.1). While behavioral adaptations, as 
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found in the three learning studies, fit well into the body of research on motor learning 
in general and mental practice in particular, the findings on perceptual-cognitive 
adaptations extend it. Specifically, the present work was the first to systematically 
examine the perceptual-cognitive adaptations within the motor action system as a result 
of mental and physical practice. 
As previously described in more detail within the scope of the cognitive action 
architecture approach (CAA-A; see chapter 1.4), the learning of a motor action is 
considered as the adaptation of representational networks of complex action in long-
term memory, and as such as stratification within the motor action system, resulting 
from changes of feature dimensions and related relative structures (see chapters 1.4.3 
and 1.5.1). In line with the prediction derived from the CAA-A that motor learning 
would be reflected on the level of mental representation, mental representation 
structures were found to develop toward more elaborate structures with practice across 
the three studies. Along with performance improvements, mental representation 
structures developed with both physical practice (cf. study 1-3) and mental practice (cf. 
study 2-3). 
Furthermore, according to the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis, mental practice 
is suggested to take place particularly on the representational levels of action 
organization, linking sensorimotor to mental representations and in this way leading to 
stratification within the motor action system (see chapters 1.4.4 and 1.5.1). In line with 
the predictions derived from the CAA-A that mental practice would lead to a 
functional development on the representational levels of action organization, mental 
representation structures were found to develop toward more elaborate structures with 
mental practice in the present work (cf. study 2-3). Importantly, in comparison to 
physical practice, mental practice was found to add to the functional development in 
representation structure over the course of learning, leading to more elaborate 
structures than physical practice (cf. study 2-3). Similarly, mental practice seems to 
add to the functional development in gaze behavior, leading to longer quiet eye 
durations (cf. study 3). 
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Interestingly, this perceptual-cognitive adaptation was not congruent with the 
behavioral adaptation such that the more elaborate representation structures and the 
more elaborate gaze behavior would be reflected one-to-one in terms of better 
performance. Despite the fact that mental practice was associated with more elaborate 
representations and more functional gaze behavior, this did not result in better 
performance in comparison to physical practice. From this, it seems that mental 
practice primarily induces (covert) perceptual-cognitive adaptations within the motor 
action system, stabilizing the representational networks of complex action, but does not 
necessarily translate into (overt) behavioral adaptations, resulting in observable 
differences in motor performance. Mental practice during early stages of learning 
seems to particularly influence the motor action system from within, leading to an 
inner refinement of action representation, thereby not necessarily transferring directly 
to the motor output levels (for more details, see also chapters 3.4 and 4.4 as well as 
below). 
The findings of the present work extend contemporary research on mental 
representation of complex action conducted in the realm of the CAA-A. While, so far, 
research has mainly compared mental representation structure across skill levels (see 
chapters 1.3.2-1.3.4), the particular focus of the present work was directed toward 
changes in mental representation structure over time. The work at hand was the first to 
investigate mental representation structure of complex action in early skill acquisition 
experimentally and from a longitudinal point of view, thereby giving insights into the 
adaptations on the level of mental representation within the motor action system as a 
result of practice. Specifically, the present work systematically investigated mental 
representation and its development with mental and physical practice during early 
stages of learning. From this, motor learning can be considered as the adaptation on the 
level of mental representation such that the relations and the groupings of action 
concepts (i.e., mental representation structure) are modified over the course of learning 
and change toward more functional ones. As such, motor learning as induced by 
mental and physical practice reflects action-related order formation in long-term 
memory. 
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Importantly, by taking a perceptual-cognitive view on the motor action system, 
it was possible to gain further insights into the similarities and differences of mental 
and physical practice in promoting learning within the motor action system. This will 
be elaborated on in more detail in the following. 
From the findings of the present work, both types of practice seem to lead to 
perceptual-cognitive as well as behavioral adaptations within the motor action system. 
Independent of practice type, motor learning seems to be reflected by changes in motor 
performance and changes in representation structure as well as in gaze behavior. 
Accordingly, with reference to the CAA-A, both the mental system and the 
sensorimotor system seem to change during motor learning as induced by mental and 
physical practice. However, and most notably, mental and physical practice seem to 
influence the levels of action organization within the motor action system to a different 
degree. Both types of practice were found to differentially influence the development 
of mental representation structure and as such seem to have their distinct contribution 
to the motor learning process within the adapting motor action system. Mental practice 
was associated with most developed representation structures, whereas physical 
practice was associated with best motor performance. This indicated that the learning 
of a motor action by physical practice differs from the learning of a motor action by 
mental practice with regard to the different levels of action organization. 
Drawing on elaborations by Schack (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010) on motor 
learning and mental practice from the CAA-A point of view (see chapters 1.4.3, 1.4.4, 
and 1.5.1), the present work takes one step further by directly comparing the different 
types of practice and as such allows for reflections on their particular influence on the 
motor action system during motor learning. Accordingly, the potential influence of 
both physical practice (cf. Figure 5.1) and mental practice (cf. Figure 5.2) within the 
levels of action organization during early stages of motor learning is sketched in the 
following. The grey circles on the left indicate the involvement of all levels of the 
motor action system during the learning of a new motor task (cf. Figure 1.1, chapter 
1.5.1), while the black circles on the right differentiate the distinct influence of practice 
type. Specifically, the solid black circles on the right highlight the primary influence of 
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practice type within the motor action system, whereas the dashed black circles on the 
right mark the secondary influence each practice type may have. 
Based on the findings of the present work, learning a motor action by way of 
mental and physical practice may differ regarding the different levels of action 
organization. Findings from study 2, for instance, revealed that mental practice alone 
as well as combined mental and physical practice led to most elaborate representation 
structures in comparison to an expert structure, while physical practice alone and 
combined mental and physical practice led to best performance. This indicates that the 
physical practice component may primarily relate to adaptations on the sensorimotor 
levels (see Figure 5.1), whereas the mental practice component of the practice regime 
may primarily relate to adaptations on the representational levels within the motor 
action system at this particular stage of motor learning (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.1. The influence of physical practice on the motor action system during early stages of motor 
learning (adapted and modified from Schack, 2002, p. 59). 
Physical practice as an “online” type of practice is suggested to influence the 
motor action system mainly by way of the sensorimotor system, integrating and storing 
sensorimotor information (i.e., feedback) that is available from actual movement 
execution. Specifically, the repeated execution of an action as a sensorimotor 
experience entails the integration of sensorimotor information into sensorimotor 
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representations and, by way of the latter, into mental representations. More 
specifically, sensorimotor information is being stored within the sensorimotor 
representations as a result of physical practice, and as such serves to discriminate and 
relate concepts by way of dimensioning. This dimensioning results in the structuring of 
the mental representation, and therefore, in a more and more refined feature-based 
representation structure. In this sense, the motor action system incrementally stabilizes 
during motor learning as induced by physical practice, and it does so via the structuring 
of mental representations based on enriched sensorimotor representations. 
 
Figure 5.2. The influence of mental practice on the motor action system during early stages of motor 
learning (adapted and modified from Schack, 2002, p. 59). 
Instead, based on the findings of the present work, mental practice as an 
“offline” type of practice is suggested to influence the motor action system mainly 
through the representational levels at the interface of the mental and the sensorimotor 
system, retrieving and re-storing “quasi-sensorimotor information” (i.e., “quasi-
feedback”) based on the action representation available. Mental practice, in contrast to 
physical practice, does not involve an actual sensorimotor experience, but the 
simulation of the latter (i.e., a quasi-sensorimotor experience). As such, the repeated 
simulation of an action (i.e., mental practice) does not entail the integration of 
sensorimotor information from the actual experience, but the retrieval and the re-
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integration of quasi-sensorimotor information from a past experience stored in long-
term memory. More specifically, this retrieved and re-stored information serves to 
reinforce links between sensorimotor and mental representations as a result of mental 
practice, thereby further relating and differentiating concepts, and finally leading to 
order formation. In this sense, the motor action system incrementally stabilizes during 
motor learning as induced by mental practice, and it does so via the structuring of 
mental representations based on stronger links across representational levels of action 
organization. 
Taken together, based on the findings of the present work, mental practice is 
suggested to primarily operate on the higher levels within the motor action system, 
while physical practice may primarily operate on the lower levels within the motor 
action system. More specifically, the primary influence of mental practice on the motor 
action system is thought to be centered between the mental and the sensorimotor 
representational levels, while the primary influence of physical practice on the system 
is suggested to be centered between the sensorimotor representational and regulatory 
levels (as indicated by the solid black circles on the right in Figures 5.1 and 5.2). For 
image generation (i.e., motor imagery and mental practice), the communication 
between the representational levels is essential, while for generation of the motor 
output (i.e., motor execution and physical practice) the communication within the 
sensorimotor system is of primary interest. The direct interaction of the person within 
his/ her environment with regard to a particular motor task helps to stabilize the 
perceptual-cognitive system within the human motor action system by allowing 
sensorimotor patterns to grow and, as a consequence, conceptual structures to evolve 
(see also Schack, 2002). In contrast, the indirect or simulated interaction strengthens 
the links between sensorimotor patterns available and the corresponding conceptual 
structures, stabilizing the perceptual-cognitive system in this way. Thus, learning by 
way of physical practice is suggested to be closely tied to the feedback available from 
movement execution leading to a refinement on the sensorimotor levels of action 
organization, and subsequently transferring to the mental levels of the motor action 
system (as indicated by the dashed black circle on the right in Figure 5.1). In contrast, 
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learning by way of mental practice is suggested to be closely tied to the quasi-feedback 
based on the action representation available, and as such is situated on the perceptual-
cognitive levels of action organization, reflecting an inner development, potentially 
transferring to the sensorimotor control level of the motor action system (as indicated 
by the dashed black circle on the right in Figure 5.2). Although not directly testing for 
the basic mechanisms, the insights of the present work add to the picture of potential 
basic mechanisms that underlie each type of practice, an issue which is still being 
highly debated (e.g., Annett, 1995b; Cumming & Williams, 2012; Glover & Dixon, 
2013; Jackson, Lafleur, Malouin, Richards, & Doyon, 2001; Munzert, Zentgraf, Stark, 
& Vaitl, 2008; Murphy, Nordin, & Cumming, 2008). However, additional research is 
needed to further test the model presented and to foster the statements and hypotheses 
derived from the present findings. 
As a side note, it is conceivable that a perceptual-cognitive, representation-
based view on mental practice as presented in the present work may help explain 
ambiguous findings in the field, for instance regarding the effectiveness of mental 
practice. So far, from the performance point of view, mental practice has proven to be 
effective, although not as effective as physical practice (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994). 
However, there are as well studies showing that mental practice can be superior to 
physical practice in enhancing performance (e.g., Healy & Wohldmann, 2012; 
Wohldmann et al., 2007; Wohldmann, Healy, & Bourne, 2008). Thus, to some degree, 
results on the influence of mental practice on the performance of a motor task remain 
ambiguous, having researchers led to the conclusion that the influence of both practice 
types and their relationship are of complex nature, with type of task being one major 
factor of influence (e.g., Driskell et al., 1994). For instance, while Wohldmann et al. 
(2008) reported mental practice to be superior to physical practice in a task with high 
“cognitive” demands (i.e., typing four digit numbers), Reiser, Büsch, & Munzert 
(2011) reported physical practice to be superior to mental practice in tasks with low 
cognitive, and higher “motor” demands (i.e., bench pressing; leg pressing, triceps 
extension, and calf raising). In addition, related to this is the discussion on the 
cognitive-motor hypothesis, stating that cognitive tasks may benefit more from mental 
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practice than motor tasks (e.g., Ryans & Simons, 1981, 1983). Approaching mental 
practice and physical practice effects from a hierarchical point of view, our findings 
add to this discussion in the way that, within a motor task, it is primarily the 
perceptual-cognitive levels of action that seems to be promoted by mental practice. In 
this sense, the findings of the present work can be regarded as an extension of the 
cognitive-motor hypothesis in mental practice research (for details, see chapter 3.4). 
In addition to the CAA-A related elaborations above, particular examples of 
related research addressing mental and physical practice along these lines will be 
described and discussed in the light of the findings of the present work: first, a 
hierarchical explanation for mental and physical practice effects will be addressed, 
drawing back on elaborations by Mackay (1981). Second, and more specifically, the 
role of feedback in explaining mental and physical practice effects will be elaborated 
on in the light of a study conducted by Wulf, Horstmann and Choi (1995). Third, and 
finally, mental and physical practice will be approached by way of memory accounts, 
as has recently been done by Raisbeck, Wyatt and Shea (2012). 
Ad 1, from our findings, it seems that both types of practice operate through 
and find expression on different levels of the motor action system, and thus influence 
subsequent performance differently. Specifically, the findings of the present work 
suggest that mental practice primarily promotes the perceptual-cognitive adaptation 
within the motor action system. 
In the same veins, Mackay (1981) approached mental practice and its effects 
from a hierarchical view. Based on findings of a speech production experiment, 
thereby examining the influence of mental and physical practice on the performance 
and the transfer of a speech production task, the author developed a hierarchical theory 
of behavior organization. According to this theory, higher level mental nodes are being 
activated during mental practice, thereby priming lower level muscle movement nodes. 
As a consequence, in the case of skilled action (i.e., the muscle movement nodes exist) 
mental practice is suggested to be effective, because the activation of mental nodes 
results in the priming of muscle movement nodes (i.e., the muscle priming 
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phenomenon; Mackay, 1981). Instead, in the case of unskilled action, (i.e., the muscle 
movement nodes do not exist) mental practice is suggested to be not effective, because 
the activation of mental nodes cannot result in any muscle priming. Accordingly, 
motor performance can be facilitated by mental practice in individuals holding an 
advanced level of skill, but not in individuals being new to a task. Thus, from this 
view, mental practice effects are restricted to skilled action. 
Interestingly, what was not addressed explicitly by Mackay (1981) is the 
question whether, in the case of unskilled action and thus during early skill acquisition, 
mental practice has any influence on higher levels within the action system, despite the 
lack of improvements in motor performance. Specifically, Mackay (1981) did not 
elaborate on whether mental practice may influence the mental nodes and their 
formation even if no muscle movement nodes exist that may allow for subsequent 
changes in performance. Similarly, according to the hierarchical view of the CAA-A, 
the motor action system is comprised of a higher mental and a lower sensorimotor 
system. Along these lines, and as an extension of Mackay’s elaborations, mental 
practice can be considered as inducing changes on representational levels within the 
motor action system, although not necessarily and immediately resulting in any overt 
changes on the performance of a motor action (cf. Figure 5.2). 
Ad 2, mental and physical practice obviously differ in terms of the feedback 
available during the execution and the imagery of an action. This distinction has 
researchers led to differentiate these two types of practice into (physical) “online” and 
(mental) “offline” practice (cf. Beilock & Lyons, 2009). First, and foremost, physical 
practice is concerned with the individual practicing a task in his or her environment, 
and therefore experiencing an actual motor action. While doing so, actual stimuli are 
present, both from the environment and from the individual, and the movement is 
being produced within this reality, including actual sensorimotor feedback. Instead, 
mental practice is concerned with the image of the individual practicing a task in his or 
her environment, with the image depending on the individual’s imagery ability and 
various other factors. As such, the experience can be regarded a quasi-experience of an 
actual motor action, being a vicarious, a representative, a non-actual experience. 
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During motor imagery, therefore, no actual stimuli and no feedback from actual motor 
execution are present. Thus, by its very nature, mental practice is an offline process 
primarily fed by and based on information resulting from a quasi-experience within a 
non-actual situation, whereas physical practice is an online process primarily fed by 
and based on information arising from the actual situation and the feedback perceived 
therein (for more details, see above). 
Addressing the idea that feedback may account for the differences in mental 
and physical practice and their effect on the motor action system, Wulf et al. (1995) 
approached the basic mechanisms of both types of practice with a particular focus on 
the availability of feedback during mental and physical practice. Motivated by the 
intriguing finding that a combination of mental and physical practice can be more 
effective than physical practice alone, Wulf et al. (1995) noted that, so far, this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by any existing theory. Accordingly, the authors 
argued that this combination of mental and physical practice may prove beneficial for 
the following reason: as the individual does not receive and does not have to integrate 
feedback after each trial (i.e., in the case of mental practice trials during combined 
practice, no feedback is available and thus feedback does not have to be processed), the 
development of a stable movement representation may be promoted. Instead, when 
receiving feedback after each trial (i.e., in the case of physical practice) permanent 
correction processes may prevent the individual from developing such a movement 
representation. Thus, the authors argued that feedback would be the main 
distinguishing factor of both practice types, and that mental practice may work like 
physical practice without feedback. Accordingly, they examined the question whether 
mental practice (i.e., MP) and physical practice without information feedback (i.e., IF) 
would similarly influence the learning of a motor action. Three groups practiced a golf 
putting task either with all trials followed by feedback (100% IF), with half of the trials 
substituted by either no feedback following the execution of the putt (50% IF) or 
imagining the putt without actually executing it (50% MP). It was predicted that if 
mental practice worked like physical practice without information feedback then both 
50% groups (IF and MP) would show a similar amount of motor learning (here: 
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improved performance during retention-test) and more so compared to the 100% IF 
group. Contrary to the authors’ predictions, the 50% IF group showed better learning 
compared to the 50% MP and the 100% IF groups when there was no feedback 
available. In addition, when there was feedback available, all three groups performed 
equally after the retention interval. Based on their findings on the behavioral level, the 
authors concluded that feedback is not the only factor distinguishing mental and 
physical practice. More importantly, the authors ended up stating that  
“it still remains unclear why combined physical and mental practice can 
enhance learning relative to physical practice alone. Determining what are the 
exact underlying mechanisms of MP remains a challenge for future research” 
(Wulf et al., 1995, p. 266).  
Importantly, Wulf et al. (1995) approach motor learning from the motor output 
level, thereby employing performance as an indicator of learning. Specifically, in their 
study, each of the three groups had learned to a similar degree in the sense that the 
groups had reached a comparable level of performance after the retention interval 
when being provided with feedback. Thus, this study shows that a lack of feedback 
during some of the trials does not seem to lead to differences in performance, neither to 
increases nor to decreases. What this study does not show is the degree to which 
representations change. 
To this extent, the findings fit well with the findings of the present work such 
that a combination of mental and physical practice leads to similar levels of 
performance in golf putting compared to physical practice alone. What the findings of 
the present work elicited in addition is that a combination of both practice types led to 
differential effects on a perceptual-cognitive level. Following up on the idea of Wulf et 
al. (1995), it would be interesting to have a closer look at the perceptual-cognitive 
adaptations, and thus the development of mental representation structure, during 
learning by physical practice with feedback, physical practice without feedback and 
mental practice, and whether it develops differently depending on the feedback 
available (cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2). In cases without feedback from actual movement 
execution during physical practice, processing of information might be deeper, leading 
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to more elaborate mental representation structure, and thus in this way promoting order 
formation in memory (for a discussion on levels of processing, see below). 
Ad 3, a potential memory-based account for the differences in mental and 
physical practice will be discussed in the light of more recent work by Raisbeck et al. 
(2012). In doubting that mental practice has any influence on motor performance at all, 
Raisbeck et al. (2012) approached mental and physical practice by focusing on 
potential differences in processing structures which underlie mental and physical 
practice, and which may cause the differential effects that the two types of practice 
have on the performance of a motor task. Specifically, Raisbeck et al. (2012) 
investigated the influence of mental and physical practice on response initiation and 
execution of a key pressing task, thereby employing a transfer paradigm. Participants 
practiced under one of four conditions: mental-mental practice, physical-physical 
practice, mental-physical practice, physical-mental practice. To explain, participants in 
the combined groups either switched from mental to physical practice or vice versa 
during acquisition phase. In doing so, Raisbeck et al. (2012) aimed to approach the 
underlying mechanisms of mental and physical practice by showing that a switch from 
one type to another causes interferences and leads to changes in performance, and in 
this case to changes in response times. The authors found execution times to become 
longer when switching from physical to mental practice, whereas execution times 
became shorter when switching from mental to physical practice. Based on their 
finding of an interaction resulting from the switch between the two types of practice, 
the authors concluded that different task representations may have developed during 
each type of practice, and that the processes of each practice type were different for 
each task representation. As a consequence, the authors suggested a memory-based 
account, separated into two processes for mental and physical practice effects. 
Specifically, the degree of effort needed for response execution served as an 
explanation for the differences found in response times between mental and physical 
practice. Accordingly, mental practice was suggested to be deliberate and to require 
effortful processing during response execution, whereas physical practice was 
suggested to be automatic and to require less effortful processing. 
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In the realm of the CAA-A and the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis of mental 
practice, one may re-interpret the findings reported by Raisbeck et al. (2012) in terms 
of adaptations on different levels within the hierarchy of action organization. 
Specifically, the switch between the two types of practice and the resulting changes in 
response times may reflect differences in mental and physical practice such that they 
operate on different levels within the motor action system (cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2). If 
learning by mental practice is memory induced thereby primarily affecting the 
representational levels, and if learning by physical practice is feedback induced and 
thereby primarily affecting the sensorimotor levels, then it is not surprising that 
transfer leads to interference as found by Raisbeck et al. (2012). 
In the same veins, mental practice has been described as being more effortful 
(e.g., Willingham, 1998). The issue of effort together with reflections on memory 
directly relate to the groundbreaking work of Craik and Lockart (1972) in the field of 
memory research. Originating in the field of verbal learning, their general idea was to 
view memory in terms of levels of processing. Accordingly, memory is approached by 
processing as opposed to entities. Along these lines, the degree to which something can 
be remembered depends on the depth of processing that had occurred during initial 
encoding. In his update on the original ideas, Craik (2002) revisits the levels of 
processing idea, thereby expanding the idea to hierarchical models on cognition, 
suggesting a hierarchical view of cognitive representations with higher, more abstract, 
and lower, more specific representational levels. In this revisit, Craik (2002) concludes 
with the words,  
“I have seen no evidence against the proposition that the memory trace 
reflects those processes carried out primarily for the purposes of perception 
and comprehension, and that more meaningful processing is usually 
associated with higher levels of recollection.” (Craik, 2002, p. 316) 
Mental practice, in this sense, may be associated with a greater depth of 
processing, while physical practice, in turn, may relate to a lower depth of processing 
(cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2), resulting in more developed representations for mental 
practice. 
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Along these lines, one may even speculate on the direction of processing 
within the hierarchy of action organization as induced by both mental and physical 
practice (e.g., Mulder, Zijlstra, Zijlstra, & Hochstenbach, 2004). It may be the case that 
changes within the motor action system as induced by physical practice may transfer 
from the sensorimotor to the mental levels over time (i.e., bottom-up changes), while 
changes within the motor action system as induced by mental practice may transfer 
from the mental to the sensorimotor levels over time (i.e., top-down changes). In other 
words, changes on the mental levels of the motor action system caused by mental 
practice may subsequently impact the sensorimotor system. For physical practice, on 
the other hand, changes on the sensorimotor levels of the motor action system may, in 
turn, have some impact on the mental system (cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2). However, this 
idea certainly warrants further considerations and investigations. 
Taken together, the findings of the present work support the notion that mental 
and physical practice may operate through and find expression on different levels 
within the motor action system. Specifically, the findings indicate that mental practice 
is particularly associated with perceptual-cognitive changes within the motor action 
system during early skill acquisition. From this, it seems that the basic mechanisms of 
mental and physical practice may be differentiated in the way that they are based on 
“offline” and “online” information. The influence of both practice types may differ to 
the degree that they are memory-based (i.e., based on “quasi-feedback” from the action 
representation available) or feedback-based (i.e., based on actual feedback from motor 
execution). As has been discussed in the realm of the CAA-A (cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2) 
and related work providing memory-based and feedback-based accounts for both 
mental and physical practice (see above), one might presume that changes within the 
motor action system in the case of physical practice are primarily feedback-based, 
taking place within the sensorimotor system. Instead, in the case of mental practice 
adaptations may primarily be memory-based, taking place between the representational 
levels of the sensorimotor and the mental system. Although the present work provides 
some support in this direction, these straightforward presumptions certainly warrant 
further investigation and experimental testing. 
CHAPTER 5 
166  
Interestingly, although researchers generally agree upon the different natures 
of the two types of practice and the different magnitudes of effect on the performance 
of a motor action that both types of practice have, little is known about the differential 
(or similar, respectively) mechanisms of both practice types within the motor action 
system to this day. Compared to the exploration of the influence that each type of 
practice has on performance, relatively few theories exist that address the basic 
mechanisms of both mental and physical practice, thereby trying to answer questions 
on the differential processes taking place within the motor action system (for details, 
see chapter 1.2.2). In fact, the principle of functional equivalence and the simulation 
theory, being the most influential among recent approaches to describing and 
explaining processes during overt and covert stages of action (and thus during physical 
and mental practice), have provoked an orientation toward potential similarities 
between and shared mechanisms of the two stages of action. Specifically, in aiming at 
understanding the basic mechanisms from a neurocognitive point of view, both the 
principle of functional equivalence and the simulation theory have stimulated a 
tremendous body of research (see chapter 1.2.2.3). From this, both stages of action 
seem to adhere to similar principles, and in this sense are to be treated as functionally 
equivalent. However, and what is important to note, since the appearance of the 
principle of functional equivalence and later the simulation theory of action, 
surprisingly little attention has been devoted to the potential differences in basic 
mechanisms that may exist between the imagery and the execution of an action, and 
between mental and physical practice, respectively.  
More recently, however, research interest in approaching the execution and the 
imagery of an action, and physical and mental practice respectively, by looking more 
closely at what differentiates them from one another has re-emerged (e.g., Wakefield, 
Smith, Moran, & Holmes, 2013). Although, strictly speaking, the findings of the 
present work do not allow for conclusions regarding the underlying mechanisms of 
both types of practice, results at least point toward differential effects of both types of 
practice, which resulted in a discussion of potential reasons leading to these 
differences. In order to gain a thorough picture of how the imagined and the actual 
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execution of an action influence the motor action system during the learning of a motor 
action, it will be valuable to focus on both the similarities and the differences between 
these two stages of action. It seems crucial to find out what mental and physical 
practice have in common and, at the same time, what the distinct contribution of each 
during motor skill acquisition is. 
5.3 Limitations and prospects 
The present work provides novel insights into motor learning as induced by 
mental and physical practice by shedding light on the perceptual-cognitive changes that 
take place within the human motor action system during early motor skill acquisition. 
Although the main research questions have been answered in the realm of the present 
work, numerous questions related to the present work remain unanswered. Further 
research is therefore warranted to gain a more detailed understanding of motor learning 
and mental practice from a perceptual-cognitive, representation-based point of view. In 
the following, limitations of the present work and prospects for future work in the area 
of basic and applied research are being presented. 
From the CAA-A perspective, several issues directly related to the present 
work remain to be answered. First, the focus in examining the underlying mental 
representation of complex action laid on its structure (i.e., the relation and the grouping 
of BACs) and how the structure changes over time. Thus, while we have learnt about 
the structuring of mental representation in the present work, the dimensioning of 
mental representation and its changes as a result of mental and physical practice so far 
have not been addressed (for details on the dimensioning of mental representation, see 
chapter 1.4.2). As the structure of mental representation of complex action is thought 
to be feature-based, it may be valuable to have a closer look at the types of features 
(i.e., functional and sensory ones), the amount of features, the distribution of features 
across concepts, and how these features contribute to the structuring of mental 
representation. To investigate the dimensioning of mental representations may shed 
further light on the differential influence that physical and mental practice have on the 
motor action system (see also chapter 5.2.2; cf. Figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
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Second, as the organization of motor action is thought to take place within two 
systems (i.e., the mental and the sensorimotor system) and thus on several levels within 
the motor action system, it seems valuable to further try to uncover the processes 
within the hierarchy of action organization. From our research, the (covert) perceptual-
cognitive adaptations do not seem to directly result in (overt) behavioral adaptations in 
terms of motor performance. However, it is conceivable that after a longer period of 
time, as learning progresses, the perceptual-cognitive adaptations transfer to 
adaptations in motor performance, and that, in turn, adaptations in motor performance 
transfer to perceptual-cognitive adaptations. In other words, it is conceivable that the 
adaptations as induced by physical practice cause bottom-up changes, while the 
adaptations as induced by mental practice cause top-down changes within the motor 
action system. Thus, it seems valuable to further examine how the changes on the 
different levels of action organization relate to one another, whether they transfer more 
or less directly or whether this transfer is mediated by distinct factors (e.g., amount of 
practice, skill level, consolidation). 
Third, and related to this, to further approach the relationship between 
representation and performance and its changes over time will help to shed further light 
on how motor action is organized and how this organization changes with practice. 
Therefore, it seems valuable to have a closer look at the motor action during motor 
learning, using a combination of biomechanical, physiological, and perceptual-
cognitive methods. First steps in this direction have been taken by Heinen (2005), and 
more recently by Land, Volchenkov, Bläsing, and Schack (2013), both examining the 
overlap of cognitive and biomechanical aspects of motor action. While motor 
performance has been approached by its outcome in the present work, a more detailed 
understanding of the changes taking place within the sensorimotor system, and their 
relation to the mental representation will be gained by approaching motor performance 
more thoroughly. Specifically, approaching motor performance not only by its 
outcome (i.e., the result of movement execution), but also by its quality (i.e., the 
process of movement execution itself), and as well by even more direct measures such 
as physiological activity in the muscles (i.e., EMG) that are involved in that particular 
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motor action, seems promising in learning more about the interplay of the sensorimotor 
and the mental system during motor action organization. 
Fourth, the present work has taken an initial step in direction of examining the 
functional links between mental representation and perception during learning, with a 
particular focus on the quiet eye. However, future research is needed to further explore 
the relation of perception and mental representation and their change over the course of 
practicing a motor action. Related to this, it will be interesting to further explore the 
influence of mental and physical practice on attention (e.g., Foerster, 2011; Heinen, 
Mandry, Vinken, & Nicolaus, 2014; Heinen, Vinken, & Fink, 2011) and the mental 
representation of a complex action (e.g., Essig, Janelle, Borgo, & Koester, 2014; 
Tenenbaum, & Gershgoren, 2014; Weigelt, Schack, & Kunde, 2007). 
Going beyond the scope of the CAA-A, it seems noteworthy that, with the 
present work only a very short part of the entire process of learning a complex motor 
action was depicted, namely early skill acquisition. The three learning studies 
exclusively relate to initial changes within the motor action system during early phases 
of motor learning. Specifically, perceptual-cognitive changes after the first few days of 
practice (here: 3 days; i.e., relatively small amount of practice sessions), and after only 
few days of no practice (here: 3 days; i.e., relatively short length of retention interval) 
have been investigated. Accordingly, a significant, but still miniature and for sure 
incomplete picture of the processes taking place within the motor action system during 
motor learning and mental practice has been drawn. Moreover, the learning of one 
particular complex action (here: the golf putt; i.e., no transfer from one to another skill) 
has been investigated. In respect thereof, it seems valuable to further pursue this line of 
research by investigating the learning process in more detail such that the retention and 
the transfer of learning will be explored from a representational viewpoint. To 
investigate long-term retention will provide further insights into the persistence (i.e., 
retention) and the loss (i.e., forgetting) of mental representation of complex action. In 
addition, to examine the degree of transfer from the learned motor action to another 
motor action, and its relation to one’s underlying representation of the action, will help 
to gain further insights into the adapting motor action system. 
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Furthermore, mental and physical practice were introduced in their most 
simple versions. In the three learning studies, participants practiced the putt by 
repeatedly rehearsing it either mentally or physically (or both). Variations in the 
practice regimes were not provided and therefore research has yet to investigate the 
development of mental representations in the light of different practice conditions. 
Specifically, the conditions of practice and their effect on the learning of a motor 
action have been highly investigated in terms of (overt) performance (e.g. variability of 
practice: e.g., Shea & Kohl, 1990; variability of physical and mental practice: e.g., 
Gabriele, Hall, & Lee, 1989), but not with regard to the (covert) perceptual-cognitive 
aspects of motor action. Accordingly, with respect to the effectiveness of learning, an 
interesting extension of the present work would be to investigate the influence of 
different conditions of practice on mental representation development. A first step in 
this direction has been taken by Land et al. (2014), demonstrating the influence of type 
of instruction (here: internal vs. external focus of attention during golf putting) on the 
rate of representation development during early skill acquisition. Specifically, in their 
study, an external focus of attention during learning led to greater putting accuracy and 
consistency as well as more developed representation structures of the putt compared 
to an internal focus of attention. Further investigating which conditions lead to most 
developed representation structures, and whether this is complementary to the 
performance of a motor action, will shed further light on motor learning. More general, 
having a closer look at practice conditions by investigating representational networks 
of complex action and their development may help to solve some of the remaining 
questions in the field. 
In the present work, motor learning through mental and physical practice have 
been approached from a perceptual-cognitive point of view. To take a 
neurophysiological perspective and to investigate neurophysiological correlates of 
perceptual-cognitive changes within the motor action system may significantly add to 
the findings of the present work. For instance, Zhang et al. (2014) recently examined 
functional connectivity within the brain over the course of learning as induced by 
mental practice. From their findings of changes in resting state functional connectivity 
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in sensory and cognitive resting state networks, the authors drew conclusions about the 
formation of action representation. While their conclusion regarding the representation 
of motor action has been drawn indirectly from neurophysiological evidence, directly 
addressing representations by examining the change of mental representation structure 
by way of the SDA-M will foster evidence on the cognitive adaptation in addition to 
the neural adaptation as reported by Zhang et al. (2014). Accordingly, a combination of 
behavioral, neurophysiological, and cognitive approaches, thereby examining changes 
in overt performance and in covert neural and cognitive representations, and thus 
considering the behavior, the brain and the mind during motor action, may contribute 
to draw a more thorough picture of changes within the motor action system during 
motor learning. It is likely that such an interdisciplinary approach using various 
methods from various disciplines will help to grow our knowledge and to advance our 
understanding of the human action system. 
Switching from the theoretical to a more applied perspective, it would be of 
great interest to learn more about the effects of representation-based learning and 
coaching. From the learning point of view, representation-based learning in 
comparison to traditional learning, which does not directly address the individual’s 
representation of an action, seems promising as a future learning strategy (e.g., Heinen 
& Schack, 2004; Heinen & Schwaiger, 2002; Heinen, Schwaiger, & Schack, 2002; 
Schack & Bar-Eli, 2007; Schack & Hackfort, 2007). It will be interesting to further 
investigate the influence of representation-based learning in comparison to normative 
learning across different skill levels, thereby investigating the question whether 
representation-based learning is as effective as or even more effective than traditional 
strategies when working with athletes. Another idea, from the coaching point of view, 
may be to investigate interactions that are based on traditional, representation-blind 
communication between the coach and the athlete and interactions that are based on 
more objective analyses of the athlete’s representation of a given motor action. 
Directly related to the idea of representation-based learning in general is to 
individualize mental practice (e.g., Williams, Cooley, Newell, Weibull, & Cumming, 
2013) such that the image to be rehearsed and the instructions given are based on the 
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individual’s mental representation, as measured via SDA-M (i.e., mental training based 
on mental representation (MTMR); Schack & Bar-Eli, 2007; Schack et al., 2014; 
Schack & Hackfort, 2007; Schack & Heinen, 2000). A step in this direction has been 
taken by Velentzas (2010), investigating the influence of individualized compared to 
non-individualized mental practice on spike performance in highly-skilled volleyball 
players. Mental practice of the spike was either based on individualized (i.e., 
representation-based) imagery scripts or on generic (i.e., not representation-based) 
imagery scripts. Specifically, generic scripts were based on general information on the 
technique of the volleyball spike, whereas individualized scripts were based on each 
individual’s representation of the spike. According to the results, those players 
practicing with individualized imagery scripts elicited better performance after practice 
compared to the ones practicing with generic scripts. Thus, findings revealed that those 
volleyball players provided with representation-based imagery scripts profited more 
from mental practice compared to those who practice mentally in a non-representation-
based fashion. From this, the author concluded that mental practice is more effective 
when it is based on and adapted to the individual’s representation of the complex 
motor action to be practiced compared to standardized mental practice. 
Finally, representation-based learning and coaching in the realm of either 
mental or physical practice may also be transferred onto technical platforms such as 
robots and virtual agents (e.g., Schack & Ritter, 2009, 2013; Schack, Bertollo, Koester, 
Maycock, & Essig, 2014). Specifically, as a supplement to the traditional human-
human interaction between the coach and her/ his athlete, human-robot or human-
virtual agent interaction may prove fruitful in situations during which the coach is not 
present, or in situations that deserve intensive one-to-one coaching that cannot be 
accomplished by the coach without neglecting the rest of the team. Therefore, systems 
may be built that are able to measure the athlete’s representation of an action, to 
analyze it in comparison to the representation of an expert, to detect movement errors 
based on this analysis, and finally to instruct the athlete accordingly. To date, initial 
ideas in direction of an intelligent coaching space have arisen (e.g., De Kok, Hough, 
Frank, Schlangen, & Kopp, 2014), whereas it remains a future challenge to build a 
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coaching space, in which the coachee experiences a comfortable, motivating, and 
informative learning environment, that significantly adds to traditional ways of 
learning, and thus results in an ideal supplement to everyday work in human-human 
interaction in our gyms. 
Taken together, although the findings of the present work make a distinct 
contribution to recent research in motor learning in general and mental practice in 
particular, many of the questions arising during the planning, conducting, analyzing, 
and writing of the present work remain to be investigated. In fact, the present work has 
led to a considerable collection of questions, growing further and inviting to take 
numerous further steps on the way to gain a deeper, more sophisticated understanding 
of the complex and intriguing human motor action systems. 
5.4 Conclusion 
To date, a strikingly large body of research exists in the area of motor learning 
(see chapter 1.1). Similar to the field of motor learning, a wealth of research has been 
conducted and tremendous progress has been made in the field of mental practice in 
the last few decades (see chapter 1.2). Conclusions about motor learning as induced by 
mental and physical practice are usually inferred from changes in motor performance 
or changes in brain activation (see chapters 1.3.1 and 1.5.1). As previously elaborated 
on in more detail, the complexity of the motor action system, with perceptual-cognitive 
representations guiding motor action and changing over the course of motor learning, 
most likely cannot be grasped by focusing on either behavioral or neural changes 
taking place during the learning of a complex action. Rather, it is essential to go 
beyond behavioral or neural changes, and to directly address the representation of an 
action if the aim is to understand the adapting motor action system during motor 
learning from within. The present work advances in this direction by approaching 
motor learning through mental and physical practice from a representation-based 
perspective, highlighting the perceptual-cognitive adaptations within the motor action 
system during motor learning, and focusing on the functional role of mental 
representations of complex action.  
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From the findings of the present work, practice is associated with both 
behavioral adaptations (in terms of motor performance) and perceptual-cognitive 
adaptations (in terms of mental representation structure and gaze behavior) (see chapter 
5.2.1). Moreover, mental and physical practice differ in their influence on the motor 
action system with respect to perceptual-cognitive and behavioral adaptations (see 
chapter 5.2.2). Study 1, 2, and 3 clearly demonstrate that performance improvements 
go along with functional changes in mental representation structure when practicing a 
motor action. Accordingly, motor learning can be viewed in terms of a development of 
representation structures, and thus as order formation in long-term memory. Study 2 
and 3 additionally indicate that mental practice promotes this development even more 
than physical practice does. Practice incorporating a mental component (i.e., imagining 
the motor action without executing it at the same time) led to most elaborate 
representation structures and most elaborate gaze behavior in the present work. 
Notably, these adaptations did not transfer one-to-one to the motor output level, 
pointing to an inner refinement within the motor action system that is not necessarily 
observable in terms of motor performance. From this, mental practice seems to 
particularly promote the perceptual-cognitive components of motor action within the 
motor action system. 
Given that, as found within the scope of the present work, functional changes 
in mental representation and gaze behavior do not necessarily transfer one-to-one to 
changes in overt motor performance (i.e., the motor action system changes covertly in 
terms of perceptual-cognitive adaptations, but not overtly in terms of behavioral 
adaptations), it seems crucial to consider motor learning as being more than just a 
reflection on the surface of the human motor action system, as measured in terms of 
performance improvements. Motor learning does not have to be necessarily reflected in 
both covert and overt changes. Essentially, motor learning takes place on different 
(covert and overt) levels within the motor action system. In this sense, apprehending 
that learning does not necessarily have to become visible in terms of behavioral 
adaptations, and that it can take place solely internally, thus become evident as 
perceptual-cognitive adaptations only, may contribute to solve some of the remaining 
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questions in our area. It is therefore unlikely that motor learning as induced by mental 
and physical practice can adequately be understood by taking either a behavioral or a 
neural perspective. Rather, when it comes to understanding the intelligence and the 
complexity of learning within the human motor action system researchers must take a 
perceptual-cognitive perspective, thereby including and directly addressing the 
functional role of representations in long-term memory. From the findings of the 
present work, it seems therefore essential to approach motor learning and the influence 
of mental or physical or any other type of practice on the motor action system, from a 
perceptual-cognitive, representation-based perspective in future studies. 
To widen the view on the adapting motor action system by investigating 
changes on different levels within the motor action system, as has been done in the 
present work, seems to prove valuable in elucidating the phenomenon of motor 
learning in general and the one of mental practice in particular. Further approaching 
the effects of mental and physical practice in this way, both in isolation and in 
comparison to one another, may even help to uncover potential mechanisms, and to 
develop a comprehensive theory of mental and physical practice. More generally 
speaking, it seems crucial to combine perspectives, theories and measures from 
movement science, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience, to gain a more holistic 
picture of the adapting and learning human motor action system. Similar to 
investigating changes in the brain by way of neurophysiological methods, it seems 
crucial to examine changes in the mind by way of cognitive methods. Moreover, 
combining behavioral, neuroscientific and cognitive approaches, thereby examining 
changes in overt performance and in underlying neural and cognitive representations 
may strongly contribute to draw a thorough picture of changes within the motor action 
system during mental and physical practice. 
Taken together, the aim of the present work was to take one step forward in 
advancing our understanding of learning a complex action by mental and physical 
practice. Specifically, the present work shed further light on motor learning in general 
and mental practice in particular from a perceptual-cognitive, representation-based 
perspective. By approaching the motor action system as one entity of various levels of 
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action organization, thereby focusing on perceptual-cognitive adaptations, and on the 
development of mental representation in particular, the present work provided some 
empirical support for and a better understanding of motor learning and the influence of 
mental and physical practice on the motor action system from within. 
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